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Abstract
This thesis contributes to the body o f research known as the new economic 
geography. According to this paradigm, increasing returns to scale at the firm level, 
monopolistic competition, and transportation costs interact in shaping the spatial 
distribution o f economic activity.
The introductory chapter lays out the motivation of this thesis and puts it into the 
perspective o f the existing literature.
Chapter 1 introduces a typical model of new economic geography: the nature of 
the agglomeration and dispersion forces it displays is recurrent in this body of research; 
the model also displays multiple equilibria. The welfare properties of these equilibria 
are also analysed.
Chapter 2 completely characterizes the set o f equilibria o f a wide range of 
models that are the quintessence o f the new economic geography paradigm. The model 
of chapter 2 is shown to share the qualitative features of these models.
Chapter 3 integrates a simple version of the model chapter 2 within a political 
economy framework. The welfare analysis of chapter 2 provides the motivation for this 
theoretical exercise. Chapter 4 seeks to provide an answer to the important but thus far 
neglected question of what is the mechanism that actually determines the magnitude 
policies that seek to affect the equilibrium spatial allocation o f industries. The 
geography model is integrated in a fully specified political economy process of policy 
selection.
Chapter 4 extends the model o f chapter 2 to deal with the issue of the 
'fragmentation' of the production process when new economic geography forces are at 
play.
Finally, the analysis o f chapter 5 contributes to the growing literature on the 
labour market imperfections as a driving force for agglomeration. In particular it shows 
how the hold-up problem can be softened or worsened by the cluster of industries using 
workers with similar skills.
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M o t iv a t io n  a n d  l it e r a t u r e  r e v ie w
This thesis contributes to the theoretical literature on spatial economics, also 
known as economic geography. This strand of the economic literature addresses the 
specific questions of why economic activities take place in a discrete number of well- 
defined places and how space does affect competition and various economics activities. 
Within this area of the economic theory, the so-called 'New Economic Geography' 
(NEG) paradigm concentrates on the interaction among increasing returns at the firm 
level, monopolistic competition, and transportation costs or the state of infrastructures. 
The principle here is that consumers' taste for variety, intermediate inputs 
differentiation, or both, result in agglomeration economies. These arise as the result of 
pecuniary externalities. The importance Of increasing returns can hardly been 
overstated: with non-increasing returns the existence of transportation costs results in 
'backyard capitalism'.
The resulting trade-off between transportation costs and increasing returns gives 
rise to a cumulative process typical in models of monopolistic competition. In a spatial 
setting, this cumulative process results in the cluster of economic activities in a few 
locations. The scope of these clusters can vary from the urban level, in which case these 
clusters are called cities, to the broadest, international level. In an international 
framework, the existence of a limited amount of these clusters draws a line between 
developed and developing countries, with the former specialised in production 
processes characterized by large economies of scale and the latter being specialised in 
more traditional, less sophisticated industries. The issues raised in this thesis are 
regional in scope; hence these clusters should be understood as industrial clusters.
What do we leam from those models we did not know from neoclassical of 
international and interregional trade? Quite a lot, as it turns out. The neoclassical trade 
theory teaches us that the conjunction of constant returns to scale and free trade or free 
factor mobility (or a mix of both) leads to the convergence of income. This is the 
famous factor price equalisation theorem. In sharp contrast the NEG aims to explain 
how the product mix of seemingly similar regions diverges endogenously as the result 
of the aforementioned cumulative process. Moreover, a dynamic interpretation of these 
models can account, firstly, for lock-in phenomena, i.e. when initial conditions 
determine the current outcome beyond and above comparative advantage. Secondly
these models can account for the possibility of self-fulfilling expectations and, finally, 
for the catastrophic changes in the spatial configuration following minor changes in the 
environment.
This thesis is entitled New economic geography: Multiple equilibria, welfare, 
and political economy. As the title suggests, the main contribution of the present work 
is threefold.
Firstly one may wonder whether agglomeration is optimal and one may want to 
identify those who gain and those who lose out from agglomeration. The first point is 
about the efficiency of the ffee-market outcome, the latter about the equity of this 
outcome. Chapter 1 tackles both of these issues in a typical NEG framework.
Secondly this work aims at completing the characterisation of the backbone 
models of the NEG paradigm. The idea here is to fill a theoretical gap. Despite the 
simplicity of their framework, NEG models are extraordinary troublesome to 
manipulate. In particular one must rely on numerical simulations to infer their 
equilibrium properties. The seminal 'Core-Periphery' model by Krugman (1991a,b) is a 
case in point. Numerical simulations of this model show three facts:
1. There are no more than five steady-states (and no more than three 
interior steady-states). In other words, this model displays multiple 
equilibria;
2. Among them the symmetric steady-state (in which industry is uniformly 
spread across regions) always exists, but is not always stable;
3. When they exist, both asymmetric interior steady states are always 
unstable.
At this level of generality it is sufficient to point to the fact that these features form a 
regular pattern in this paradigm. And yet, more than ten years on no algebraic proof to 
points 1 and 3 has been put forward. The search of an analytical proof for the remaining 
points represents a formidable task. In fact most of the third chapter o f this thesis is 
devoted to it. Additionally the analysis in Chapter 2 shows why these facts are regular 
across widely different models: it turns out that most of these can be written in a more 
natural state space in which they are all isomorphic. As a corollary, the proof of the 
three points above is valid for a whole family of models.
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The third contribution of this thesis is perhaps the most innovative in this study. 
It integrates a simple model of economic geography within a political economy 
framework. The motivation for this exercise starts with the observation that the spatial 
allocation of industry is an important determinant to the welfare of different groups of 
people, as Chapter 1 points out. Several contributions show how different policy 
instruments affect the spatial distribution of industries. But an important question has 
been put aside in the literature thus far: 'What is the mechanism that actually determines 
the magnitude of infrastructure spending or of the production subsidy?' Chapter 3 seeks 
to provide an answer in an economic geography model, which it extends to include a 
fully specified political economy process of policy selection (a probabilistic voting 
model to be precise).
The final two chapters of this thesis deal not with core analytical questions, but 
instead with extensions of geography models. Chapter 4 deals with the issue of the 
'fragmentation' of the production process when NEG forces are at play. The idea here is 
that the presence of decreasing returns in the background sector implies that wages are 
higher in more industrialised nations, which squares well with empirical evidence. In 
such a context, firms trade off the benefits of agglomeration economies associated with 
locating in the more industrialised nation with the low wages of the less developed 
country. It is assumed that low communication costs allow firms to outsource some of 
the routinised tasks to the less industrialised nation. This attenuates one of the 
dispersion forces and, as a result, sustains the viability of the industrialised base. This 
has an ambiguous effect on each nation's workers' welfare, as we shall see.
The last contribution of this thesis is the topic of Chapter 5. The analysis therein 
goes beyond the NEG and contributes to the growing literature on the labour market 
imperfections as a driving force for agglomeration. In particular it shows how the hold­
up problem can be softened or worsened by the cluster of industries. The main message 
of this chapter is thus that agglomeration and labour market pooling (or absence thereof) 
emerges as the outcome of the interaction between market power (or lack of), the non­
verifiability of some investment, and the specificity of this investment to the 
relationship -which itself depends upon the location decision of various agents. The 
mechanisms it emphasizes and the empirical predictions that can be derived from it set 
the theoretical model of Chapter 5 apart from the NEG, which it seeks to complement.
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This finishes my discussion of the aims and scope of the thesis. I will now 
review the relevant literature in more depth. I start by briefly reviewing the literature 
that is relevant to the whole context of this work. Then I review contributions more 
specifically related to each chapter, explaining in turn how each of them contributes to 
the literature. References that are more specific to a given chapter's idiosyncrasies are 
referred to in the introductory section of the chapter itself.
General literature review
Before briefly reviewing some of the major contributions within the NEG 
proper, it is useful to step back a little and in following Fujita and Thisse (1996) to 
distinguish between the different expressions of the agglomeration phenomenon. At the 
smallest scale, restaurants, cinemas, and small shops cluster in a few neighbourhoods 
within a city. All of these restaurants, shops, etc. provide almost identical services. As 
an example consider the catering industry in London: there are an uncountable number 
of East-Asian restaurants in Soho and there are just as many Bengali and Bangladeshi 
restaurants in Brick Lane. Why do providers of such homogenous products cluster in 
the same neighbourhood -o r on the same street even in the latter example?
Up one level, we may wonder why industrial districts exist. Presumably, at the 
regional level, it is hard to imagine that the UK motor industry is spread along the 
Thames Valley on the grounds of Ricardian or Heckser-Ohlin-Vanek comparative 
advantage. At the international level the North-South divergent development patterns 
also reflect a Core-Periphery structure, with the rich North being the industrialised core 
and the poor South being left behind in the periphery.
One can also distinguish among different agglomeration mechanisms. At the 
regional level, for instance, industrial clusters can take different forms as e.g. Duranton 
and Overman (2002) insist. As an illustration, they stress the difference in scale between 
the cutlery industry in Sheffield and the motor industry along the Thames. The former is 
localised in one area of Sheffield whereas the latter is spread over more than 100 km. 
This distinction has long been recognised, for more than a century ago Marshall (1890) 
identified three sources of agglomeration economies.
The first of these 'Marshallian externalities', as they are often referred to in the 
literature, is the knowledge spillovers. This is a technological externality that arises via 
face-to-face interactions. This is probably most relevant at the product development
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stage (Fujita and Thisse 1996, p. 345, Saxenian 1994). Berliant, Reed and Wang (2000) 
formalize the interaction between knowledge spillovers and concentration of economic 
activities.1
The second of these externalities regards the localised economies of a thick 
labour market. In the words of Marshall:
A localized industry gains a great advantage from the fact that it offers a 
constant market for skills. (...) (Employers) are likely to find a good 
choice of workers with the special skill which they require; while men 
seeking employment naturally go to places where there are many 
employers who need such skills as theirs (...). (Marshall, 1920, p. 225)
I shall return to this when discussing the analysis of Chapter 5.
Finally the last type of Marshallian externalities expresses itself as the forward 
and backward linkages associated with large markets (Fujita, Krugman, and Venables 
1999, p. 5). This type of pecuniary externalities in particular stresses the fundamental 
importance of increasing returns for agglomeration phenomena. With non-increasing 
returns the distribution of factor endowments and technology alone determine the 
production patterns. By contrast the production scale has no importance: product 
specialisation patterns are determined but backyard capitalism prevails. Moreover, when 
factors are mobile the neoclassical theory cannot account for why cities of the scale 
observed come to existence.
To be sure von Thiinen's (1826) concept of bid rents seeks to explain the 
distribution of agricultural production around cities without relying on indivisibilities. 
However it takes the existence of the city as given. As far back as 1940 Losch (1940) 
believed that scale economies are important for understanding the spatial configuration 
of the economy and built a model of monopolistic competition.
The NEG literature to which all but one chapter of thesis belongs falls into the 
third Marshallian category.2 The standard in the NEG literature is articulated around the 
Core-Periphery model introduced by Krugman (1991a,b) and similar models that build
1 See also the discussion o f Combes and Duranton (2001) in the section devoted to Chapter 5.
2 The NEG's relation to the urban and regional literature is discussed in greater detail and certainly with 
more accuracy by Fujita and Thisse (1996, 2002).
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Other studies then ask 'What are the determinants of agglomeration?' If vertical 
linkages between firms seem to be empirically relevant, the winning prize goes to the 
labour-pooling argument (Dumais, Ellison and Glaeser 2002, Rosenthal and Strange 
2001). In other words, industries that use the same type of skilled workers seem to co­
locate most. This suggests that agglomeration may be functional rather than sectoral, to 
paraphrase Duranton and Puga (2001).
Finally, various papers by Davis and Weinstein (1996, 1999) aim to detangle the 
causes of country specialisation. In particular, using data on Japanese prefectures (Davis 
and Weinstein 1999) and data on OECD countries (Davis and Weinstein 1996), they 
suggest that NEG determinants might be important at the regional level but that 
traditional Heckser-Ohlin-Vanek comparative advantages drives international 
specialisation. See also Midlefart-Knarvik, Overman and Venables (2001) for a similar 
approach using cross EU-country sectoral data.
Chapter 1
The purpose of Chapter 1 is threefold. First of all it introduces the notation as 
well as the model that will act as the workhorse to subsequent chapters. I also discuss 
the nature and operation of the agglomeration forces that play a central role in the NEG 
literature, namely the backward and forward linkages. Lastly I address the issues of 
equity and efficiency of the ffee-market equilibrium: the analysis identifies the losers 
and gainers of agglomeration and the nature of the externalities whose existence makes 
agglomeration genetically sub-optimal; some of this analysis borrows freely from 
Baldwin et al. (2002).
The model this chapter introduces is a NEG model in which agglomeration 
stems from the interaction between increasing returns at the firm level, transportation 
costs, output-input linkages among firms (also called vertical linkages), and perfect 
capital mobility across all space. The original models based on vertical linkages are due 
to Faini (1984), Venables (1994, 1996a), and Krugman and Venables (1995). 
Applications to industrial development include Venables (1996b) and Puga and 
Venables (1996); applications to trade policy and preferential trade agreements include 
Puga and Venables (1996, 1997) and Baldwin et al. (2002).
Let me to compare the model I propose in Chapter 1 to the simplest form of the 
original model -taken from Section 14.2 in FKV- and call it the CPVL model (for
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Core-Periphery and Vertical Linkages).6 The CPVL model allows for two regions, two 
sectors, and one primary factor of production (labour).7 Both regions are endowed with 
the same technology and labour force. The background sector produces a homogenous 
good under constant returns in a perfectly competitive environment using labour only; 
its output is freely traded. Restricting parameter values so that this sector is active in 
each region or country at any equilibrium ensures that labour wage is equalized across
o
space and sectors. By this token, the supply of labour to the sector of interest, which is 
called ’manufacturing', is perfectly elastic. The manufacturing sector produces different 
varieties of a horizontally differentiated product using both labour and intermediates 
under increasing returns. Its output is both consumed by final consumers and used as 
intermediate inputs by other manufacturing firms. This way firms are said to be 
vertically linked with each other.
Because there are increasing returns at the firm level the environment in which 
firms produce is necessarily imperfectly competitive. Indeed each firm is a monopolist 
in its own variety and hence it prices its output with a mark-up. Free-entry and exit 
ensures that no pure profit are made at equilibrium. Increasing returns have another 
implication: the number of firms that can be supported at equilibrium is finite but 
possibly uncountable. This way, market size matters: a larger market can accommodate 
a larger number of firms. Since both consumers (who value variety) and producers (who 
value input diversity) benefit from this, a larger market will be associated, ceteris 
paribus, with a higher degree of consumer utility and larger profits. This is the nature of 
the agglomeration force. Essentially it exploits in a spatial setting the kind of circularity 
causality recurrent in models of monopolistic competition (Matsuyama, 1995).
In the CPVL, workers are perfectly mobile on an intersectoral basis whilst 
perfectly immobile on an interregional one. In other words, workers can move freely 
from the background sector to the manufacturing sector within each region, but they 
cannot migrate from one region to another. To see how this might trigger regional 
disparities consider the following thought experiment. Imagine that nominal wages are 
equalized within each region and that initially both regions are perfectly symmetric. 
Consider the effect of moving one worker from the background to the manufacturing
6 This terminology and the likes to follow are borrowed from Baldwin, Forslid, Martin, Ottaviano and 
Robert-Nicoud (2002).
7 Models in which space is continuous are more involved. See e.g. Chapters 6 and 17 o f FKV.
8 The assumption that trade in the homogenous good is free is one o f  convenience (FKV, Chapter 7). 
However, see Davis (1998) for a divergent opinion.
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sector in a single region only. In the background sector this worker is paid her marginal 
product. In the manufacturing sector this supplementary worker will generate a product 
that is priced above the cost of her labour. This is a pecuniary externality for the worker 
does not take it into account when she decides to join the manufacturing force as she 
simply compares the nominal wages.
Furthermore, this expansion of output must be accompanied by an increase in 
demand for intermediates since these factors are complementary. The existence of 
transportation costs implies that this supplementary demand is biased towards local 
inputs, which in turn raises the profitability of local firms relative to foreign ones (by 
mark-up pricing again). This increase in profitability is matched by the entry of new 
firms (more of them in the local market), which also hire workers from the background 
sector, so the cycle repeats. This is the essence of the demand (or backward) linkage.
When a new firm starts producing in a region, it also offers a new variety of 
intermediates that by the prevalence of transportation costs, decreases the production 
cost of local firms relative to foreign firms. This increases the profitability of the former 
relative to the latter, so net entry of new firms takes place in the local market, so the 
cycle repeats. This is the essence of the cost (or forward) linkage.
The discussion of these linkages points to the obvious fact that strictly positive 
transportation costs are essential for this home-bias to exist and trigger agglomeration 
forces. When transportation costs are nil, location is irrelevant.
If the forward and backward linkages were left by themselves, all firms would 
cluster in a single location so as to take full advantage of these agglomeration 
economies. In the standard model, there is only one centrifugal, or dispersion force to 
oppose these centripetal forces: the market crowding effect (in the terminology of 
Baldwin et al. 2002). In a monopolistically competitive environment, there can be no 
pro-competitive effect. However when entry occurs the market share of all existing 
firms shrink and since markets are segmented by transportation costs, they do so 
disproportionably for the firms located in the market in which entry occurs.
To sum up, if one extra worker joins the manufacturing workforce this may or 
may not trigger a snowball effect that takes the form of a 'catastrophic agglomeration'
(in the jargon), depending on whether the linkages are stronger or weaker than the 
market crowding effect.
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Consequently agglomeration will or will not take place as the result of the 
tension between centrifugal and centripetal forces. The value of the parameters of the 
model is crucial, and traditionally the NEG has focused its attention on one of them: 
transportation costs. In the standard models like the CPVL model, agglomeration is the 
outcome when transportation costs are low whereas dispersion forces prevail when 
transportation costs are high. It is clear that different assumptions may lead to different 
conclusions. In Helpman's (1995) model, for instance, the conclusion as far as 
transportation costs of the manufactures are concerned is the exact opposite.
Table 1. Three classes of Economic geography models
No Aggl. Forces Vertical Linkages Factor Migration Factor Accumulation
Fixed firm size Krugman (1980) CPVL CP
Specific factor FC FCVL FE CC
In the model I propose in Chapter 1, firms also by buy each other's output and 
use this as intermediates, alongside labour they can poach at a constant wage from the 
background sector. There are two differences between the model therein and the CPVL 
model. In the latter there is only one primary factor of production, labour, which is 
spatially immobile. Hence the agglomeration rents accrue to the workers and it is this, 
which drives them in or out the background sector out of equilibrium. By contrast, there 
are two primary factors in the model of Chapter 1: capital and labour. As before, the 
background sector uses only labour. In the manufacturing sector, labour is used 
alongside intermediates as a variable input; capital is specific to the manufacturing 
sector and hence captures the agglomeration rents. Capital is also mobile across regions 
-but capital owners are not. Hence capital moves in search for the highest nominal 
return. Capital being mobile and specific to the manufacturing sector, agglomeration 
rents induce capital to move from one region to another. In short, interregional capital 
mobility plays the same role here as intersectoral labour mobility in the CPVL model. 
Despite this important conceptual difference, the dynamic properties of both models are 
strikingly similar. These two models arguably illustrate different empirical situations, 
but when it comes to theoretical applications the model o f Chapter 1 is more 
parsimonious and hence is much easier to manipulate. It has the additional advantage of
being the natural extension of the 'Footloose Capital' trade model by Flam and Helpman 
(1987), which it encompasses. For this reason I dub it as the FCVL model (for 
Footloose Capital and Vertical Linkages).
Table 1 classifies various NEG models according to their agglomeration 
mechanism and the functional form they assume. In the first column are the original 
models on which the NEG models of columns 2, 3 and 4 are built. Neither the model of 
Krugman (1980) nor the FC model of Flam and Helpman (1987) display any self- 
enforcing agglomeration force by themselves. This is achieved by the addition of 
vertical linkages among firms (like the CPVL and FCVL models of the second column), 
factor migration (like the CP and FE models of the third column), of the endogenous 
accumulation of factors (like the CC model of the last column).
The second column of Table 1 summarizes the earlier discussion. The CPVL 
model is the original model of agglomeration as driven by vertical, or input-output, 
linkages. The functional form here assumes that the fixed and variable components of 
total cost for the typical manufacture use factors in the same intensity, like in Krugman 
(1980). As a result of free entry, the equilibrium firm size is function of the parameters 
only; the adjustment variable is the number of firms. The FCVL model, by contrast, is a 
specific factor model: the fixed cost is made of capital, whereas the variable cost is as in 
the CPVL model. As a result, the number of firms is fixed by initial endowments; the 
adjustment variable is the size of firms.
The interaction between vertical linkages, factor mobility, and other factors is 
not the only possible mechanism that can give rise to agglomeration, as can be inferred 
from Table 1 .1 turn to these next.
Chapter 2
Before turning to the purpose of Chapter 2, some additional background is 
necessary.
This body of research has also identified other sources to forward and backward 
linkages. I am here surveying two of them: embodied factor migration and endogenous 
factor accumulation.
Start with the models in which agglomeration is driven by factor migration 
alongside the usual suspects (monopolistic competition and transportation costs). These 
are the topic of the second column of Table 1. The Core-Periphery model by Krugman
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(1991 a,b) -a  more complete version of which can be found in Chapter 14 of FKV- is 
the backbone o f the NEG literature.9 It assumes two ex-ante identical regions, each 
initially endowed with equal numbers of unskilled and skilled workers. Each factor is 
specific to the background and manufacturing sectors, respectively. Like in the CPVL 
model, the background sector is Walrasian and the manufacturing sector is 
monopolistically competitive. Skilled workers are mobile between regions (unskilled 
workers are not) and move according to current real wage differences.
As in the CPVL model there is room for circular causation in the form of 
backward and forward linkages. A simple way to identify these linkages in the CP 
model is to point at the similarities with the CPVL model.
To begin with consider the forward (or cost) linkage. In the CPVL model, 
workers 'migrate' from one sector to another so as to equalise nominal wages. When 
workers join the manufacturing sector, they resemble the firm's owner, for pure profits 
are eliminated and wages capture all the rents. Hence, when making their occupational 
choice, workers will compare the costs that are prevailing in the manufacturing sector 
with those in the background sector, among other things. Since there are vertical 
linkages in the former, the manufacturing costs are a function of the location 
equilibrium. Usually then, manufacturing costs differ in the two regions. In the CP 
model there are no vertical linkages, but interregional migration plays exactly the same 
role. The cost dependant on the location pattern is no longer a production cost, but a 
cost-of-living: in the CP model, manufacturing workers have to make a location choice 
only which they base on the real wages currently prevailing in each region. Therefore, 
as such a worker immigrates into a region and contributes to the local manufacturing 
production process; this decreases the cost-of-living in the destination location and 
increases it in her region of origin. Again, this arises because transportation costs are 
strictly positive.
In the CPVL model, the backward (or demand) linkage stems from the fact that 
firms use each other's output as intermediate. In the CP model, the backward (or 
demand) linkage stems from the fact that skilled workers are also consumers. 
Consequently when such a worker moves from one region to another, this increases the
9 See also the excellent and critical survey by Neary (2001). Baldwin et al. (2001, 2002) provide the most 
comprehensive analysis o f the model.
19
relative profitability of the firms in the latter. Again, this home-market bias holds 
because transportation costs are strictly positive.
In the CP model, too, if the forward and backward linkages were left by 
themselves all firms would always cluster in a single region. Moreover there exists a 
dispersion force alongside these agglomeration forces. Like in the CPVL model some 
demand emanates from both regions in any configuration. Indeed the workers in the 
background sector are immobile. The usual market crowding effect applies: the more 
firms co-locate, the lower is market share on the domestic market to each of them.
When this market is large enough and/or transportation costs are low enough, this does 
not restrain the marginal firm to locate there. If this were not the case, then it would 
rather go for a large market share in a small market. This trade-off illustrates the tension 
that exists between agglomeration and dispersion forces.
As I already mentioned, the Core-Periphery model by Krugman (1991a,b) is the 
backbone of the NEG literature. Regrettably the CP model is astoundingly difficult to 
work with analytically. None of the interesting endogenous variables can be expressed 
as explicit functions of the variables that the model tells us are important -trade costs, 
scale economies, market size, etc. Indeed, the CP model does not even provide a closed- 
form solution for the principal focus of the whole literature -  the spatial distribution of 
industry. This has forced researchers to illustrate general points with a gallery of 
numerical examples. While the resulting outcome points to some consistent results, it is 
less than fully satisfactory from a theorist’s perspective; one simply cannot be certain 
these regularities give a comprehensive description of the results generated by the 
model.
As Forslid (1999), Ottaviano (2001), and Forslid and Ottaviano (2001) have 
shown, a large shrunk of the intractability of the Core-Periphery model is due to the 
specific functional form Krugman is using. To put it simply, they propose to work with 
a functional form similar to the one I use in the FCVL model instead. In particular both 
sectors use labour as the variable input with capital specific to the manufacturing sector. 
In Forslid and Ottaviano's model, capital is embodied and as a result is best interpreted 
as human capital. Like the manufacturing workers in the CP model, human capital 
owners, or entrepreneurs, migrate in search for the highest real wage. For this reason, 
call this model the 'Footloose Entrepreneur' (or FE) model. The cost of living in the FE 
model replaces the vertical linkages of the FCVL model as the forward linkage. The
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backward linkage in both the CP and FE models are identical. The market crowding 
effect needs not be detailed for it is identical in all models surveyed thus far.
As it turns out the FE and CP models are isomorphic. In particular their dynamic 
behaviour is the same. Since the FE is much easier to work with, it makes it more 
amenable to use in applications and extensions.
Finally in the class of models of the third column of Table 1, the agglomeration 
forces stem from the accumulation of factors. The pioneering model in that tradition is 
Baldwin's (1999) 'Constructed Capital' model.10 Baldwin (1999) works with the specific 
capital functional form. Capital is not exogenously given, as in the FE and FCVL 
models but produced by a Walrasian investment sector using labour only. Investors are 
forward looking. There are no vertical linkages and no footloose factor. Agglomeration 
forces stem purely from the fact Capital is assumed to be immobile allowing the returns 
on capital to diverge across regions. If for some reason capital accumulates faster in a 
region, income and demand increase faster there, too. Via the usual home-market bias 
local firms benefit more that foreign ones, which stimulates further entry in the form of 
investment and capital accumulation, so the cycle repeats. This is a demand linkage. 
There is no cost linkage in this model. As a consequence of this it is much more 
amenable -so much so the model is completely solvable analytically. The market 
crowding effect is the same as in the other models.
Before proceeding further, I note as an aside that the grids of Table 1 are not 
hermetic: it is perfectly possible to imagine a model combining two or more of the 
agglomeration forces. In fact, with a European context in mind, this is exactly what 
Puga (1999) does with the CP and CPVL models to study the impact of labour mobility 
(or absence of) on regional divergence. Faini (1984), whose work it is fair to say 
considering the excitement that followed the publication of Krugman (1991a,b) was 
overshadowed at the time it came out, proposes a model of capital accumulation in 
which the production of a Walrasian final good uses capital, labour, and non-traded 
intermediate inputs. In this sense it merges the last two columns of Table 1 for yet 
another functional form (not shown). The purpose of Chapter 2 is twofold. First, it
10 Applications and extensions involve endogenous growth models. See Baldwin and Forslid (2000), 
Baldwin, Martin and Ottaviano (2001), and Martin and Ottaviano (1999, 2001). The engine of 
endogenous long run growth stems from spillovers in R&D, possibly due to the non-rivalry in knowledge 
(Romer 1990). If spillovers are localised, then innovation will take place in any region that takes the lead, 
as in Englman and Walz (1995).
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claims that all the models listed in Table 1 are isomorphic (with some qualification for 
the CPVL model) in a sense that I shall make precise below.
Moreover, it completes the analytical analysis of the CP model -and so confirms 
that the gallery issued by numerical simulations is complete. To sustain the first claim I 
show in this chapter that a judicious choice for the state variable and judicious 
collections of the structural parameters render these models identical (or almost so in 
the case of the CPVL model).
Then I use this fact to prove that all the models share the same dynamic features. 
In this way I complete the characterization of the CP model by simply conveying this 
exercise for the FE model, which is much simpler to work with. In doing so this chapter 
contributes to an eleven-year old body of the literature that assigned itself the task of 
completing the analytical study of the CP model.
In his canonical paper, Krugman (1991b) took the simple Dixit-Stiglitz 
monopolistic competition trade model with trade costs and added labour migration 
driven by real wage differences. Using simplifying assumptions, leaving the dynamics 
of the model in the background, and relying on numerical simulations, Krugman 
showed how this model behaved in a radically different way as compared to the trade 
model.
Further contributions to our understanding of the model include Puga (1999), 
who linearized the model around its symmetric steady state, and this way provided an 
analytical solution to an important parameter of the model, the T>reak point'. Baldwin 
(2001) used formal tests to assess the global stability properties of the steady states of 
the model and introduced forward-looking expectations (together with migration costs) 
on the migrants' side. This exercise showed that most properties of the original model 
remain true in a more formal and orthodox setting. Interestingly, when migration costs 
are low, 'history versus expectations' issues of the type first described in Matsuyama 
(1991) arise.11 Ottaviano (2001) conveys the same type of exercise in the FE setting.12 
Neither Puga (1999) nor Baldwin (2001) provides an analytical proof for the fact that
11 However, Karp (2000) shows that the equilibrium indeterminacy vanishes under certain conditions 
when agents have 'almost common knowledge' (in the sense o f Rubinstein 1989) about economic 
fundamentals rather than common knowledge.
12 See also Krugman (1991c) and Matsuyama and Takahasi (1998) on this issue in a related model. The 
latter authors conduct welfare analysis and show how the coordination failures between migration 
decisions o f  individuals and entry decisions o f firms typically result in inefficiencies at the long run 
equilibrium location.
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there are generically three interior and two comer steady states. This chapter closes this
gap-
Other related contributions include Herrendorf, Valentinyi, and Waldman 
(2000), Tabuchi and Thisse (2001), and Ottaviano, Tabuchi, Thisse (2002). The latter 
paper proposes yet another functional form for migration-driven models o f 
agglomeration (and hence fills a virtual additional cell to column of Table 1 labelled 
'Factor Migration'). Their work adopts a quasi-linear quadratic utility function and in 
doing so avoids some of the unappealing implications of the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic 
competition and iceberg trade costs. In particular firm prices change as location changes 
allowing for real competition effects. Moreover this model too is analytically solvable. 
The remaining papers reconsider the 'bang-bang' properties of the model. Tabuchi and 
Thisse (2001) show that this property is due to the assumption that potential migrants 
are homogenous. Taste heterogeneity adds a dispersion force into the model that 
smoothes the location equilibrium: the correspondence that maps transportation costs 
into the location equilibrium becomes continuous. Herrendorf, Valentinyi, and 
Waldman (2000) convey the same exercise in Matsuyama's (1991) setting in which 
scale economies are external to the individual agents.
Chapter 3
The topic of Chapter 3 is probably the most innovative of this thesis.
The de-location process associated with trade integration has been a major 
concern for European policy makers for decades. It is reflected, for instance, in the 
quadrupling of cohesion spending as a share of the EU budget since 1986, and in the 
important level of spending by member states on their disadvantaged regions such 
Germany's Eastern Lander and Italy's Mezzogiomo. Much of this spending is explicitly 
aimed at preventing, delaying or even reversing the agglomeration of economic activity 
in favoured regions.
Using the FC model introduced in Chapter 1, the aim of the present chapter is to 
address the issue of agglomeration during a process of regional integration in a 
framework where regional policy is determined by political economy forces. More 
precisely, taking a laissez-faire equilibrium as a benchmark, the analysis show how 
politics and economic integration interact in both directions to speed up or slow down 
the agglomeration process that results from integration.
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With few exceptions, the economic geography literature has not considered 
policy issues since it is concerned mainly with the positive analysis of exogenously 
rising levels of openness. When it has, instruments of regional policy were either taken 
as exogenous (Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud 2000, Martin 1999, Martin and Rogers 
1995, Ottaviano and Thisse 2002), or addressed the specific issue of inter-regional tax 
competition (Andersson and Forslid 1999, Baldwin and Krugman 2001, Kind, 
Midelfart-Knarvick and Schjelderup 2000, Ludema and Wooton 2000). Likewise, 
Persson and Tabellini (1992) consider a model where two policy makers, each from a 
different region or country, compete for the mobile factor (capital) by setting t^xes. 
They consider how equilibrium redistributive policies are affected by economic 
integration in a more classical environment (i.e. they focus on public good provision in 
populations with heterogeneous factor ownerships rather than on economic geography 
issues). By contrast, this chapter assumes that both regions belong to a single, 
centralised constituency and focus exclusively on the interaction between spatial 
redistribution politics and geography in a framework of electoral competition.
In a related context, Rauch (1993) assesses the role of the developers of 
industrial parks in coordinating location decisions by individual firms. Firms are 
initially agglomerated in a location that no longer has the comparative advantage (the 
nature of agglomeration forces is left unspecified). Under some conditions, there is a 
first-mover disadvantage and as a consequence firms fail to coordinate and are stuck in 
the 'wrong' location (that is, history matters). In this context, Rauch shows that 'land 
developers' (see e.g. Henderson 1985) can circumvent this coordination problem by 
subsidising the first firms to move, while charging a positive price to the land slots 
allocated to firms moving at a later stage. In this way, the land developer makes non­
negative profits and firms that move first are compensated for not taking advantage of 
the location economies that accrue to the initial location. Rauch also cities some 
evidence that supports his theory. In this chapter, the central government plays the role 
of the land developer, but its role is not to coordinate firm relocation (the model features 
a unique locational equilibrium, so there can be no coordination failure). Rather, 
political candidates seek a location equilibrium that maximizes their political support. 
Generically, the outcome is not the utilitarian optimum.
The paper by Cadot, Roller and Stephan (2001) provides empirical support for 
the idea that candidates will craft their policy platforms to please regions that have a lot 
of 'swing voters'. Using French panel data, these authors show that electoral concerns
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(as well as lobbying activities) are significant determinants to the spatial allocation of 
regional transportation infrastructure investments. In particular, they instrument for the 
proportion of swing voters in different regions and show this explanatory variable to be 
statistically highly significant. Since they take the location of industries as given, 
however, their study is not a direct test of the model of this chapter but it provides 
strong support to the political mechanism it is assuming.
The following chapter extends the FCVL model of Chapter 1.
Chapter 4
The purpose of Chapter 4 is to study the phenomenon of fragmentation of 
vertically integrated production processes from a NEG perspective. The term 
'fragmentation' refers to the breaking up of such processes into parts and components, 
which might then be internationally traded, in which case this qualifies as intra-product 
trade (Jones and Kierzkowski 1990). To take a specific example,
'Textiles and electronic products may be designed and marketed in Hong 
Kong, but they are largely produced in the Pearl River Delta.' (Arndt and 
Kierzkowski 2001, p. 1)
The neoclassical paradigm then predicts that each locations or countries produce 
components according to their comparative advantage. Before the breaking up of the 
process, the production of the vertically integrated process took place according to the 
average factor intensity of the end product. What permits this physical breaking up 
across national borderers is the reduction in coordination and communication costs of 
all sorts, from the convergence of legal systems to technological innovation in the 
telecommunication sector.
The model in Venables (1996a) is best suited to study the interaction between 
the location of the production of components and that of final goods in a NEG 
framework. This model is the initial version of the CPVL model in which the 
manufacturing sector is split into two distinct sub-sectors: the upstream sector, which 
produces intermediates, and the downstream sector, which uses them together with 
primary factors to manufacture different varieties of a final good. In this chapter, I want 
to go beyond this re-labelling exercise and study instead the fragmentation of the 
services to the firm.
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Indeed, a similar phenomenon can be observed in the case of services provided 
to the head of the production unit, also referred to as the 'front office'. Specifically this 
chapter looks at how reductions in communication costs -  together with variations in 
transportation costs -  affect the spatial distribution of economic activity. 
‘Communication costs’ are understood here as encompassing the cost of coordination 
and of conveying information between the head of the production unit and other 
workers. Unlike transportation costs proper, the object of the communication costs is 
immaterial.
Low communication costs allow a firm to physically separate different activities 
that used to be performed in a single location. The actual production of the final output 
is performed by the ‘front office’. ‘Back office’ tasks involve include data entry, data 
processing, and database management; financial and accounting services; processing 
assurance claims; and computer software development. Nowadays, the unbundling of 
back and front office production is widespread. I review some anecdotic evidence in the 
introductory section of Chapter 4.
In NEG models all forms of costs are collected into one parameter: the iceberg 
transportation costs. The aim of this chapter is to disentangle communication costs from 
trade and transportation costs and furthermore to assess how this framework conveys 
new insights to help understand the growing importance of these phenomena that have 
taken some importance recently -  primarily the growing importance of unbundled back 
office work.
The analysis of this chapter is related to earlier work as follows. In the paper by 
Gao (1999) headquarters are intermediate-inputs intensive whereas final production is 
labour intensive. In this chapter I make the opposite assumption. The intermediates to 
HQ's are specialised business services -for example lawyers, insurers, or banks. This is 
what Gao's (1999) model captures. On the other hand, this chapter analyses the 
fragmentation of routinised business services (e.g. call centres) in industries in which 
localisation economies are more important at the manufacturing stage. In this sense the 
two are complementary. Duranton and Puga (2001) allow for a multi-industry, multi­
city setting in which firms trade-off the benefits of becoming multi-location -benefits 
associated with the localisation economies in both business services and specific 
intermediates- with the managerial cost-saving associated with a spatially integrated 
firm.
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Harris (1995, 2001) argues that better transportation and communication 
technology together with the quasi non-rival nature of the latter is a major force driving 
the fragmentation of the production process. In his model operating global 
communication networks involve large scale economies; consequently, trade results 
from the specialization in component production to take advantage of these scale 
economies. In an essentially static, partial equilibrium framework Gersbach and 
Schmutzler (2000) study how local spillovers between plants and knowledge spillovers 
within multi-plant firms (a shorthand for communication costs) interact to generate 
agglomeration.13
Jones and Kierzkowski (1990, 2001) propose a general framework to consider 
fragmentation. Campa and Goldberg (1997) and Feenstra (1998) provide some indirect 
evidence for this phenomenon at the industry level for the UK and the US respectively. 
Helleiner (1981) reports that a growing part of international trade takes the form of 
intra-corporation trade, which also provides indirect support to the story.
In this chapter the model extends the FCVL model in two ways. First, following 
Krugman and Venables (1995) I assume that the labour supply to the manufacturing 
sector is no longer perfectly elastic. This adds a dispersion force that is not sensitive to 
variations in transportation costs. As a result agglomeration of industry in a unique 
location arises at intermediate levels of trade barriers only. This suggests the rather 
optimistic view according to which falling transportation costs might have created a 
North-South duality in the past, but that fostering 'globalisation' beyond the current 
standards will naturally reverse that trend. I reconsider this issue.
Second, I amend this scenario to allow for the possibility for firms to hire 
workers from abroad to carry on some back office task. In the model this possibility 
arises when communication costs are low, having the effect of integrating the labour 
market. As a result Northern firms may be increasingly able to outsource some back 
office jobs to Southern countries whilst retaining their Northern location for the 
processing of final goods so as to take advantage of the agglomeration economies 
associated with the cluster. In doing so two effects emerge. Firstly some good news for 
the poor country: the integration of the labour markets should bring a convergence in
13 Their model implicitly assumes that by definition o f the term 'spillovers' multi-plant firms do not 
internalise these flows. Since they play a central role in the analysis, this is somewhat unsatisfactory. 
Moreover, the model makes the rather strong assumption that knowledge 'spills over' to firms sharing the 
same location better than it would do from two plants o f the same firm located in two different locations.
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nominal incomes. However, the bad news is that the prospects for the South 
industrialising are postponed, and hence the poorest countries forego the agglomeration 
rents for an extended time (namely, trade costs would have to decrease further to re- 
industrialize the South). The net outcome of these two effects on people's welfare is 
unclear.
Chapter 5
Chapter 5 goes beyond the NEG and contributes to the growing literature on the 
externalities of the labour market as a cause for agglomeration. In particular, it shows 
how the hold-up problem can be softened or worsened by the cluster of industries 
employing workers with similar skills. The central tenet of this chapter is thus: 
agglomeration and labour market pooling (or absence of) emerges as the outcome of the 
interaction between market power (or lack of), the non-verifiability of some investment, 
and the specificity of this investment to the relationship -which itself depends upon the 
location decision of various agents. The assumption that investment is not verifiable by 
a third party is both reasonable in the context of human capital accumulation and 
important. If it were observable and verifiable, then it would be contractible. See e.g. 
Hart (1995) for a discussion of this issue.
The pooling of the labour market brings us back to the earlier quotation of 
Marshall (1890). The literature has put forth several motives for labour market pooling. 
In Krugman (1991a) firms facing idiosyncratic risks pool their labour force so as to 
reduce aggregate volatility of regional employment. In Combes and Duranton (2001) 
firms that co-locate benefit in drawing from a common pool of trained workers. It 
follows that firms can poach each other's workers, having two effects. Firstly when a 
worker moves from one firm to another brings with her the knowledge of the product of 
her former employer; this enhances the degree of competition in the goods market. In 
turn this reduces the firm's revenue (note that this effect is minimal in the case of 
functional agglomeration). Secondly the ability of poaching a competitor's workers 
enhances the degree of competition in the labour market, increasing wages and costs. 
Presuming that some knowledge is embodied in workers, the authors note that labour 
mobility across firms diffuses knowledge acquired in various workplaces. If workers
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tend to primarily consider jobs in the same geographical area as their current one, this 
provides a theoretical foundation for the diffusion of knowledge spillovers.14
In Hesley and Strange (1990), workers with heterogeneous skills and firms with 
heterogeneous skill requirements expect the quality of matches to improve with city size 
as in Kim (1990). This is because there are increasing returns to scale in production and 
because information regarding skills is private. Since all agents are mobile these 
agglomeration economies will ensure that a discrete number of cities exist at 
equilibrium. The dispersion force at work comes from the fact that land prices increase 
with city size. As is common in the urban literature cities are mono-centric by 
assumption. Hence as the size of the city increases, commuting costs increase for the 
additional workers joining the city, which in turn translates into high land rents near the 
'central business district'. The equilibrium number and size of cities are the result of the 
tension between the congestions costs and the agglomeration economies.
The theoretical setting of Chapter 5 is perhaps most closely related to 
Rotemberg and Saloner's (2000). They assume a simple environment in which two very 
different parties are co-dependent to produce a given good. One party has all market 
power; the other is to make a non-verifiable investment. Under these strong 
assumptions, they get a strong result: agglomeration takes place as it solves the hold-up 
problem.
The analysis of Chapter 5 will stress that a very specific conjunction of 
assumptions is needed for this result: agglomeration is the efficient spatial organization 
of production if the party that has to make important relation-specific investments faces 
a potential hold-up problem. Now, assume the contrary case in which the firm that has 
to make an unverifiable investment. In this situation the firm it does better by locating 
somewhere in the ‘periphery’ and forming a one-firm town so as to grab a larger share 
of the surplus generated at the production process. This, in turn gives it higher 
incentives to invest in the first place. Hence, in this specific example, agglomeration 
worsens the hold-up problem, turning Rotemberg and Saloner’s (2000) result upon its 
head. To sum up the respective identity of the party that exerts market power and of the 
one that makes an industry-specific investment is crucial. This suggests a potentially 
rich theory in which the relative importance of the investments of the parties involved,
14 The empirical paper by Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993) suggests that knowledge spillovers are 
local in scope.
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the specificity of this investment to their relationship, and their outside options all 
mater.
The question ‘does competition solve the hold-up problem?’ addressed in Felli 
and Roberts (2001) is clearly related to ours: agglomeration affects the hold-up problem 
in our setting via its effect on the degree of competition, as measured by the degree of 
market power. Felli and Roberts, however, assume away efficiency arising from market 
power (or absence thereof) and concentrate on inefficiencies arising from matching 
frictions. Accordingly their measure of degree of competition is different to ours (and is 
very specific to their setting). In their setting, heterogeneous firms compete a-la 
Bertrand for matches with heterogeneous workers once relation-specific investments 
have been made. The numbers of both firms and workers are finite with the number of 
workers being smaller than the number of firms; each party is matched with at most one 
agent and there is exogenous heterogeneity in quantitative abilities on both sides.
In the matching process they are assuming the party that is on the Tong’ side of 
the market (the workers) is the residual claimant o f the surplus generated by the match. 
Consequently when workers alone invest, they face the correct investment incentives 
and investment is efficient. If instead firms engage in investments before the Bertrand 
competition game starts, then they face a hold-up problem and under-invest as a result. 
However in this case aggregate inefficiency is bounded above by the inefficiency that 
would arise if the best firm matched with the best worker in isolation. This is a 
remarkable result, as this means that inefficiencies due to the hold-up problem do not 
cumulate in the presence of workers’ competition for the matches (Felli and Roberts 
2001). In other words, competition solves (a part of) the hold-up problem.
I
Other important and related papers are Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), Bolton 
and Whinston (1993), and Grossman and Helpman (2002). Acemoglu and Shimer 
(1999) consider which labour market institution could solve the hold-up problem that 
results from search frictions. In their model, firms alone make investments prior to 
matching with workers. With ex-post bargaining over the surplus firms’ investments are 1 
held up and hence firms under-invest in the first place. If instead firms were able to post 
wages and workers to direct their search towards different firms, then these authors 
show that the decentralized economy would achieve an efficient outcome under 
relatively mild conditions: even if the workers were able to observe any two wage offers 
at a time only, each firm in effect Bertrand-compete for workers, as long as the pair of
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firms is random. Firms that have acquired more capital are able to propose higher 
wages. They have the incentive to doing so because posting higher wages fills vacancies 
faster. So, investment (and entry) is constraint efficient. As the authors note, it is not 
sure that this remarkable result extends to more complex environments, e.g. one in 
which both sides engage in non-verifiable investments.
The other papers relate the boundaries of the firm with the hold-up problem, 
following the seminal papers by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). 
See also Hart (1995) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1989) for non-technical treatments.
A concluding chapter wraps up the results of the analysis of Chapters 1 to 5 
points to some questions related to the issues tackled in this thesis but left aside here. 
They constitute material for further research.
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Chapter 1. A SIMPLE MODEL OF 
AGGLOMERATION WITH VERTICAL 
LINKAGES AND PERFECT CAPITAL 
MOBILITY
1.1. Introduction
This chapter introduces the workhorse model that will be used in later chapters. 
It is a 'New Economic Geography' model that nests the 'Footloose Capital’ (or FC) 
model of Flam and Helpman (1987), to use Baldwin et al.'s (2002) terminology.15
The original model in the 'New Economic Geography' (or NEG) is Krugman's 
(1991) 'Core-Periphery' (or CP) model in which agglomeration relies on (skilled) labour 
migration. In an alternative class of models starting with Venables's (1996) paper 
agglomeration arises as the interaction between labour mobility between sectors within 
the same region and input-output (or vertical) linkages among firms (see the 
introductory chapter). Empirically vertical linkages are a stronger explanation of 
international agglomeration patterns than labour migration. Also, capital mobility is 
much more prevalent than labour migration. It is therefore useful to have a model in 
which capital mobility and vertical linkages together sustain agglomeration.
This can be achieved by extending the FC model to include intermediate inputs. 
The resulting model, call it the FCVL model, retains the same qualitative properties of 
Fujita, Krugman, and Venables' (1999, chapter 14.2) CPVL model, which greatly 
simplifies the original model by Venables (1996a).16
This chapter presents this model in great lengths. However, the characterization 
of its stability properties are left to Chapter 2 because this latter chapter is dedicated to 
the stability properties of NEG models in general -and not just the FCVL model.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The section below sets up 
the structure of the model. Section 1.3 discusses the agglomeration and dispersion
15 The FC model is strictly speaking a "New Trade' model. However, it can also be interpreted as 
geography model since it has a spatial dimension. See Martin and Rogers (1995).
16 'FCVL' stands for Footloose capital-vertical linkages and 'CPVL' stands for Core periphery-vertical- 
linkages.
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forces displayed in this model. Section 1.4 solves the equilibria for ex-ante symmetric 
regions. Section 1.5 introduces the FC model as a special case of the nesting model. 
Sections 1.6 to 1.8 conveys the welfare analysis. Section 1.9 concludes.
1.2. The basic model
The model developed in this section shares functional forms with Flam and 
Helpman's (1987) trade model and builds on Dixit and Stiglitz's (1977) framework of 
monopolistic competition. The novelty here is to add agglomeration forces a-la 
Venables (1996a). As I proceed, I make choices of units and of the numeraire that are 
standard in the NEG literature.
Tastes and produ ction
Consider a country consisting of two regions or countries, j= l,2  (in the 
applications of subsequent chapters, one interpretation or the other will be more 
appropriate; in this chapter, however, I use the two terms interchangeably). The typical 
individual is assumed to supply one unit of labour L (the reward of which is w) and k 
units of capital K (the reward of which is 7t) inelastically. There is a measure L of 
workers and a measure K of capital in this economy, so the typical worker owns k=K/L 
units of capital and, as a consequence, her income is w+k7i. Tastes for a typical 
individual in j take a Cobb-Douglas form in which j spends a share p o f her income yj 
on a composite good M (for 'manufacturing') and a share 1 -p on the homogenous good 
A (for 'agriculture', say). The composite good M comes in N different varieties. Tastes 
over the different varieties are captured by a CES, 'love-for-variety', functional form, 
with an elasticity of substitution cj between any pair of varieties. The dual of this, the 
indirect utility function o f region j's representative consumers, can therefore be written 
as:
where p(i) is the consumer price of variety i, Gj is the true CES price index over the N 
varieties of the manufacturing good, and pA is the price of good A (the reason pA and n 
are not indexed by j will become clear shortly). Each firm ie[0,N] produces a different 
variety, the buyer price of which is p(i); this brings us to production.
(1-1)
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Each producer enjoys monopoly power over his own variety. No producer has 
any incentive to produce a variety already being produced by another producer, for she 
would then directly compete for the market of that variety with the incumbent producer. 
As a result her profits be lower. Hence, N is also the number (mass) of firms operating 
in sector M.
The manufacturing sector M is the usual monopolistic competition sector a-la 
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). It produces a CES aggregate under increasing returns. 
Specifically, each firm needs a fixed amount ajcx of capital K to start producing and a 
constant amount (3 of a Cobb-Douglas composite input made out of labour (with share 
1-a) and intermediates produced by sector M itself (with share a) for each unit of 
output it produces. Mathematically, the cost function for the typical firm located in j is 
given by:
(1-2) CJ{xj ) = aKXnj + p x jW:aGaj - 0 < a < \
where Gj is the same CES price index as in (1-1), 7tj is the cost of one unit of K 
prevailing in j, and Xj is a typical firm output. Observe that the same Gj enters (1-2) and 
(1-1); this means that the elasticity of substitution among varieties of manufacture is the 
same for consumers and for firms. Qualitatively, this is an innocuous assumption, but 
this is required to keep the analysis manageable. See also Fujita et al. (1999, chapter 
14).
The background sector A produces a homogenous good under constant returns 
using labour only: the per-unit output labour requirement is aLA. A is assumed to be 
freely traded (hence pA is the same in both regions) and parameter values are chosen so 
that no region ever specializes in M (we make the 'no-specialisation' condition more 
precise below); further, we choose A as the numeraire. These imply aLAWj=pA=l, 
je  {1,2}. As a consequence, we can rewrite (1-1) as Vj=yJGj'Ji.
By contrast to A, interregional trade in M is subject to Samuelson-type iceberg 
transportation costs 7>1. That is, in order to sell one unit abroad a firm has to ship r 
units. The difference 7-1 melts in transit (hence the name). Monopolistic pricing yields 
the usual relation pj(l-l/a)=  /Swj’^Gj01 for the producer price of a typical firm in j. The 
term in the right-hand side is the marginal cost, and a  is the perceived elasticity of 
demand; this requires to impose a> l as a regularity condition. We choose units so that 
/3=l-l/a, hence pj=Gja. In Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition transportation costs
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are fully passed onto consumers so the producer price pj holds irrespective of the market 
served.
Would be entrepreneurs bid for units of capital. Free entry and exit in M ensures 
that these entrepreneurs make no profits, so the operating profits of a typical firm active 
in j just cover the capital reward 7Cji
(1-3) P j  =  G °
a
Normalize aicx to 1. By symmetry among all varieties and full-employment of capital 
this implies N=K. Furthermore, we normalise K to 1 and we define n as the share of N 
operating in j= l. Therefore, we can rewrite the price indices in (1-1) as
(1-4) A, =nA° +</>(}-n ) A “ ; 0 < Ay = <jJ° < 1, 0 < ^  = r ,_CT< l
and A2 is defined analogously. Note that the definitions of A] and A2 are implicit and 
simultaneous. The variable Gj and the primary parameter 7 usually come raised at the 
power 1-a, so it is more convenient to use Aj and <J) instead. The parameter (|) measures 
the degree of free-ness of inter-regional trade in manufactures M (it is zero when trade 
is prohibited and equals unity when trade is perfectly free). Like <]), Aj lies in the unit 
interval because ne[0 ,l] and a< l. (This claim is easily made by contradiction.)
E ndow m ents and factor m o b ility
Potentially, the two regions differ in size: region 1 is endowed with a share s of 
world labour and world capital stock alike; assume s> l/2  without loss of generality.17 
Labour is embodied and immobile; capital is disembodied and perfectly mobile in the
1 o
long run (consequently, n^s is possible). Both workers and capital owners are 
themselves immobile. We further assume that the capitalists own a perfectly diversified 
portfolio, namely, each of them own the same share of each firm.19 Hence, their 
portfolio return is 7r=n7i 1 +(1 -n)7t2. In the long run, capital is perfectly mobile, so
171 relax the assumption o f  identical relative endowments in section 1.5.
18 What 'long run' means in the context o f  this model will be made clear in Section 1.4.
19 More on this in footnote 21 below.
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7ii=7r2=7i must hold whenever there are some active firms in both countries.20 Also, 
remember that wi=W2=l holds by free trade in A and by the choice of numeraire.
All these imply that aggregate income Y in region 1, say, is equal to Yi=s(L+7i). 
Location 1 expenditure on M is given by Ei=pYi+ocnpi/3xi. The term pYi in the 
previous expression is the share of final demand (and, since there are no savings, 
income) spent on M; it follows from (1-1). The second term in the expression for Ei, 
anpi/3xi, is the share of intermediate demand spent on M that emanates from other 
manufacturing firms. It can be inferred from (1-2) using Shepard's lemma. By analogy, 
location 2 expenditure on M is given by E2=pY2+a(l-n)p 2/?X2 .
To close the model, note that the value of total output in sector M at producer 
prices must equal the value of global M-sector private expenditures, viz. npjXi+(l- 
n)p2X2=a/?[npiXi+(l-n)p2X2]+p[L+7c]. Making use of the pricing rules and the free-entry 
condition (1-3), we get 7t=pL/[(l-a)a+a-p]. Observe that the equilibrium n is function 
of parameters and exogenous endowments only; in particular, this expression holds for 
any n. Importantly, it does not depend upon (j) or r.
As an aside, we now have everything at hand to make the no-specialisation 
condition more precise: if all firms cluster in a single location, we require the labour 
supply of this region to be larger that the labour these firms demand so that sector A is 
active in both regions and the law of one price prevails on market A. Mathematically, 
this requires min{Li,L2}>(l-oc)p<77t. Using the equilibrium expression for n, the closed- 
form condition is (l-s)> (l-a)(a-l)/(a(l-a)+ a-p). We assume it holds throughout.
Short run and lon g  run equilibria
In the short run capital is immobile while it becomes mobile only in the long 
run. Thus, in a short run equilibrium consumers maximize utility, firms maximize 
profits, and all markets clear.
Define qj as the ratio of the actual operating profit in region j to the equilibrium 
value of 7i, that is, q=7ij/7c, and ej as the share of expenditure that emanates from region j,
20 More precisely, the necessary condition for an equilibrium is nj(7ij-7t)=0, with the possibility that 7ij<7i if  
nj=0.
21 Economic consistency imposes 7t>0, which requires (l-a )a+ a-p > 0 . This always holds because a > l  
and l>p. If K had not been normalised to unity, the expression for 7t in the text should be divided by K.
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99viz. epEj/a7t. Together with the expressions for p and Ej above, we obtain the
following closed form solutions for ej:
(1-5) e, = s + ap{n -  s) + «/?«(#, -1); e2 = (1 -  s) -  ap(n  -  s) + a/?( 1 -  n)(q2 -1 )
We then use Sheppard's lemma and Roy's identity to get the demand for a typical 
variety, pj"CTpEj/Aj. Using this alongside (1-2), (1-3) and (1-5), we obtain the following 
operating q-ratios:
It is obvious from the definition of n and the q's that ne(0 ,l) implies, first, qi<l if, an 
only if, q2>l and (and conversely) and, second, qi=l if, an only if, q2=l. In words, the 
firms located in a given region make above normal operating profits whenever the firms 
located in the other one make below normal operating profits.
The system (l-3)-(l-6) completely characterizes the so-called instantaneous 
equilibrium. (In an instantaneous equilibrium, n is an exogenous variable and qi and q2 
are functions of n.) In the long run, n adjusts so that 7tj=7r=pL/[(l-a)a+a-p] (and hence 
qj=l) for any active firm. For the time being we assume that capital owners allocate 
their capital according to current nominal differences in rewards according to the 
following ad-hoc law of motion for n:
(1-7) h = yn( 1 -  n)(nx ~ tt2) = yn{ 1 - n)(ql -  q2)n
where y is a strictly positive parameter and the second equality follows from the 
definition of n. The long run equilibrium is attained whenever h is zero. Three cases 
can occur: n=0 (in which case q2=l), n=l (in which case qi=l), and 0<n<l (and hence 
qi=q2=l). The first two cases are usually referred to as 'core-periphery' equilibria and 
the third as interior or 'dispersed' equilibria. By the symmetry of the model, the 
symmetric equilibrium n=1/2  always exists. More generally denote an interior long run 
equilibrium as n°.
To assess the stability of these equilibria the NEG typically resorts on the 
following informal methods. Staring from any long run equilibrium, the allocation of 
capital is hit by an exogenous perturbation. For the interior equilibria (in particular the
22 The use o f the 'q' notation in this static model is deliberate: in a straightforward dynamic extension o f  
the model, n would play the role o f the replacement cost o f capital.
(1-6)
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symmetric equilibrium n=1/ 2), one evaluates the sign of the change in the nominal profit 
gap, viz. 7ij-7i2- If the displaced unit of capital increases the profit in the receiving 
region, then the symmetric equilibrium is unstable.
For the agglomerated (or core-periphery) equilibrium, one checks whether the 
perturbation creates a nominal profit in the periphery that is higher than the nominal 
profit in the core. If this is the case then this equilibrium is unstable.
Mathematically, these two tests can be written as: 
d(n.-7t2)(1-8)
dn
<0, O r ,-* 2) L > 0
The equilibrium under consideration is stable when the relevant inequality holds. It is 
unstable otherwise.
Before describing the forces that compete to make long run equilibria stable or 
unstable (the topic of Section 1.3), I briefly justify the use of the law of motion for 
capital (1-7) and the informal stability tests in (1-8) following the method introduced by 
Baldwin (2001) for the truly dynamic version of the CP model.
D ynam ic optim al allocation
Assume that the instantaneous utility function is as in (1-1) and that inter­
temporal preferences are represented by:
(1-9) V(t)=  |
where p is the subjective discount rate.
Assume further that the management of the portfolios is entrusted to a-spatial 
funds that maximise the shareholder's nominal value. These funds maximises the capital 
earning of their customers less some adjustment cost.23 For simplicity, we assume that 
re-location costs are quadratic to the flow of capital and proportional to the sending and 
receiving regions capital stocks. Portfolio value maximisation thus requires each fund to
23 We can justify the assumption that these funds maximise nominal returns as follows. First, the market 
for funds is perfectly competitive: each o f these funds is atomistic. Second, each o f these funds buys 
shares o f a sub-sample o f firms, which mass is negligible. These two assumptions together have two 
implications. On the one hand a typical capital owner, whose capital endowment is mass-less, will invest 
in funds that maximise her nominal earning (the location decisions o f the firm managed by these funds 
having a negligible impact on the price index). On the other hand, by free-entry and exit in the market for 
funds, each active fund will propose a gross return of 7t.
38
chose the optimal capital allocation time path to solve the infinite, discounted stream of 
operating profits net of ’migration' cost:
(1-10) max em J
feO
-p(s-t) , I'm2 jn7r] + (l -  n)7r2--------------- \at\ m - n
2 n ( l-n )J
where T>0 is a parameter. This allows for almost any sort of migration behaviour (see 
Baldwin 2001).
Taking m as the control variable, the current-value Hamiltonian for this problem 
is the term in the brackets in (1-10) plus mX, where X is the co-state variable of this 
problem; X captures the asset value of capital 'migration'. The necessary conditions for 
an optimum are
(1-11) V7: m = f o f i - —1, X = pX-{7i\ -7U2)
and the transversality condition limt_>ooe'ptXm=0. Standard differential calculus implies 
that the migration equation and the asset-value of migration respectively satisfy:
(1-12) A = nQ_ji)A, X = p x - (a l-7ci)
If expectations are static, fund managements assume that the current gap will 
persist forever (Baldwin (2001). In this case, choosing parameter values such that r=yp 
and solving (1-12) for X yields X=(7i]-7i2)/p and:
(1-13) h = y n ( \-n ) { n ^ - n 2)
which is identical to (1-7). To sum up, we have:
Result 1-1. The law of motion (1-7) is consistent with optimal behaviour 
from forward-looking fund managers with quadratic migration.
Still building on the work of Baldwin (2001), it is easy to show that the following 
couple of results also hold:24
Result 1-2. The 'informal stability tests' in (1-8) correspond exactly to the 
formal, local stability o f the model.
24 This is taken almost verbatim from Baldwin's (2001) paper.
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Result 1-3. (a) The model is globally stable, (b) Informal methods to 
determine the where the system ends up is confirmed by the formal 
'Liaponov's Direct Method'.
Point (a) above says that the system drives the system to anyone of the steady states, 
regardless of initial conditions. The informal methods point (b) refers to are the 
following. By the definition of a stable interior steady state (1-8) and by continuity of 
the short-run equilibrium as a function of n, it must be that stable and unstable equilibria 
alternate on the n scale. The informal methods claims that if n is at some n' between n° 
and n", where n° is part of a stable long run equilibrium and n" is part of an unstable 
long run equilibrium given the value of the parameters, then the model will converge to 
n°.
With Result 1-1 at hand, I follow the standard but implicit practice in the NEG 
literature in assuming that expectations are static and adjustment costs of (capital) 
migration are quadratic. Also, as a consequence of Result 1-2 and Result 1-3,1 follow 
the tradition in the NEG literature and keep the discussion of the stability properties of 
the models of this chapter and next ones at a heuristic level.
The description of the model is now complete: the long run equilibria consist of 
the values of n in the interval [0,1] that solve (l-3)-(l-7) for h = 0 .
1.3. Agglomeration and dispersion forces
The model as described in the previous section features both agglomeration and 
dispersion forces. These forces are of the same nature in all models reviewed in the 
introductory chapter. The dispersion forces usually present in the NEG models are also 
present in the 'New trade models'. What sets the NEG apart in the literature is the 
presence of agglomeration forces. These forces are usually of two sorts -the backward' 
and 'forward linkages'. We start with the former linkage, which can be thought of as a 
demand linkage.
Backward linkage
This linkage is best illustrated in expression (1-5) and (1-6) keeping the A's 
equal and constant. Start from a 'long-run' configuration in which firms are active in
25 Baldwin also carries the analysis for the case o f forward-looking agents.
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both regions so that qi=q2=l. Now imagine a firm originally located in 2 relocates in 
region 1, i.e. dn>0. Since this firm buys intermediates from other firms, this increases 
(decreases) expenditures on manufacturing goods that emanates form region 1 (region 
2), viz. dei>0 (de2<0). Since manufacturing firms sell their output with a positive mark­
up and transportation costs are strictly positive (viz. (|)<1) this expenditure shifting gives 
rise to profit shifting. Mathematically, this can be seen using (1-6): obviously qi 
increases if ei increases and e2 decreases, keeping Ai and A2 is constant. The opposite is 
true for q2 . From (1-7), it is clear that this profit shifting gives rise in turn to production 
shifting, viz. dn>0, so the cycle repeats.
The next agglomeration force is the 'forward linkage', which can be thought of 
as a cost linkage.
Forward linkage
To illustrate the cost linkage, we use the same set of equations as before and 
make a similar thought experiment. However, we now keep the e's constant as well as 
the A's at the denominator of (1-6). As it turns out, the A's play two conceptually distinct 
roles, so it is useful to distinguish them in order to fully understand the mechanisms at 
work. We are here interested in the A's that enter the numerator of (1-6) at the power a. 
Using (1-4), we claim:
Result 1-4. Ai is maximised at n = l (by symmetry, A2 is maximised at 
n=0). Moreover, Ai increases relative to A2 as n increases.
Proof The proof o f the first claim is easy. Remember that Ai 6(0,1], so Ai 
cannot be larger than one. Next, it is immediate from (1-4) that n = l 
implies Ai = l. Turn now to the second claim. Define A as A i/A 2 and r\ as 
n/(1-n). Clearly, A and r\ are respectively increasing in Ai (decreasing in 
A2) and n. Using (1-4) and the new notation, the latter definition o f the 
price indices can be written as Aar|=(A-(J))/(1-A<J)). We shall see in 
Chapter 2 that <|)<A<1 / <|> always hold. Simple algebra then reveals that 
dA/dr\>0 and which implies<3A/dn>0 by definition o f r\.Q ED .
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The interpretation of this result is straightforward if we remember that Ai is negatively 
related to the price index of region 1, G] (and hence to the marginal cost of producing in
1): it says that the more numerous are the firms that locate in 1, the lower is the price of 
intermediates in 1 relative to 2. This directly follows from the assumption that 
trade/transportation costs are positive.
Since intermediate inputs enter with a share a  in the cost function, and because 
f.o.b. prices are proportional to marginal costs, qi is proportional to Aia. Clearly, ifn  
increases it becomes relatively cheaper to produce in 1 and more expensive to produce 
in 2. As a result, profitability in 1 (in 2) rises (decreases). In other words, this 
production shifting gives rise to cost shifting and, in turn, to profit shifting. By (1-7) 
dn>0 and the cycle repeats.
Together, the forward and the backward linkages are referred to as 'vertical' (or 
output-input) linkages, as they both would be inexistent if firms did not buy some of 
each other's output (which is the case if a=0). In other words when a=0 cumulative 
agglomeration forces are absent. Clearly, if the vertical linkages were the only forces at 
work production would always be located in a single region. However, there also exists 
a dispersion force that offsets these agglomeration forces -the 'market crowding effect'.
M arket crow ding
To illustrate this effect as clearly as possible, we impose a=0 to turn off the 
agglomeration forces. This implies that the e's as constant. For simplicity, take s=Vi so 
that ei=e2=1/ 2 . The objects of interest now are the A's at the denominators of qi and q2 in 
(1-6). These can be thought of as market shares.26 Indeed, on the numerators are the 
expenditure shares of each region; a given firm gets only a fraction of this and this 
fraction is lower, the larger is the mass of competitors.
Clearly, dAj/dn>0 and dA2/dn<0 imply that the relocation of a firm from 2 to 1 
increases both the domestic and foreign market shares of firms that stay put in 2 and 
decreases the market shares of firms in 1. Since profits are increasing in market shares, 
this initial production shifting implies a negative profit shifting', by (1-7) dn<0 and 
hence this counterweights the initial increase in n. If this force dominates the
26 For the general case a>o, the term A^/Ai in the expression for qj corresponds to the share that a typical 
firm in 1 enjoys on the domestic market. Conversely, the term (j)Ai“/A2 corresponds to the share a typical 
firm located in 2 enjoys on market 1.
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agglomeration forces surveyed above, then any exogenous shock of the form dn>0 or 
dn<0 is self-correcting. Note that this force is always present -even when ot=0. This 
contrasts with the agglomeration forces discussed under the two previous headings.
Turn now to the formal analysis of the interplay of these forces and ask when the 
dispersion force dominates the agglomeration forces, and vice-versa. I pursue this 
analysis under two headings. On the one hand, the model with a>0 is a NEG model: 
generically, it displays multiple equilibria and the production structure o f ex-ante 
identical regions (i.e. s=1/ 2) typically diverges when trade/transportation costs are low 
enough (this is the topic of Section 1.4). The application of Chapter 4 will be using the 
resulting model. On the other hand, Section 1.5 conveys the analysis for a=0. This 
simplified version will be used in the application of Chapter 3.
1.4. Symmetric regions and vertical linkages: The FCVL 
model
Following the tradition of the NEG, my primary interest here is to discuss how 
regions that share identical tastes, endowments, and technology might endogenously 
diverge in terms of production structure and real incomes. Therefore, we impose s=1/2  in 
the remainder of the section. As we shall stress, the resulting model features the same 
qualitative results of the CPVL model of Fujita et al. (1999, chapter 14.2).
(U n)stability o f  the d ispersed  equilibrium
We define a dispersed equilibrium as the configuration in which n=1/4. With 
symmetric regions such an equilibrium always exists as can be seen from (l-4)-(l-7). It 
might not always be stable in the sense of (1-8), though. Here the thought experiment is, 
if a firm moves from region 2 into region 1, in which case would the gap Ti\-Ti2 thus 
created be positive and hence, by (1-7), widening? In which case would that gap be 
negative and hence the perturbation be self-correcting? Formally, answering this 
question is equivalent to signing dqi/dn evaluated at n=1/ 2 .27
As we know from the symmetry of the model, n—Vi implies ei=e2 , Ai=A2 , and 
qi=q2 . We therefore denote common variables with the nought subscript. From (1-4)- 
(1-6), we find that qo=l, eo=1/2, and A o^K l+ M ^. Taking first derivatives at the
27 Or, which is equivalent by the symmetry o f the model when s='/2 , to signing d(qr q2)/dn at n=Vi.
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symmetric equilibrium, defining Z as (l-(}))/(l+<|)), and using deo=dei=-de2 , dAo=dAi=- 
dA2 , and dqo=dqi=-dq2 , we obtain:
i—oNS1of.. ..
i
£
 
__
1
" Z "
(1-14) 2 0 -ap dA0/ A0 = 2 ap
- 2  Z Z - a  1 1 #
- 
1__ _ 0
dn
Using Cramer's rule and solving dqo/dn=0 for Z>0 gives the corresponding break point, 
defined as:
(1-15) *
break
(l + a ) ( l  + a/?)
which is strictly smaller than unity by inspection. To sum-up we can write:
Result 1-5. The symmetric equilibrium is stable for all (() below (|)break. 
Figure 1-1: Dispersion and agglomeration forces at the symmetric equilibrium
^  Dispersion force (market crowding)
Agglomeration forces (vertical linkages)
1ci
s
.break
This suggests a picture along the lines of Figure 1-1, which depicts the magnitude of the 
forces discussed in Section 1.3 at the symmetric equilibrium. The degree of trade free­
ness (j) is depicted on the horizontal axis; when <()=0 trade in manufacturing goods is 
prohibitive. When ((>=1 trade in M is perfectly free, so the two regions are perfectly 
integrated and location no longer matters. AA plots the agglomeration forces and DD
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plots the dispersion forces. It can be shown that both agglomeration and dispersion 
forces decrease with (j) (Baldwin et al. 2001, 2002), so both AA and DD are downward 
sloping. Result 1-5 suggests that agglomeration forces dominate dispersion forces if (j) is 
large enough and that the two curves cross only once. In other words, when <j> is low 
dispersion forces take the upper hand. When increases, both dispersion and 
agglomeration forces decrease but the former decreases faster; eventually the later 
dominates. Formally, this is so whenever <{>>(j)brea,<.
The symmetric equilibrium is unstable for lower values of (j) if agglomeration 
forces are stronger. Ceteris paribus, agglomeration forces are increasing in a  and p. a  
captures the strength of vertical linkages among firms (when a  is large, firms buy a lot 
of each others' output as intermediate inputs). To a large P corresponds a low elasticity 
of substitution cr; the less different varieties are substitutes, the larger is the market 
power of each firm and hence the more sensitive profits are to changes in the conditions 
firms operate.
Using (1-8) again, we now ask a rather different question, namely, if  all firms 
are set in one region, does any of them have any incentive to deviate?
Sustainability o f  the concentrated equilibrium
Here the question is, is a core-periphery pattern sustainable? To answer this 
question, we check under which conditions n=l and q2<l hold simultaneously. No firm 
wants to leave 1 if the shadow profit in 2 is inferior to n. Substituting n=l into (1-4)- 
(1-6), we find that this condition holds whenever <j>e [(|)sust,l), where <|)sust is implicitly 
defined as the smallest root of the following polynomial (1 is the unique other root):
(1-16) 2(</>sus,)'~a - [1  + a P W mt)2 - [ l - a / ? ]  = 0
In words, whenever trade costs are low enough, if it already happens that all firms have 
agglomerated in either region, then none has any incentive to leave the core and start 
producing in the periphery. To sum-up, we have:
Result 1-6. The Core-periphery equiHbrium is said to be sustainable if <|) 
is larger that (j>sust.
It can be shown that <|)sust<<|)break. I show this formally in Chapter 2.
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O ther equilibria and g loba l stab ility
Thus far we have shown that long run equilibria in which ne {O,1/ ^ ! } exist and 
under which conditions they are stable. Now the following natural question may arise. 
Do there exist other equilibria, and what are their dynamic properties if they do?
Simulations undertaken by several researchers provide the following answer to 
this question. Generically, there are five equilibria: the dispersed equilibrium (n=1/2), the 
concentrated equilibria (n=0,l), and two asymmetric, interior equilibria n' and n" with 
n '+ 'n '-l. Moreover, whenever they exist, these equilibria are unstable in the sense that 
dqi/dn>0 and dq2/dn<0 at n=n',n". The analytical proof of these claims is a formidable 
task that is undertaken in Chapter 2. The methodology in this chapter works by showing 
that a whole class of models can be written in a more natural state space. The current 
model is no exception to this. An appendix at the end of this chapter writes the model of 
this section in this 'natural' state space.
Com parison w ith the break and sustain p o in ts o f  the CPVL m odel
The reader familiar with the NEG literature already knows that break and sustain 
points in the CP and CPVL models are isomorphic, as are the corresponding point of the 
FCVL model of this section. In particular, the break and sustain points of the CPVL 
model solve:
(1-17) = ( j -<*)(/?- g ) 2(<f>™yL) ~°~' -  [1 + -[1  -  = 0
(1 + a)(/3 + a)
The model requires the so-called 'no black hole conditions' J3>a to hold. Without these, 
the break points would be negative, implying that the symmetric equilibrium is never 
stable. The similarity between the two models is striking as both the functional forms 
for the cost functions and the mechanism driving agglomeration are different. In 
particular, agglomeration stems from labour mobility between the manufacturing and 
the background sectors within each region the CPVL model. By contrast, international 
capital mobility is the driving mechanism in the FCVL model.
The similarities among different NEG models run deep and wide, as we shall see 
extensively in Chapter 2.
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1.5. Asymmetric regions in the absence of linkages: The FC 
model
In this section we withdraw the restriction s=Vi that we imposed earlier. We also 
allow for asymmetries in transportation costs. The problem, however, is that the model 
becomes so highly intractable that virtually no analytical solutions can be derived. The 
source of the problem is the implicit and simultaneous definition of the A's in (1-4) 
whenever a>0. Is it to say that nothing can be said in the case of asymmetric regions?
The answer to this question is negative. It turns out that all the complications 
wash away if we no longer assume that firms buy each other's output as intermediates.28 
Hence, in the remainder of the chapter we assume that vertical linkages are absent, viz. 
a=0. With this parameter restriction, the resulting model collapses to the model used by 
Flam and Helpman (1987) and Martin and Rogers (1995).
Note an important implication of this assumption. The very existence of 
agglomeration forces depends on the existence of vertical linkages, as was shown in 
Section 1.3. Since we assume a=0 the market crowding dispersion force alone remains. 
Hence, the model will display a unique stable equilibrium akin to the symmetric 
equilibrium in the symmetric-region case. Graphically, this means that the AA curve in 
Figure 1-1 is flat and is identical to the zero horizontal line. Hence, the break point is 1 
in which case does not matter anyway.
As we shall see, the location equilibrium is now a smooth function of (|).
Form al analysis o f  the location equilibrium
Here we consider asymmetric regions and asymmetries in trade cost by allowing 
region 1 ’s trade free-ness parameter to differ from that of region 2. We refer region 1 ’s 
as (|) and region 2’s as ())*; when (|)<(|)* it is cheaper for region l's firms to export to 
market 2 than for region 2's firms to export to market 1. Carefully tracing through the 
impact of this change on the mill pricing of region 1 and region 2 firms and thus on 
operating profit, we can easily establish the more general version of (1-6) and (1-7):
28 Baldwin et al. (2001, 2002) characterize some aspects o f the case o f  asymmetric regions in the CP 
model.
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(1-18) 9 l= i L  + £ fL ; q 2 = ^ .  + t l  A, = n + ^ ( l
A, A2 A2 A,
where ei=s and e2=l-s, as can be seen from (1-5). In words, expenditure now consists 
only on consumer expenditure; given the structure of the model nominal incomes are 
identical, hence consumer expenditure is proportional to income. Region 1 is endowed 
with a share s of world endowments, so it owes a share s of world income.
Solving these for q2=q2, implies that there is only one interior equilibrium:
(1-19) B . J + ( 2 f l i z 4 + L ±. -(1
i-<* a - m - * )  (i-<*)(i
This expression is valid for <|)’s where n lies between zero and unity. For <t>’s outside this 
range n is either zero or unity as appropriate. For the sake of illustration assume n> !/2  
and <])><()* unless otherwise specified. We can infer four things from (1-19). First, n is 
larger than s if s>V2 or (|)*>(j) or both. Market access considerations induce firms to 
locate in the larger market (market 1 by s>V2) or in the market from which it is easiest to 
reach final consumers located in the other region (market 1 by <J><<j>*). The market 
crowding effect will temperate these considerations, so generally 0<n<l.
Second, the sign of the interaction term in (1-19) is ambiguous. When (|) is large 
location is extremely sensitive to any asymmetry between the two regions, hence the 
interaction factor is positive. When (|) is low, by contrast, the market crowding effect is 
large and the tendency of firms to locate far apart is strong, so the additional benefit 
brought about by better market access is decreasing. Put differently, s-Vt and <|>*-<|> are 
the same thing -they both capture the market access advantage of market 1- and (1-19) 
says that n is increasing and concave (convex) in market access if <j) is small (large).
Third, (1-19) reveals that n can be larger of smaller than s, but we know for sure 
that n increases with the gap in market access, viz. <|>*-<|>. To see this, note that the sum 
of the third and last terms in the right-hand side of (1-19) is proportional to l-(l-2<|))(s- 
Yi), which is strictly positive because both (l-2<()) and (s-lA) are smaller than unity in 
absolute value.
Finally, it can be shown that n is increasing in (s-54) by the same token. 
Additionally, assume now that ((>=(1)*. Then n>s if and only if, s>V4: the large market 
attracts a more than proportional share of industries and hence exports the good for
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which it has an unusually large demand. This is a manifestation of the 'home market 
effect' (HME) of Krugman (1980). More precisely, the HME is defined as
(1.20) r —- - 1'  — > 1
d ( s / ( l - s ) )
for values of such that n is an interior solution to (1-19). Note also that the HME is 
magnified by the degree of trade free-ness <|>: as location becomes more sensitive for 
low levels of trade/transportation costs, any difference in income is amplified at the 
location equilibrium. To sum-up we can write:
Result 1-7 (HME). Ceteris paribus, the largest region attracts a more than 
proportional share o f firms, viz. n>s<=>s>V2 . Moreover, the HM E is 
magnified by the magnitude o f trade freeness.
A s y m m e tr ic  R e la tiv e  F a c to r  E n d o w m e n ts
The model can also easily handle regions that are asymmetric in terms of their K 
versus L endowments. Until now, s has denoted region l's endowment of both labour 
and capital relative to the world aggregate. By implication, s also denotes region l's 
share of income. Indeed, Yi=slL+sktiK which is equal to s(Y]+Y2) if Sl=Sk=s. Under 
this heading, we allow Sl and sk to differ and impose <|>*=<|>. Using the equilibrium 
expression for n, it is easy to see that the following relationship
(i-2 i)  S = ( i - £ ) S + £ s
G G
is an identity at equilibrium. This defines s as a weighted average of Sk and s^ One 
interesting question in the context of distinct relative factor endowments is the direction 
of capital flows, which boils down to the sign of sn-SK. If this difference is positive 
region 1 employs more of the world’s capital than its own, so it must be a capital 
importer. If the difference is negative the region 1 is a net capital exporter.
By Result 1-7 we know that if region 1 is bigger but sl=Sk=s then region 1 will 
be a capital importer. An interesting case is when region 1 is both larger and relatively 
well endowed with capital. Suppose Sk>s> !/2  and for simplicity. In this case, the 
region 1 ’s relative abundance of capital tends to offset the home market effect. In 
particular, manipulating (1-19) and (1-21), we get:
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This shows that if region l ’s factor endowment is sufficiently skewed towards capital 
then region 1 may be a capital exporter despite the home-market effect. However, the 
home-market effect will eventually dominate for sufficiently low trade costs. See 
Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2000) for the general case in which all asymmetries are 
simultaneously present.
1.6. Welfare analysis
In the chapter thus far the analysis has concentrated on positive issues 
exclusively. The following sections deal with normative issues. The discussion is 
organised around the FC and the FCVL models of this chapter. From an equity- 
perspective one may ask: Who are the gainers and the losers from agglomeration? 
Which factor owner benefit and which suffer? Which regions are advantaged and which 
are disadvantaged? From an efficiency-perspective one may wonder: Can the gainers 
compensate the losers? Does the free working of market forces deliver the optimal 
degree of agglomeration? Tf not, is there too much or too little agglomeration for the 
economy as a whole? The aim of the next couple of sections is to hint at the answers of 
this kind o f questions.
1.7. Equity and Efficiency in the Footloose Capital Model
We start with the most tractable model, the FC model of section 1.5. The 
analysis borrows extensively from Baldwin et al. (2001).
Thus far we have assumed that capital ownership was uniform across each the 
populations of each regions. The algebra of the model carries over other factor 
ownership assumptions. In particular, we could assume that each individual owes either 
one unit o f labour or one unit of capital. Potentially, this gives rise to 'class conflicts.' 
We take this interpretation of the model here so that we can use the terminology 
'worker' and 'capital owner' as a short hand. It should be understood that an individual 
who owes both labour and capital might see her welfare unaffected even though her 
wage increases and her capital reward decreases.
29 See also Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002), Ottaviano and Thisse (2002), and Ottaviano (2002).
At the finest level, each factor located in each region may have distinct and 
frequently conflicting welfare concerns. Conflicts of interest between these various 
classes of agents arise along two dimensions. The first dimension is spatial: viewing all 
factors within a region as a group, the question is: How industrial location affects living 
standards of each region? The second dimension distinguishes between agents 
according to their factor ownership (labour versus capital).
Pareto welfare analysis
In this section we want to assess: (i) the welfare of each group of individuals at 
the market equilibrium; (ii) which groups of individuals can be made better off by a fia t 
relocation of M-firms when no inter-group transfers are allowed for (‘Pareto welfare 
analysis’); (iii) how the economy as a whole can be made better off by a fia t relocation 
of M-firms when transfers are available (‘global welfare analysis’).
Welfare analysis is particularly simple in the FC model. There are four groups: 
capital owners in regions 1 and 2 and workers in regions 1 and 2. In this section I 
assume that factor ownerships are degenerate for simplicity: workers own no capital and 
vice versa. The nominal incomes (i.e. incomes measured in terms of the numeraire) of 
all four groups are independent of the spatial allocation of industry n and transportation 
costs <|> so all welfare effects stem from the cost-of-living effects, i.e. changes in the A's. 
(Remember that the cost of living in region j is equal to A /^1'^.) Transportation costs 
imply that the cost-of-living is lowest in the region with the most industrial firms. 
Consequently, any change in the location of firms that increases A] will decrease A2 , 
and vice versa. Therefore, we have:
Result 1-8. In the FC model conflicts o f interests arise on the spatial 
dimension only. Indeed, any spatial reallocation o f capital (industry) 
benefits one region at the expense the other. Moreover, there is no 
conflict between capital owners and workers who live in the same region.
This implies that no Pareto improvement is feasible but it is legitimate to ask whether a 
planner with a utilitarian social welfare function can improve on the decentralized 
equilibrium. I turn to this issue next.
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Global welfare analysis
This sub-section derives the utilitarian social planner's optimum. For simplicity I 
work with the logarithmic transformation of (1-1). Accordingly, we can write the 
utilitarian objective function as:
(1-23) W  = W0 + —^ — [(s l L + sK )In A, + ((1 -  1 -  ^ ) In A, ]
(7 — 1
where Wo collects all the (indirect) utilities derived from the factor rewards. This is 
constant at equilibrium since factor rewards are constant themselves. Note that the 
aggregate mass o f capital owners is one by the normalisation of section 1.2.
In principle there are many potential sources of inefficiency a planner may want 
to deal with. First, firms price above marginal cost. Second, capital owners choose 
where to offer their services without taking into account the impact of their decisions on 
consumer surpluses in the two regions. Third, they also do not take into account the 
impact on firms operating profits. Thus the agglomeration and dispersion forces of 
section 1.3 result in pecuniary externalities.30
In the first-best outcome all distortions are removed. As part of this the planner 
imposes price equal to marginal cost p for both local and export sales, so the local price 
of a typical variety will be (1-1/a) and the export price will be t times this. The 
resulting Aj is just (1-1/a) times the market one. O f course, marginal cost pricing drives 
operating profits to zero, so lump-sum transfers are needed to support capital-owners’ 
consumption. Following Baldwin et al. (2001) we can assume that these transfers are set 
at some exogenously determined level to avoid unenlightening complications.
It is however often admitted that marginal cost pricing cannot be imposed, either 
because lump-sum transfers from consumers to firms are not available, or because the 
degree of surveillance necessary to enforce it is impractical. This implies that firms set 
prices above marginal cost as usual. As a result the second-best planner tackles the last 
two inefficiencies. Note that under the specific assumptions of the model the first-best 
objective function is identical to the second-best objective function up to a constant (the 
welfare gains associated with marginal cost pricing are independent of n). This is due to
30 Moreover, the effects on consumer surpluses and operating profits are also neglected in the entry 
decisions by firms so that generically the number o f firms operating is sub-optimal. In the present setting, 
however, this last source o f  inefficiency is inexistent because the number o f  firms is determined only by 
the M-good fixed costs and the aggregate endowments o f capital, so entry is optimal.
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the conjunction of the following assumptions and results. First, the number of varieties 
is fixed by capital endowment. Second, transportation costs take the iceberg form. 
Finally, mill pricing is optimal in Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition. This last 
point implies that the ratio of imported to locally produced varieties is exactly t  
(exogenous) in both the first and second best cases, so above-marginal-cost pricing does 
not distorted the location decision. As a result the planner maximizes an objective 
function that equivalent to (1-23) in either case. To sum-up, we have:
Result 1-9. The first- and second-best geographical distributions o f firms 
coincide.
Therefore, we can use (1-23) to derive the optimum spatial allocation of firms. The first- 
order condition to the planner’s problem is:
dW
(1-24) ^ r  = (£  + i)dn
J in  A, J in  A, _ 0 -  c =  +  SK
’ pop
where spop is defined as the share of the world’s population living in 1. The second- 
order condition is satisfied by concavity of (1-23). This shows that the optimising 
planner must strike a balance between the opposing effects of changing n on individual 
welfare. Using (1-18), (1-24) can be rewritten as:
(1-25) ( 1 - 0 ) =  0
This holds either when trade is perfectly free (viz. <(>=1) because the planner is 
indifferent to firm location since this is irrelevant to consumers’ welfare. Or, when 
transportation costs are positive (viz. <|)<1), (1-25) reveals that the planner chooses n by 
balancing two opposing effects. The first effect -the transportation cost saving effect- is 
(1+<|>) times the region l ’s share of world population, which depends on the spatial 
endowments of workers and capital owners. The second is (1-(|)) times the region 1 ’s 
share of industry. The second effect is what Baldwin et al. (2001) call the individual 
welfare effect. By the concavity of utility, the welfare trade off between region l's 
residents and region 2's worsens as the division of industry becomes more extreme.
Thus the individual welfare effect is a force that favours an even distribution of 
industry.
Solving (1-25) for n gives the optimal allocation of firms n* where
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g   1/
(1-26) n = s + (2d>) p-%■
if s PoP g [ ( | ) / ( 1  +((>), 1 /(I +<())]; outside this range, the planner concentrates all production in 
the big region. To summarise, we write:
Result 1-10 (Social home-market effect). The socially optimal spatial 
allocation o f industry requires the large region to have a more than 
proportional share o f industry.
By implication Result 1-7 continues to hold qualitatively.
We are now ready to establish whether there is too much or too little spatial 
concentration of industry in the market equilibrium. All we have to do is to compare n 
with n*. Taking the difference between (1-19) with <|)*=(|) and (1-26), we obtain:
(1-27) n - n  = X-^(s„„„)
This shows that any difference between the market and social allocation of industry 
depends upon the difference between region 1 's share of world expenditures (viz. s) and 
its share of world population (viz. spop). The reason is that the utilitarian criterion (1-23) 
puts equal weights on each individual regardless of their incomes and places of 
residence. By contrast, the market cares about expenditures, which implies that richer 
individuals count more. This implies:
Result 1-11. The market outcome has too many firms in the region that 
has the highest per capita income.
Per capita income depends on two things: the region’s relative factor endowment and 
the relative reward of the two factors. To take a natural case, suppose the income of 
capital owners is higher than that o f workers (this requires L>(a-p)/p). In this case, the 
region relatively well endowed with capital is also richer and there will be too many 
firms located in that region at the laissez-faire equilibrium. If this region is also the 
largest, then there is too much agglomeration.
Result 1-12. There are two special cases when the market outcome is 
optimal, when the two regions are scaled versions of each other (in
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which case s l = s k )  or when remunerations are equalized across factors, 
viz. 7t—1 (this requires L =(g-|li)/p).31
The location inefficiency is larger the larger is the factor price and the difference in 
relative factor endowment differentials. The inefficiency gap n-n* is magnified by (|>. 
However, it can be shown that the welfare loss is independent of (|>, i.e. W(n)-W(n*) is 
equal to a constant. Since W(n*) is increasing in <|>, this implies that the welfare loss is 
greater as a fraction of aggregate welfare when trade is more restricted.
This overall result hides a potential conflict between factor-owner groups. While 
there are no conflicts between different factor owners within a region, the preferred 
spatial allocation of industry for the inter-regional coalition of workers will differ from 
the preferred allocation of the inter-regional coalition of capital owners. By the same 
token as above,32 it is straightforward to derive the preferred spatial allocation of firms 
for the two groups as nL (the workers' bliss point) and nK (the capital owners' bliss 
point), where:
(1-28) nL =sL+ nK=sK+
1 ~(f) \ - ( f )
which is similar to (1-19) and (1-26). Comparing the first expression in (1-28) with 
(1-19) and (1-26), we obtain:
Result 1-13. From the workers' (capital owners') point o f view, both the 
market and the planner allocate too many (too few) firms to the capital 
abundant region.
This result is clearly more relevant in a situation where the two regions belong to the 
same nation, since it is easier to think of ways in which inter-regional interest groups 
can be affected when both regions are within the same political system.
31 In Chapter 3, we will assume that the former special case holds so that departures from the optimum 
will be exclusively due to the political economy process.
32 The workers' aggregate welfare is like (1-23) with zero weight to capital owners' welfare, and 
conversely for the capital owners' aggregate welfare.
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1.8. Equity and efficiency in the FCVL model
The FC model is the simplest and most analytically tractable model of this 
chapter. As a result, its welfare analysis is quite simple. In this section, I consider the 
FCVL model, which is less tractable than the FC model but displays a wider range of 
features.33 As for the FC model, I start with the Pareto welfare analysis and then turn to 
the global welfare analysis.
Pareto welfare analysis
The first thing to note is that nominal rewards are invariant in the FCVL model, 
exactly like in the FC model. This implies that all the welfare effects occur via the price 
index. Since increasing the share of industry n hurts capital owners and workers in 
region 2 alike and benefits capital owners and workers in region 1, there is no way we 
can Pareto improve upon the market outcome. In other words Result 1 -8 holds in the 
FCVL model as well. Therefore each of the stable multiple equilibria is Pareto efficient.
Equilibria ranking
We can also rank the various equilibria according to each of region 1 and 2's 
residents welfare. The decentralised equilibrium delivers two types of stable long run 
equilibria: the dispersed equilibrium (in which case n=1/2) or a core-periphery outcome 
(n=0 or n=l). The first thing to note is that anyone's preferred outcome is to live in a 
region in which the whole of industry clusters. This is unambiguous, for e.g. Ai is 
maximised at n=l by Result 1-4. Thus we write:
Result 1-14. In all cases, capital owners and workers o f region 1 (region
2) alike are best off when all firms are clustered in region 1 (region 2).
Take for instance the residents in 1. Result 1-14 says that their preferred outcome is n=l 
but is silent on which outcome is their second best: are those people better off if they are 
in the periphery (n=0) or if firms are evenly spread between the two regions (n=1/2)? As 
it turns out, this is not a trivial question.
33 An even wider variety o f results arise when we consider embodied factor mobility. See Baldwin et al. 
(2001) and Ottaviano (2001).
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Take the FC model as a benchmark. The FCVL model collapses to the FC model 
with s=lA when a=0. As we know from section 1.3, a=0 implies that there are no 
forward or backward linkages -and hence no agglomeration economies. In such a case 
(1-4) reveals that Ai is strictly increasing in n. This implies:
Result 1-15. When the magnitude o f the vertical linkages is small (oc~0), 
then residents in 1 rank the possible equilibria as follows: there are best 
off under the core-periphery pattern n -1 ; their second best is the 
dispersed equilibrium n=Vz; they are least well off under the core- 
periphery pattern n=0.
Now turn to the case a>0. When a  is large the magnitude of the agglomeration 
economies is large. As a result, when all firms cluster in a single region the production 
costs are very low because no intermediate inputs need be imported. O f course, this 
hurts people left behind in the periphery unless agglomeration economies are so strong 
that the cost of importing all varieties is compensated by lower mill prices.
To see this formally, assume without loss of generality that if firms are fully 
agglomerated then region 1 is the industrial cluster and region 2 the periphery. Then 
manipulating (1-4) reveals that in the dispersed outcome n=Yi we have:
By contrast A]=l and A2=<|) if firms are clustered. Therefore residents in 1 always prefer 
the core-periphery pattern and residents in 2 do so if, and only if,
is positive. This expression is negative for low values of § and nil if <J>=1 in which case 
location is irrelevant. However, it is easy to see that this expression is increasing at <J>=0, 
decreasing at ((>=1 if and only if a</4, and everywhere concave. As a consequence it has 
a unique maximum at which (1-30) is non-negative. If a > /2  the expression in (1-30) is 
positive for any <|> in ((|)p,l), where <()p is the unique real root of this polynomial in (0,1). 
If a</4 then (1-30) is negative for all admissible value of § (in this case define <|>p as the 
comer solution (|)p=l). Hence, we have shown:
(1-29)
(1-30) 2</>Ua-(!+</>)
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Result 1-16. If 0 OV2 then residents in the periphery are better o ff under 
the core-periphery outcome than under the dispersed outcome n=Vz if, 
and only if, transportation costs are low enough. If a<Vi then residents 
in the periphery are worse off than under n=V2 for all (|).
This result is quite intuitive. Agglomeration economies ensure that producer prices are 
lower in the core-periphery outcome than in the dispersed outcome. Low transportation 
costs ensure that consumer prices are also lower in the former configuration than in the 
latter configuration, even for the consumers who have to import the manufacturing 
goods.
Moreover, it is easy to see that this effect is stronger, the larger the 
agglomeration economies. Indeed, at the limit a = l, A2—»A]=1, so consumer prices in the 
periphery are the same as in the core, for all any value of <j). More generally,
(1-31) A  (2 ^ 1-  _ ( 1  + f l )  = -2f°ln(<0 > 0
which implies that <|>p is decreasing in a. In other words,
Result 1-17. The range of (|) over which everybody benefits from the 
clustering o f industry in either region vis-a-vis the dispersed equilibrium 
is increasing in the magnitude o f agglomeration economies.
This too is rather intuitive.
We can finally address the question of whether the market provides too much or 
too little agglomeration from the periphery's resident's point of view. To answer this 
question we rank <|>p, (|)break, and <j>sust.
Plug (1-15) into (1-16) and (1-30); numerical simulations reveal that the former 
resulting expression is positive hence (j)sust<(j)break>34 Also, the sign of the latter depends 
upon the magnitude of a  and <7 . As is to be expected, the condition (1-30) is less likely 
to be violated at the break point when the magnitude of the vertical linkages a  is large. 
Also, numerical comparisons show that <|)sust<<|)p holds for all parameter values.
34 This fact is formally demonstrated in Chapter 2. This implies that for all (j>e(<j)sust,(|)brealc) both the core- 
periphery and the dispersed outcomes are stable long run equilibria.
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Together, these facts imply first, <J)sust<(J)break, <|)sust«|)p and second, the sign of <j)p-c|)break is 
ambiguous. As a consequence, five cases can occur. From the point of view of region 
2's residents:
1. If <j><4)sust the market outcome (n=1/2) is the second best;
2. If (|)>(j)p,(|)break the market outcome (n=l) is the second best;
3. If (|)p><j)><|)break the market outcome (n=l) provides too much 
agglomeration;
4. If <|)p<(|)<(j)break the market outcome is the second best if n=lbut provides 
too little agglomeration if n=1/2;
5. If (|)sust<(j)<(j)p the market outcome is the second best if n=lbut provides 
too little agglomeration if n=1/2.
By contrast, anyone's welfare is maximised when firms cluster in one's region. Hence, 
from the point of view of region l's residents, three cases can occur:
1. If <()><J)break then the decentralised outcome (n=l) delivers the first best;
2. If (j)<(|)sust then the decentralised outcome (n=1/2) delivers too little 
agglomeration;
3. If <j)sust<(|)<<|)break then the decentralised outcome delivers the first best if 
n=lbut provides too little agglomeration if n=1/2.
This concludes our Pareto analysis. Turn now to the global welfare analysis.
Global welfare analysis
Here the question is, can the planner improve upon the decentralized 
equilibrium? I invoke Result 1-9 (first best and second best outcomes coincide) to focus 
only on the second-best analysis. Namely the planner will choose n so as to maximize a 
utilitarian welfare function, not being able to correct for above marginal cost pricing. 
This assumes that the planner can only correct for the inefficiencies that arise as the 
result of the spatial allocation of firms.
In the FCVL model we assume that the two regions are equally endowed with 
labour and capital. Hence, the planner maximizes (1-23) with Sl=Sk=1/2, which is 
equivalent to maximising
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(1-32) Q = ln(Aj) + ln(A2)
where the A's are given by (1-4).
As before we take the FC model as a benchmark. The FCVL model collapses to 
the FC model with s=1/ 2  when a=0. As we know from section 1.3, a=0 implies that 
there are no forward or backward linkages -and hence no agglomeration economies. In 
such a case, (1-32) is concave for all n; this implies that the solution to the utilitarian 
planner's problem is n*=1/ 2 . In words when there are no vertical linkages the planner 
chooses to spread industry evenly between two symmetric regions. In the light of Result 
1-11, the market and the social optimum coincide because both population and 
expenditure are spread the same way.
Turn now to the case a>0. By a continuity argument, it must be that Q is 
concave in n in the neighbourhood of n=1/2, at least for a small a . When a  increases, 
however, agglomeration economies start to be of important magnitude and hence the 
planner may be willing to cluster all industries in a single region so as to lower the 
production costs on all varieties. By Result 1-16 this may hurt people left behind in the 
periphery.
To see this formally, note that (1-29) and (1-32) imply that Q is larger when n=l 
than when n=1/2  if, and only if,
(1-33) 4(j)Ua - (1 + ^ )2
is positive. This expression is negative for low values o f (j) and nil when <|>=1 in which 
case location is irrelevant. However, it is easy to see th a t, like the left-hand side of 
(1-16), this expression is increasing at <|)=0, decreasing at <|>=1, and everywhere concave. 
As a consequence it has a unique maximum at which it is positive. Therefore the 
expression in (1-33) is positive for any (|> in (<|)usp,1)> where <|)usp is the unique real root 
of this polynomial in (0,1). The subscript 'USP' stands for utilitarian social planner. 
Moreover, by the same token as for the analysis of (1-30) and (1-31) it is easy to show 
that d§\jsp/da<0. Hence, we have proved the following result:
Result 1-18. The social planner prefers the core-periphery pattern to the 
dispersed equilibrium if, and only if, transportation costs are low enough. 
Moreover, the range of (j) over which the planner prefers the core­
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periphery pattern is increasing in the magnitude o f the vertical linkages 
as parameterised by a .
This result is quite intuitive in light of Result 1-15, Result 1-16, and Result 1-17.
We can also finally address the question of whether the market provides too 
much or too little agglomeration from a utilitarian point of view. To answer this 
question, we rank <|>usp, <|>break, and <j)sust. Plug (1-15) into (1-16) and (1-33); numerical 
simulations reveal that the former resulting expression is positive and that the latter is 
negative. Together, these imply (|)sust<<j)usp<<t)break- F°ur cases can occur:
1. If (|)<<|)sust the market outcome {n=Vi) is socially optimal;
2. If <|)><|)break the market outcome (n=0 or n = l) is optimal;
3. If <|>sust<(|)<<|>usp the market outcome is optimal if n=1A but provides too 
much agglomeration if n=0 or n = l;
4. If the market outcome is optimal if n=0 or n=lbut provides
too little agglomeration if n=1/2 .
This concludes our welfare analysis.
1.9. Concluding remarks
In this chapter I have developed an alternative NEG model in which 
agglomeration is driven by the interaction of increasing returns at the firm level, 
trade/transportation costs, and vertical linkages among firms -that is, firms use each 
other's output as an input. I have sketch the ways the present model behaves in a very 
similar fashion to already well-established economic geography models. In particular, it 
shares the features of the original model developed by Venables (1994, 1996a). 
However, it is more tractable and hence allows for easier extensions and less reliance on 
simulations. I have also shown that this models nests the 'footloose capital' model of 
Flam and Helpman (1987) and Martin and Rogers (1995).
The models of vertical linkages-driven agglomeration of Venables (1996a), 
Krugman and Venables (1995), and Fujita et al. (1999) are intractable for several 
reasons. First, the price indices are defined implicitly and simultaneously, as here. In 
addition, there is only one primary factor, which means that w and n are the same thing; 
since prices are functions of wages, the q's in (1-6) enter the price indices definitions of
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(1-4) as well, adding one more degree of simultaneity -and complexity. As a 
consequence extensions of the basic model that allow for asymmetries become 
extremely tedious and one has to rely on simulations to derive the predictions of the 
model. The model above is simpler and hence extensions along the same lines are more 
tractable. A good example of this is the paper by Puga and Venables (1997) in which 
the authors study preferential trading agreements in a NEG framework using the CPVL 
model. Conveying the same kind of exercise with the model developed in this chapter 
provides more analytical solutions.35
The model of this chapter will be used in the applications of Chapters 4 and 5 to 
two specific issues. Chapter 2 completely characterizes the set of equilibria for a whole 
class of NEG models, including the FCVL model of Section 1.4.
Appendix
In this appendix I rewrite the model in (1 -4)-(l -6) in the so-called natural state 
space of Chapter 2. Note first by that nqi+(l-n)q2=l for all n, in any instantaneous 
equilibrium (this holds by the definitions of n and the q's). Consequently define r\= 
nqi/[(l-n)q2]. Also, define the following ratios: q=qj/q2 , A=Ai/A2 , and e=ei/e2 . Finally, it 
proves useful to denote the ratio of expenditures in the special case all firms cluster in a 
single region by x; to get a solution for x, substitute n=0 in (1-5) in the definition of e to 
get x=(l-aP )/(l+ap). With all these definitions, the instantaneous equilibrium can be 
written as:
(1-34) e « f ± J L ; 9  = A « £ ^
l + r/% 1 -A  (j) Y<f) + A
As we shall see in Chapter 2, this system is much simpler to deal with when it comes to 
show that it has no more than three long run equilibria (defined as (1-34) with q=l).
35 For an application see Baldwin et al. (2001).
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Chapter 2. TH E STRUCTURE OF SIMPLE
'N e w  E c o n o m ic  Ge o g r a p h y ' 
m o d e l s
2.1. Introduction
The beauty of the neoclassical trade theory stems for a good part on its ability to 
provide strong results relying on few assumptions and robust to the choice of functional 
form; see for instance the two-sector, two factor model of Jones (1965). By contrast, the 
so-called 'New Economic Geography' (NEG hereafter), initiated by Krugman's 
(1991a,b) seminal contributions, seems to rely on very specific functional forms and yet 
to be highly intractable. NEG models come in basically three categories:36
■ Migration-based models
■ Models based on vertical linkages
■ Models based on factor accumulation
In models based on factor migration, agglomeration is a result of the interaction 
of the 'Home-Market effect' (Krugman 1980) and factor spatial mobility. Krugman's 
(1991b) famous Core-Periphery (CP hereafter) model assumes that the factor used 
intensively in the imperfectly competitive sector is mobile between regions and moves 
according to regional differences in real wages. In models based on vertical-linkages 
among firms, like the FCVL model of Chapter 1, agglomeration comes as a result of the 
interaction of the home-market effect and input-output linkages among firms. Finally, 
agglomeration can also result as the interaction between the home-market effect and the 
accumulation of some factors, as in Baldwin (1999).
Beyond assuming different agglomeration mechanisms, these contributions use 
different functional forms (albeit the differences are small). Yet, these models are 
surprisingly isomorphic when one rewrites them in a more natural state-cum-parameter 
space, as I shall demonstrate in this chapter. Consequently, the predictions of the NEG 
models are robust to important changes in the particular agglomeration mechanisms.
36 This topology is not hermetic, as e.g. Puga's (1999) model combine ingredients o f several o f these 
categories.
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This implies that, very much like the neoclassical trade model, the NEG paradigm is 
well suited to be brought to the data and its theoretical predictions to be tested.
Another ambition of this chapter is to characterize fully the set o f steady states 
of a wide class of NEG models. To be more precise, the aim here is to fully characterize 
the set of equilibria of the symmetric two-region models of Table 1-1.37 As strange as it 
may seem, this is yet an unfinished business. This is odd because the multiplicity of 
equilibria is one of the central features of the NEG paradigm. Numerical simulations of 
these models consistently display the following features:
■ There are no more than five steady-states (and no more than three 
interior steady-states);
o o
■ Among them the symmetric one always exists, but is not always stable;
■ When they exist, the two asymmetric interior steady states are always 
unstable.39
In Krugman's terminology, these properties are illustrated by the famous 'tomahawk 
bifurcation diagram' of Figure 2-2.
Importantly, no formal proof of these results has ever been provided despite 
many attempts. However, many important statements of practical importance made in 
the literature -hypes, in the words of Neary (2001)- rely on these features.40 The present 
chapter provides such proofs.
In short, the purpose of this chapter is twofold. For one, it fills an important gap 
in providing analytical proofs to some key results in this strand. On top of that, it 
contributes to a deeper understanding of the core mechanics of NEG models by showing 
that many such models are isomorphic even though they assume different 
agglomeration mechanisms; choose some different functional forms, or both.
37 Two reservations are in order here. First, the full characterization o f  the CPVL model is a bit more 
involved for reasons that will be clear later. Hence, the conclusions reached in this chapter are more 
tentative than conclusive in this case. Second, the analytical method developed here applies to the models 
of Table 1 strictly speaking. It would need to be extended, possibly at prohibitive cost in term of effort, to 
the various extensions o f these models (like the extension of the FCVL model conveyed in Chapter 4).
38 This is obvious given the symmetry o f the model.
39 That is, the number o f equilibria is odd. Of course, this is not particular to this model. Indeed, it is a 
very general result: for instance, see the Index Theorem in Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995, p. 
593).
40 Think, for instance, o f Krugman and Venables's (1995) 'History o f the world, Part I' in which they 
conjecture that the very same process that has brought huge income inequalities among countries, 
globalisation, might yield income convergence in the future. See also Chapter 4 on this issue.
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2.2. A natural state space for migration-based models
Our main task in this section is to set up the natural state space for the 
migration-based CP and 'Footloose-Entrepreneur' models alike. The Footloose- 
Entrepreneur (FE hereafter) model from Forslid and Ottaviano (2001) is very similar to 
the CP model, but an apparently small modification in the functional form of a cost 
function makes the model more tractable whilst retaining all of its qualitative features.
Writing these models in their natural state space is a necessary intermediate step 
for the central proofs o f Section 2.3. Here I only sketch the structure of the models, for 
they are very similar to the model of Chapter 1 .1 am using the notation of Fujita, 
Krugman, and Venables (1999) so as to facilitate the comparison between the CP model 
as laid down in their chapter 5 and the FE model.
The com m on structure
Common to virtually all NEG models are two regions (indexed by j= l ,2) and 
two sectors. The background sector A produces a homogenous good under constant 
returns to scale (CRS) in a competitive environment using unskilled workers only; its 
output is freely traded; consumers spend a share 1 -p of their expenditure on A. The 
manufacturing sector M produces a differentiated product under increasing returns to 
scale (IRS) in a monopolistically competitive environment a-la Dixit and Stiglitz 
(1977). Denote the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties by cPT. The 
mathematical expression describing tastes is given by (1-1). Shipping this good into the 
other region involves 'iceberg' transportation costs: T>1 units need to be shipped so that 
1 units arrives at destination; the rest, T>1, melts in transit. Consumers spend a share 
0<p<l of their expenditure on the composite M. Further, in models based on factor 
migration, both regions are equally endowed with Lu/2 unskilled workers. These two 
regions also share L skilled workers, with X (l->-) of them living in region 1 (region 2);
X is the variable of interest; it is endogenous in the 'long run'.
The Core-Periphery m odel
In the CP model, each factor is specific to a different sector: the background 
(manufacturing) sector uses unskilled (skilled) workers only. In particular, the cost 
function of the typical M-firm takes the following form: C(x)=(F+px)w, where x is the 
firm output, F is the fixed labour requirement, p is the variable labour requirement, and
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w is the (skilled) labour wage; when necessary, w will be indexed by a subscript 1 or 2 
so as to distinguish between regions. Tastes are as specified in Chapter 1.
As usual, monopolistic pricing implies that the producer price p of any variety 
involves a mark-up, viz. p(l-l/cr)=pw. Free-entry eliminates pure profits so px-C(x)=0, 
which implies px=(cr-l)F irrespective of the wage. This has two consequences. First, the 
equilibrium firm size is constant, viz. x=(a-l)F/p. Second, skilled worker wages have a 
dual nature here. On the one hand, these wages are a cost -in  particular, higher wages 
translate into higher variable costs and hence higher prices. On the other hand, w 
captures the monopoly rents. Indeed, pure profits are eliminated at equilibrium, hence 
the fixed factor -skilled labour again- captures the rents that accrue from monopoly 
pricing. This dual nature of skilled labour is the cause of much of the analytical 
intractability of the CP model.
N orm aliza dons
Following FKV, let us make the following normalizations. First, we take A as 
the numeraire. Second, we choose units so that (i) F=p/p; (ii) L=p and Lu=l-p; (iii) the 
labour-output requirement in A is 1, which implies wy=l in each region; (iv) p = l- la  so 
that the M-sector f.o.b. prices are all equal to unity.
Instantaneous equilibrium
With all these assumptions at hand, we can solve the model treating X as a 
parameter to get the so-called 'instantaneous equilibrium'. Such an equilibrium is 
defined for any value of X as a situation where all markets clear and trade is balanced. 
Using subscripts to indicate regions, the instantaneous equilibrium of the CP model is 
characterized by the following equations (see FKV, p. 65):
Y = //Aw. +  - — — , Y2 -  /i{  1 -  A)w2 +  - — —
(2-1) 1 1 2 2 2 2
G ,1_<T =  Aw , 1_ff +  (1 -  A)(Tw2) ] , G x; °  = A{Tw,)'-a +  (1 -  A)w2x~a - l '~a A)(T '-a x ' n
V Y V Vw° T>-° _ L _ +_ h _
^ l-o -  (j a G G a
The economic signification of (2-1) is as follows. Income in region j, Yj, is defined as 
the sum of skilled workers' income (whose wage is wj) and unskilled workers' income 
(whose wage is unity by choice of numeraire). Gi and G2 are the true CES price indices.
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The third line provides the ffee-entry-and-exit conditions (also called the ’wage 
equations'): firms in region j  break even if they pay the wage Wj.
We claim that the following holds for all X:
(2-2) Xw1+ ( l - X ) w 2 =l
To see this, multiply the wage equations in (2-1) by wj1*0 and the result follows readily 
by using the income and price index equations. This property stems from the Cobb- 
Douglas functional form of the upper-tier utility function.
Define the real (skilled labour) wage in region j as C0j, viz. C0j= CDjGj'f Hence, the 
system in (2-1) can be viewed as providing an implicit solution for ©1-CD2 as a function 
of X; accordingly, we write (2-1) as F(coi-co2 ) = 0  for short. Skilled labour is assumed to 
move from one region to the other so as to eliminate differences in real wages according 
to the following law of motion:
(2-3) X = yX(l-X)(co,-(o2)
where y>0 is a parameter. Clearly, this means that expectations are static (see Chapter 
l).41 A long run (or steady-state) equilibrium is defined as a value of X that solves (2-1)
and such that (2-3) holds for X -  0. We are interested in the number of interior 
solutions, i.e. the number of Vs such that coi=o>2 - Call the set of these X's Lo, with Ao 
being the typical element of Lo. That is,
(2-4) L0 = {Xe[0,l]:F(0,X) = 0}
Using (2-1), it is straightforward to show two things. First, A=1/ 2 gLo is always true.
Also, A,oeLo if, and only if, l-A^eLo. These two facts hold by virtue of the symmetry of 
the model.
Define the parameter as <t>=T1-ae[0,l); <|> is decreasing in T. We now move on 
by using the definition of ©j 0=1,2) and plugging it into (2-1):
41 Baldwin (2001), however, shows that this is merely an assumption o f  convenience. Indeed, allowing for 
rational expectations and sufficiently large quadratic migration costs does not alter the break' and 'sustain' 
points defined in section 2.3 below. Yet, expectations can be self-fulfilling when migration costs are low  
enough, as in Matsuyama (1991) or Krugman (1991b).
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(2-5)
Yx =  fiX  w, + ]~ y ~  , Y2 =  //(l -  X )w 2 + X- ^ -
xr =xwMGtr + w - x)w2{co2G^r,
G]“a = <f)Xwx(cQxG ? y a +  (1 -  X)w2{co2G ^ y a
K
( ^ G r r =  - ±  + * - k ,  (a>2G ? y = < fi-^  + - i
Gi G2 G, G2
We can transform (2-5) further to simplify both the resolution of the problem and the 
algebra. First, by virtue of (2-2) we can define the parameter r| as the ratio of the mobile 
factor’s expenditure in 1 to mobile expenditure in 2, namely r|=A,wi/(l-A,)w2 . Next, 
define 0 as the following collection of parameters 0=p/p (as we shall see 0 can be 
interpreted as measure of the forward linkage). Third, define the analogue of <|> for the 
price index, Aj^Gj1'0, with dAj/dGj<0.
Finally, the entire problem can be rewritten in terms of ratios because the two 
regions are the mirror image of one another (in this two-region world, only the relative 
size of any variable matter). Accordingly, define A, Y and co as A=Ai/A2 , Y= Y\/Y i, and 
G)=CDi/a>2 . When all mobile workers settle in a single region (viz. Xe {0,1}), this region 
is dubbed as 'the core' and its GDP is equal to L+Lu/2 by (2-2). Conversely, the GDP in 
the 'periphery' is equal to Ly/2. Let us then define % as the ratio of these two, viz.
(2-6) % = — —^ <1
'  ’ A 2 L + Lu
Using these ratios as well as the definitions of r\ and A j into (2-5), we obtain the 
following system:
(2. „  r . f i ;
1 + tjx 1 - A 0  Y(p + A
where the 'natural' benchmark q is defined as coCT (the model reaches an interior steady 
state whenever q=l). The model in (1-34) is identical to the model in (2-1), as I will 
show shortly. The endogenous variables Y, A, and q are functions of the 'natural' 
parameters <j>, 0, and % as well as the state variable r\. Following Fujita et al. (1999) I 
impose the 'no-black-hole' condition 0<1 (FKV, p. 59). Without this the symmetric 
equilibrium is never stable. If 0>1 then both the break and sustain points defined below 
are equal to zero.
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Backward linkage, forward linkage, and m arket crowding
As it turns out the expressions in (1-34) illustrate the agglomeration and 
dispersion forces of the model neatly. These forces are described at length in Chapter 1 
so I will be brief here.
Start with the backward linkage, an agglomeration force that stems from the fact 
that some expenditure is mobile. It is obvious from the first expression in (1-34) that 
incomes are increasing in the local share of skilled workers' expenditure. In other words 
Y\ is increasing in Xw\ 42 This in turn is transmitted into the relative real wages via 
3q/3Y>0 in the last expression of (1-34). Obviously firms care about the value of 
demand so Aw, and ( 1 -X.)w2 are the proper yardsticks to asses relative demands when 
tastes are homothetic, as here. All things equal, an inflow of mobile expenditure in 1 
increases demand for local firms' output; this, in turn, increases the wage at which firms 
can break even, attracting further mobile workers, and the cycle repeats. Also x is 
inversely related to the magnitude of the backward (or demand) linkage: when no 
expenditure is mobile then x=l, in which case Y is invariant in r\.
The second expression in (1-34) provides an implicit definition for A and 
illustrates the nature of the 'forward linkage’ in this model. To boost intuition, assume 
real wages are equalized, so that q=l. It can be shown fairly easily that 1>0>O implies 
dA/dr\>0, namely, the price index in 1 falls relatively to the price index in 2 when the 
share of mobile expenditure in 1 relative to 2 increases. This is the source of the forward 
linkage: the more firms there are in 1, the cheaper it is for workers to live there, ceteris 
paribus, so this induces more workers to settle in 1, and the cycle repeats. Interestingly 
Baldwin's (1999) model displays no forward linkage so 0=0 in his model..
The last expression in (1-34) also captures the 'market crowding' dispersion 
force. To identify this dispersion force switch off the forward and backward linkages, 
namely impose 0=0 and %=1. This restriction is sufficient to ensure that dq/3A<0. What 
this says is the following: A is also a measure of the degree of competition in market 1 
relative to market since A is larger than 1 if there are more firms in 1 than in 2, ceteris 
paribus. Since A is itself increasing in r|, this implies that as mobile workers move from
42 As we shall see, Y \ it may or may not increase in X (see Result 2-1 below on this).
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2  to 1 , the increased competition in market 1 has a negative impact on manufacturing 
wages, acting as dispersion force.
Write now (1-34) in a compact form as f(q,r|)=0. With this notation, an interior 
steady state is defined as a value for r\ such that f(l,r|)=0. By analogy with (2-3), define 
N o  as:
(2-8) N0 = {r)>0:f(\,r]) = 0}
We denote the typical element of N o  by r|o. Remark that it is readily verified using 
(1-34) that r|= l is always an element of No. We can infer the exact number of interior- 
steady states # L o  of the problem (2-3) from # N o  if the two are related, e.g. if # N o = # L o .  
Result 2-2 below shows that there indeed exists a one-to-one mapping from No to Lo. 
Before turning to this important result, I need the following lemmas -the proofs of 
which, as well as the proof of other intermediate results, are relegated to an appendix at 
the end of the chapter.
L em m a 1. Define the function 971: [0,1] —► R + where 77 = 971(2). Then 
971 is surjection (a.k.a. onto).
Proof. See appendix.
L em m a 2. 971'(-) > 0 at the symmetric steady state X—Vz.
Proof See appendix.
Result 2-1 below says that expenditure of skilled workers in, say, region 1, 
increases with the share of such workers there, even taking the (potentially) depressing 
effect of A, on wj. Note that this is not trivial as the mapping from wi to X is not one-to- 
one (not an injection) . 43
Result 2-1. (a) 971 is a bijection; (b) 77 is increasing in 2.
Proof See appendix.
43 This claim can be made rigorously fairly easily. Since this is nowhere needed for our purposes, 
however, we omit the proof.
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Figure 2-1: Instantaneous Equilibrium
ln(q)
0
E q .(l)
0
Turn to Figure 2 - 1 . This figure plots ln(q) as a function of r\ in the upper panel, 
viz. ( 1 - 3 4 ) ,  and CO1-CO2 as a function of X in the lower panel, viz. ( 2 - 1 ) .  Result 2 - 1  above 
says that to each X on the horizontal axis in the lower panel corresponds exactly one r\ 
on the horizontal axis of the upper panel. The figure also prefigures Result 2 - 2  which 
shows that the number of solutions for X to the problem ( 2 - 4 )  is identical to the number 
of solutions to the problem ( 2 - 8 ) ,  viz. # N o = # L o .  Result 2 - 2  is essentially a corollary of 
Result 2 - 1 . It is fundamental because it is much easier to characterize q in ( 1 - 3 4 )  than 
©1-CO2 in ( 2 - 1 ) .
Result 2-2. Let 9Jl0 : Z,0 -» N0 be the mapping such that rj0 = 9Tt0 (2t)) .
Then 9Jt0 is a bijection, implying #No=#Lo.
Proof. 97l0 is identical to 9JI, except for its range and domain that are 
subsets o f those of DJl. Therefore, to each solution for p in (2-8) 
corresponds exacdy one value for X (and reciprocally). This must 
obviously correspond to a solution in (2-4). Indeed, XoeLo implies 
coi=co2, or q=(© i/© 2)a= l so e N0. A  parallel argument shows
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that for all rjo in No there exists 7,ogLo such that ^  e 9Jt 1(tj0) = 93V (^o) ; 
by Result 2-1 this Xo is unique. QED.
Hence it remains to show that the curve q-1 plot against r\ crosses the horizontal 
axis at most thrice, a case Figure 1 illustrates. A sufficient condition for this to be true is 
that the curve q-1 admits at most two flat points when plotted against X, or r\. It turns 
out that the simplest way of showing this is to invoke the alternative model of 
migration-driven agglomeration, the FE model.
The Footloose-Entrepreneur m odel
In the FE model, skilled workers are specific to the M-sector, but unskilled 
workers are employed in both sectors; specifically, the cost function takes the same 
functional form as in Chapter 1, namely C(x)=Fw+pxwu, where wy is the unskilled 
labour wage rate and is equal to unity by our choices of units and normalizations.
As usual, monopolistic pricing implies that the producer price p of any variety 
involves a mark-up, viz. p(l-l/a)=pwu. Free-entry eliminates pure profits so px-C(x)=0. 
Using the fact wu=l this implies px=(a-l)Fw. This has two consequences. First, this 
gives us an expression in both x and w, so we need one more expression to be able to 
solve for x and w, hence x and w are determined simultaneously. Remember that in the 
CP model, the size of firms is fixed and the variable of adjustment is the number of 
firms; in the FE model, exactly the opposite is true, as we shall see.
Second, unskilled workers' wage enter the variable cost only. By contrast, 
skilled worker captures the monopoly rents; in effect, w is the operating profit that 
accrues from monopoly pricing.44 For this reason, we can see the skilled workers as 
'entrepreneurs'. By contrast, in the CP model skilled workers held a dual role: they were 
workers and entrepreneurs at the same time. This somewhat innocuous change makes 
the FE model much more tractable than the CP model.
44 In the FCVL and FC models 'capital' plays the role of'skilled labour' here. We are using the former 
terminology when the specific factor is disembodied, as in Chapters 1, 3, and 4. We use the latter 
terminology when it is embodied, as here.
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Instantaneous equilibrium
We keep all the normalizations of the CP model, but one: we take L=jj./cf and 
Lu=(a-p.)/a; this way (2-2) holds as before. The instantaneous equations can then be 
written as follows:
/U w , g - f i  y  =  n { l - X ) w 2 | G - y .
(2-9) 1 <j 2cr ’ 2 cr 2cr
g i1" C7 = a + ( i - t ) ^ ,  g ';° =X(f>+(\-X)
YX j. Y2 j. Yl Y2
J, Ct2 g ,  g 2
This is a simpler model in that the price-indices now depends on X and (|) only -in  
particular, they depend on no 'short-run' endogenous variable; this way explicit 
solutions for coi and 0 )2  are available.
Since (2-2) holds in the FE model as well, we can define rj as before. Together 
with the definition of 00j, this implies coJco2 = (G1/G 2 )“//77(l -  T)/A . We solve for X/(l- 
X) and plug the result into (2-9); we also use the definition of Aj and the ratio notation to 
get:
(2-10) Y = n u L -, 9 = a * I ± M
i + t^  l - A ^  y^+ A
In this expression q is now defined as co and 0 as p/(cr-l); x is still defined by (2-6) and 
the no-black-hole condition 0<1 is unchanged. Clearly, (2-10) and (1-34) are identical, 
hence the CP and FE models are isomorphic. Consequently, we can use Figure 2-1 for 
the FE model, too, in which case the bottom and upper panels correspond to (2-9) and 
(2-10), respectively. We define the set of the interior long run solutions to (2-10) for q 
and X as N o FE and L o FE, respectively:
(2 -1 1 ) = {J?> 0 : / ( l >7/) = 0 }, I ?
these are the equivalent of No in (2-8) and Lo in (2-4).
The intuition for the proof of the main result in this chapter (Result 2-4 below) 
goes as follows. Since (2-10) is identical to (1-34), the sets N o  and N o FE are identical as 
well, though generically the sets Lo and LoFE are not. (In particular, asymmetric steady 
states differ). What is important, however, is that the number of solutions to the two
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models is identical. A final intermediate result is needed before we can turn to the proof 
proper:
Result 2-3. The FE model admits at most 3 interior steady states, viz.
#LoFE<3.
Proof. See appendix.
We have at last everything at hand to prove the main result of this chapter, 
namely that #Lo is no larger than 3 for the CP model as well.
2.3. On the number of steady-states and stability analysis
In this section we show three results. First, the CP model admits at most three 
interior steady states. Second, asymmetric interior steady states are always unstable. 
Finally, location displays hysteresis in a well-defmed sense. We turn to the issue of 
determining the generic number of steady states first.
On the num ber o f  steady-states
Result 2-4. The CP model admits at most 3 interior steady states.
Proof. Start with the FE model. Using Result 2-2 and Result 2-3 we have 
#NoFE<3. Since (2-10) is identical to (1-34), it must be that No—NoFE.
Using Result 2 - 2  again we find #L o-#N o= #N oFE=#U)FE. This implies 
#Lo<3 and establishes the result. QED.
Figure 2-2 plots the famous 'tomahawk bifurcation diagram'. It plots (j) on the 
horizontal axis against X and shows the stable steady states in plain lines and the 
unstable ones in dotted lines. We infer from the figure and the analysis in Chapter 1 that 
when trade/transportation costs are high (<|><<|)sust) the only stable steady state is the 
symmetric one. In particular, the core-periphery structure is said not to be 'sustainable' 
(hence the name of the threshold (|)sust). When trade integration is deep enough ((|)>(j)break) 
the only stable configuration is the core-periphery structure; the stability of the 
symmetric steady state is said to be ’broken' (hence the name of the threshold (|>break). For 
intermediate values of <\> both the dispersed and the core-periphery outcomes are stable;
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there are also two interior, asymmetric steady states. These are always unstable because 
(j)sust<(j)break in this model (see Result 2-5 below). This form of multiplicity of equilibria 
also implies that location is path-dependent. 45 In order to establish that the bifurcation 
diagram has the shape drawn in Figure 2, we need to rank the 'break' and 'sustain' 
points, as defined in the sequel. We turn to this issue next. As an aside, it should be 
noted that doing so using the 'natural' state-space, viz. (1-34) or (2-10), is much simpler 
than it is using (2-1) or (2-9).
Figure 2-2: The Tomahawk Diagram
x
1/2
H ysteresis
As is well known, two local stability tests are usually applied in the NEG 
literature.46 A first question we may ask is, 'is the core-periphery structure sustainable?' 
To answer this question we solve for the lowest value of (j) in [0,1] such that it is just 
profitable to produce in the periphery. That is, we imposerj=0 (or r|=co) and q=l in 
(1-34) or (2-10) and solve for (j>; this gives us the following implicit definition of the 
'sustain point' <()sust:
( M 2 ) < \ + % ) ( r ty - e - ( r t)2- x = o
45 To see this, fix <J) in (<t)sust, <{>break) for some time t+At. Also, assume that at time t (j) was either below <f>sust 
-in  which case A(t)=14— or greater than <|)break -in  which case X(t) e  (0,1}. Clearly, X(t+At) = X(t) by (2-3). 
In other words, location displays hysteresis.
46 Generally, these test are also valid to asses the global stability o f the system. See Chapter 1.
This expression holds for both the CP and the FE models (remember, they are 
isomorphic). The comer steady states are stable whenever <j>><|)sust.
We may also ask an alternative question: When is the symmetric equilibrium 
stable? To answer this question, we sign dco/dA, at \=Vi. Since q is strictly increasing in 
co and r\ is increasing in X by Result 2-1 this is equivalent to signing dq/dr| around r\=\. 
This is much simpler than dealing with the usual equations in (2-1), as we did for the 
FCVL of Chapter 1. To see this, note first that r)=l implies that all endogenous ratios 
are equal to unity by symmetry of the model, viz. Y=A=q=l. This is handy because in 
that case dlnY=dY, dlnA=dA, and dlnq=dq. Next, using the previous fact, it is easy to 
show that total differentiation of the system in (1-34) can be written in matrix form as:
where Z is defined as Z =(l-([>)/( 1+(|)). Using Cramer's rule, we find that dq/dr) equals 
zero if and only if Z{6 - Z _,)(l -  %)(l + z ) _1 + Z - 0  = 0. Solving for Z>0 (4><1) gives 
the solution for the 'break point'; the corresponding value for (j) is defined as:
which is in (0,1) by the no black-hole condition and (2-6). The symmetric steady state is 
unstable whenever (|)>(()break. Interestingly, when forward linkages are absent (like in 
Baldwin 1999) the break and sustain points coincide, viz. 0=0 implies (|>break=(|)sust.
Using the definitions of % and 0, (2-12) and (2-14) are of course equivalent to 
Eq. (5.17) and Eq. (5.28) in Fujita et al. (1999, pp. 70, 74) and the corresponding points 
in Forslid (1999) and Ottaviano (2001). It remains to describe the stability properties of 
the asymmetric interior steady states, namely, of ^ o^LcAC/i) or r|oeNo\(l). We turn to 
this issue next.
Stability o f  the asym m etric interior steady-states
We claim that whenever they exist such steady states are unstable. To this aim, a 
look at Figure 2 confirms that it is sufficient to show that (j>sust<(|)break holds.
(2-13)
1 0  0  dY
0 6 - Z ~ ] -1 dA
- Z  Z - 6  1 dq
d  < \ - z W + z )  
 = -1  drj
 0
(2-14)
Result 2-5. If  they exist, asymmetric equilibria are unstable.
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Proof. We have to show that <j)sust<(|)break 47 First, we characterize how the 
function h ^ sx + t^ -O + x )1-0, which is just a transformation of the expression in (2 - 1 2 ), 
changes with <|). This function is of interest since <))sust is one of its roots. With some 
work we can show three facts: (a) h (l ) = 0  and h'(l)> 0 ; (b) h(0 ) > 0  and h'(0 )<0 ; (c) 
h(.)has a unique minimum. This is illustrated in Figure 2-3, in which we plot h as a 
function of (j). As can be seen on the graph, the previous properties of h taken together 
imply that h has a unique root between zero and unity. Next, we show that h(<|)break)<0, 
which is only possible if (|)sust<(j)break, given the shape of h(.). To this end, observe that 
h(<|)break)is a function of x and 0. Call this new function g(x$) and note that the partial of 
g with respect to x is positive (not immediate, but true) and g(l,.) is zero . 48 The point of 
all this is that the upper bound of g, and thus the upper bound of h(<|)break), is zero. We 
know, therefore, that for permissible values of x and 0, <|)sust<<|)break as claimed. QED.
Figure 2-3: Proving the <|)break><|>sust
.sust
.break
0
This completes the proof and implies that the asymmetric interior steady states 
are unstable.
47 Here we only sketch the proof, since Neary (2001) contains a detailed proof building on this.
48 To make this last point is easy: x= l implies p=0 (and hence and 0=0) in any model; from (2-14) this in 
turn implies <|)break= l and we know that h(l)=0; the rest follows from the definition o f  g(.).
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2.4. Concluding remarks
In this chapter I have shown that the original Core-Periphery (CP) model and the 
alternative Footloose-Entrepreneur (FE) model can be entirely characterized by the 
same set of equations in the appropriate state-cum- parameter space; in other words, 
they are isomorphic -see expressions (1-34) and (2-10). In particular, the natural state 
variable of these models is the mobile expenditure. This implies that the relevant 
variable to look at in empirical studies based on these models is the spatial distribution 
of expenditure or income (rather than population) of mobile factors. Because (1-34) and 
(2 - 1 0 ) are identical, it is sufficient to describe the properties of either to know the 
stability properties of both the CP and FE models. In both of these models 
agglomeration is driven by labour mobility.
Agglomeration mechanisms other than migration have been put forward, too. On 
the one hand are the models based on factor accumulation; among them, the 
'Constructed-Capital' (CC) model of Baldwin (1999) is isomorphic to the CP and FE 
models so (1-34) and Result 2-4 hold for these as well (the CC model is a special case 
in which forward linkages are absent). On the other hand are the models based on 
input-output, or 'vertical', linkages among firms. The FCVL model introduced in 
Chapter 1 is isomorphic to the CP and FE models, too, and, as such shares their 
dynamic properties (see the Appendix to Chapter 1).
It should be possible to develop an extension of the proof of this chapter for the 
'Core-Periphery Vertical-Linkages' (CPVL for short) model of Krugman and Venables 
(1995) and Fujita et al. (1999, section 14.2). In these models, factor owners are 
immobile across regions but labour moves from one sector to the other so that nominal 
wages are equalized within each region across sectors. The definition of the relevant 
parameters % and 0 and law of motion in (2-3) must be changed accordingly.
For the method developed here to be applied to the CPVL model as well, 
however, we need a supplementary trick because this model has two state variables, not 
one. We can do as if this was not the case and use a relation similar to (2-2) and show 
that this approximates the CPVL model when q * 1 (namely, outside state-states) but 
that the model is exactly characterized by (1-34) otherwise. What remains to be shown 
formally is that approximating the model this way does not eliminate (nor adds) any 
new steady state, nor does it change the stability analysis. This would imply that the
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CPVL model is isomorphic to the CP model at the steady-states only; this true only as 
an approximation elsewhere. This task is left for further research.
It is my hope that the present chapter is helpful in understanding why most of 
the NEG models that build on the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition are so 
strikingly similar and how the agglomeration and dispersion forces interact in such a 
way that no more than five steady-states ever exist. Common functional forms are 
necessary for the isomorphism result. However, it is extremely remarkable that they are 
sufficient as well, since the mechanisms driving agglomeration differ from one model to 
the next, as does the interpretation of the parameters.
Appendix
Proof ofljemma 1. We have to show that V 77 e [0 ,oo) there exists a 
X e [0,1] for which 77 = 9Jt(X) . Start with X = 0; by (2-2) we know that 
w2 = 1 and by definition of 77, viz. 77 = XwJ{{ 1 -  X)w2) ,  this implies 
77 = 0 . By symmetry, we know that X = 1 implies 77 = 00. In other words,
9JT maps the least (greatest) element o f the domain into the least 
(greatest) element o f the range. Consequendy, if 9JIQ is continuous then
to any 77 in the range [0 ,oo) corresponds at least one X in the domain of 
SUt(-). Next, if we can show that w, and w2 are continuous in X, then 77 
is continuous in X, too. By (2-2), w, (X) is continuous if, and only if, 
w,(2 ,)/w>2 (A) is continuous, as long as both w, and w2 are strictly 
positive. Define A = X / ( \ -X )  and w = w f w 2 , and rewrite (2-1) using 
the ratio notation to get:
(M S ) y = ^ ± J L ;  A = A* 7 + C
1 + A w% (/)Kw +1 Y(j> + A
Three things can readily be noted from (2-15). First, whenever $ > 0,
X = A = 0 implies =(%/(f>+ </))/(% +1), a real, finite, and positive 
number. Also, w is finite and positive, viz. w<£ {0 ,oo}, for all A .
Assume not, i.e. set w = 0 or w = oo in (2-15); this implies
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0  = ( z  + 1)/(Z /V  + in third expression whenever ^ > 0 , a 
contradiction. Finally, no denominator in the three expressions o f (2-15) 
nor w1-0" is ever non-positive. These facts imply that each endogenous 
variable in (2-15), namely Y, A and w, is a continuous function o f A 
(and o f A in turn). We can back up this result for w,(A) and w2 (A) to 
claim that these two functions are continuous, too. As we saw, this in 
turn implies that HJt(-) is continuous, and, together with the fact that 
9Jl(0) = 0 and DTC(l) = oo, that 9H(-) is a surjection. QED.
Proof of Lemma 2. Differentiate (2-15) at the symmetric steady-state to get:
(2-16)
" 1 0 -(l-*)/(l + z ) ~dY~ ~(i-z)/(i+z)"
0 1 (<j —i)z dA = z
-z z <7 dw _ 0
d  A
Solve for dw/dA  and plug this into drj = dw + d A to get:
o-(l + Z)(2-17) drj
~di
= </>■
>1=1/2 r </>2 + (2 < J - l) ( \  + z)<t> + Z
this is positive by inspection, as was to be shown. QED.
Proof ofPisult 2-1. (a) To each rj corresponds at least one A, by Lemma 1 . 
So we are left to show that to each rj corresponds at most one A 
(namely, 9JI is an injection, too). The proof is by contradiction. Assume 
that there are two tuples {A, w,, w2, Y}, 72, G,, G2} and
{A, tv,, w2, Y}, Y2, G], G2} that solve (2-8) and such that 7  = Aw, /((l -  A)w2) 
and 7  = Aw,/((1 -  A)w2) . Let A and Y be the equivalent to A and Y in 
(1-34) for the second tuple. Assume 7  = 7  and A * A . This implies 
(w,/w2) ^ (w,/w2) by (2-2) and Y = Y by the first expression in (1-34). 
Next, using the wage equations in (2-15), we obtain:
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(2-18) . w - 6  ~ w - d )
A  — = A  ±r, w  =
1 —<f)W 1 — (f)W
/  \ a w, /  ~  \ CT w,w =
Vw2 y
From the relative price index in (1-34), we find:
(2-19) ^  _  rj +  (fiw ~ _  77 + (f)w
(f>TJ + w ' (f>7J + W
Substituting for A and 8  into (2-18) implies
(w -  w)(l + 77X77 + mv)( 1 -  (f)1) = 0  . Since (p < 1 , this holds if, and only if,
w = w . This contradicts (w,/w2) (w,/w2) . Hence, to each 77
corresponds only one X. (b) The proof immediately follows from 
Lemma 2  and (a) above. QED.
We note that the corresponding lemmas and result hold for the FE and FCVL
models.
Proof ofPisult 2-3. 49 From (2-9), it is possible to get analytical solutions 
for u>, and w2. Using the definition of (Oj and the ratio notation, we get:
(2-20) co = X<p + (\-X)<b
{\-X)cp + X<&
X + (\-X)(p 
X<p + { \ - X)
where O = ( x  + ^ 2)(cr + A7) /(2o") is a collection o f parameters. Simple 
algebra reveals that CO generically admits two flat points. Indeed, the 
numerator o f dXrvco/dX is a second-order polynomial in X. Indeed, 
dlnco/dA, is equal to:
(2-21)
0(1 -  (p2)[X(p + (1 -  X)®][XO + (1 -  X)cp] -  (O2 -  (,t>2)[X(f) + (1 -  X)][X + (1 -  X)(p] 
[Xcp + (1 -  X)®][X® + (1 -  X)cp][X(p + (1 -  X)][X + (1 -  X)<p]
49 Forslid and Ottaviano (2001) independently developed the proof for this result.
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This implies that dco/d)I equals zero at mot twice which, in turn, implies 
that the set in (2-4) admits at most three zeroes for the FO model.
Hence we write # L™ < 3. QED.
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C hapter 3. T h e  'VOTE-MARKET EFFECT',
o r , t h e  P o l it ic a l  E c o n o m ic s
OF INDUSTRY LOCATION
3.1. Introduction
The de-location process associated with trade integration has been a major 
concern for European policy makers for decades. It is reflected, for instance, in the 
quadrupling of cohesion spending as a share of the EU budget since 1986, and in the 
important level of spending by member states on their disadvantaged regions such 
Germany's Eastern Lander and Italy's Mezzogiomo. Much of this spending is explicitly 
aimed at preventing, delaying or even reversing the agglomeration of economic activity 
in favoured regions.
The aim of the present chapter is to address the issue of agglomeration during a 
process of regional integration in a framework where regional policy is determined by 
political economy forces. More precisely, taking a laissez-faire equilibrium as a 
benchmark, we show how politics and economic integration interact in both directions 
to speed up or slow down the agglomeration process that results from integration.
State intervention at the regional level could take any form, from infrastructure 
spending to tax reduction and so forth. To be concrete we focus on a location-specific 
subsidy that reduces the fixed cost a firm faces when setting up production in the 
subsidised region. In our simple model, the fixed cost consists of only capital, so the 
location subsidy ends up as a subsidy to capital (and, in equilibrium, to the level of 
production). The interaction between the two regions at the political level determines 
the direction and the amount of the regional subsidy. We assume lump-sum transfers are 
available; in this context, the policy instrument chosen is non-distortionary, which 
implies that the results of our analysis do not depend upon the choice of instrument.
The political economy model we work with is based on electoral competition 
rather than on a lobbying approach. Sectoral concerns are likely to be transmitted to the 
decision makers through lobbying activities (see e.g. Becker 1983, Grossman and 
Helpman 1995, Olson 1965). However, when we look at regional issues, we see regions 
as spatial entities and not as sectors. Since they are often recognized as distinct entities 
in the political system, regions are more likely to influence the policy outcome directly,
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i.e. through elections. Hence, we will not rely on a lobbying approach to characterize 
the political game. Instead, we use a Hotelling-Downs probabilistic-voting model 
(Hinich 1977, Ledyard 1984).
Probabilistic-voting models (also referred to as swing-voter models) feature a 
second, political, dimension, in addition to the economic-policy dimension that 
characterizes median-voter models. Voters are endowed with non-policy preferences 
over the two parties (what we call 'ideology'). The economic-policy dimension is, by 
assumption, orthogonal to 'ideology'. Candidates know voters' preferences when it 
comes to the economic issue at hand, but they know only the distribution of voters' 
preferences in the ideology dimension. As we shall see, this assumption implies a 
dramatic departure from the median voter's 'dictatorship' (Hinich 1977); in particular, 
the outcome can be non-majoritarian on some (or even all) dimensions. The key is that 
the 'swing voter' (the voter whose ballot can be thought of as winning the election) need 
not be the voter whose preferences reflect the median in the economic dimension 
because voters also care about ideology. In this set up, a group of voters with 
particularly uniform ideology are more likely to be swing voters. Knowing this, 
candidates will craft their policy platforms to cater to the economic interest of this 
group. 50
We assume that the population in the urban region is more widely spread out 
along the ideology dimension than the population in the small, rural one. We make this 
assumption on the grounds that economic activities and, hence, special interests are 
more variegated in more urbanized regions than in less urbanized ones (or, equivalently, 
that regional policy is a less salient issue) . 51 As we shall see, this stylised fact will shift 
the equilibrium policy variable in favour of the economically small region (see Persson 
and Tabellini 2000, chapter 3) . 52
Indeed, there is some indirect evidence that politically powerful regions are not 
always the largest ones when it comes to regional policies. As an illustration, take the
50 See Coughlin (1992) for an exhaustive analysis o f the probabilistic voting approach to representative 
democracy and Anderson et al. (1992) for the theory o f discrete choice when preferences are random.
51 This stylised fact - that larger cities tend to be more diversified - is one o f many on city diversity and 
specialisation, as surveyed by Duranton and Puga (2000).
52 The fact that small groups sometimes possess disproportionate political power is not new in the 
literature. Alternative explanations exist. For instance, small groups can presumably circumvent the free­
rider problem since they are more easily able to organise themselves into pressure groups (Olson 1965). 
Or the electoral system might incite competing candidates to appeal to narrowly defined and specific 
groups rather than more broadly (Myerson 1993, Persson and Tabellini 2000, chapter 8).
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repartition of the EU 1994-99 budget devoted to the 'Structural Funds'. Almost 72% of 
this was allocated to 'Objective 1' European regions, namely to regions that are mainly 
peripheral and with relatively little industrial activities. 53 All the same, people living in 
'Objective 1' European regions accounted for approximately 26% of the total European 
population. In total, aids used to finance objectives with a specifically regional nature 
(Objectives 1, 2, 5b and, the recently created, 6 ) accounted for 87% of the total 
Structural Funds. The same bent can be found also at the national level. In 1999-2000, 
for example, subsidies granted to firms located in the Mezzogiomo (Southern Italy), 
where 36% of the total Italian population lives, were twice as much as those given to 
firms located in the rest of the country. 54
In addition to accounting for the commonly observed phenomenon of anti­
agglomeration policy, the endogenisation of policy has interesting implications for the 
economic geography literature. Once regional policy is considered as a political issue, 
economic integration does not necessarily lead to full agglomeration of industries in the 
larger region, as the orthodox geography model would predict. The location of 
economic activity will depend both on the economic home-market effect and on what 
we call by analogy the vote-market effect. As usual, we find that low levels of openness 
to trade correspond to dispersed outcomes (neither region attracts all firms), but 
sufficiently high levels of openness result in a core-periphery pattern. One of our novel 
results concerns the location of the core (orthodox economic geography models predict 
that it must be in the big region). However, if the economically small region is 
politically over-represented, the big region attracts the core if and only if  its relative 
economic size overcomes its relative political weakness. Finally, and interestingly, 
although the equilibrium spatial allocation of industry is never ambiguous, the question 
of which region gets subsidised has an ambiguous answer, the answer being determined 
by both economic and political considerations. As we shall see, this is partly due to the 
fact that agglomeration creates quasi-rents that can be taxed in the core without leading 
to re-location.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section introduces the 
basic economic model and solves it taking the policy variable as given. Section 3 
presents the reduced form of the welfare functions and discusses how utility is affected
53 Formally, 'Objective 1' regions are regions with per capita GDP below 75% of the EU's average.
54 The sources are Eurostat for the EU data and the Italian Treasury's 'Terzo Rapporto sullo Sviluppo 
Territoriale, 1999-2000' for the Italian data.
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by the policy choice, still exogenously given. In Section 4 the economic model is 
integrated into a political economy model and the two are solved together. Section 5 
discusses the results. The concluding section considers some casual empirics that 
support our model. Some proofs are relegated to the appendix.
3.2. The augmented FC model
The FC model on which this chapter builds is described at length in Chapter 1, 
so here we skip the details but stress the additional assumptions. The basic set-up 
consists of two regions (1 and 2) that belong to the same nation; two factors (labour L 
and physical capital K) and two sectors, manufacturing M and agriculture A.
Individuals have identical preferences, endowments, and technology. Regions differ in 
their size only, so that region 1 is just the upscale version of region 2. In particular, 1 is 
endowed with A>1 times as much of both capital and labour as 2. For this reason, we 
will sometimes refer to A as the relative economic strength of region 1 (or, equivalently, 
as the relative economic weakness of region 2 ).
Turn to technology. Both labour and capital are used to produce the 
differentiated good M under increasing return to scale and monopolistic competition. 
Production of each manufacturing variety involves a one-time fixed cost consisting of 
one unit of K and a per-unit-of-output cost consisting of (3 units of L. Sector A produces 
a homogenous good under constant return to scale and perfect competition using one 
units of labour per unit of output. Labour is the only input. This good is also chosen as 
the numeraire. Labour is perfectly mobile across sectors, but immobile across regions.
Physical capital can move freely between regions, but capital owners cannot, so 
all K-reward is repatriated to the country of origin. Industrial and agricultural goods are 
traded. Trade in A is costless. Industrial trade is impeded by frictional (i.e., ’iceberg') 
import and barriers and transportation costs such that r  > 1  units of a good must be 
shipped in order to sell one unit abroad. In this chapter r  is mostly interpreted as 
technical trade barriers (r generated no tariff revenue). Accordingly, we refer to regional 
integration as a gradual fall in r.
Preferences of the representative consumer comprise the usual Cobb-Douglas 
nest of a CES aggregate of industrial varieties and consumption of the A-good. More 
precisely, in this chapter we take a logarithmic functional form, viz. U=juln(M)+(l-
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p)lnA, where M is the CES composite of all manufacturing varieties and A is the 
amount of good A consumed.
Each region's representative consumer owns the entire region's L and K and her 
income (and expenditure) equals wL+pK, where p is the private return on capital; there 
is no tariff revenue with iceberg barriers. This consumer pays lump-sum tax T so as to 
finance the central government's government regional policy, hence her disposable 
income is wL+pK-T. There are no savings in this static model, so private expenditure 
equals disposable income. Therefore, we can write:
(3-1) Ex = L x+ p K x- L xT
and E2 is isomorphic.
We assume that state intervention consists of a subsidy to firm's fixed costs. As 
such subsidies are independent of output and, given that the one-time fixed cost consists 
of one unit of K, they actually represent a subsidy to capital.55 Let n\ (712) be the before­
subsidy capital reward, equal to operating profits by free-entry, to entrepreneurs 
producing in region 1 (region 2). Also, define 0 as 711/712, with 0>O. When rural 
production is subsidized, 0>1 and 0-1 is the ad-valorem subsidy given to capital owners 
who produce in that region, regardless of the region they reside in. Under these 
circumstances, 0712 is the capital reward for producing in 2 and 711 is the capital reward 
for producing in 1. When 0<1, 1/0-1 is the ad-valorem subsidy given to capital owners 
producing in region 1. In this case, capital owners that set up their firms in 1 get 7i]/0, 
those setting up their firms in 2 get 712. Clearly 0=1 means that capital is not subsidized 
anywhere and the lower is |0-1|, the smaller is the subsidy.
In what follows the location subsidy is determined implicitly as the result of a 
political game between the two regions. The fact that at most one region is subsidized at 
a time is without loss of generality. This is because, in New Economic Geography (and 
related) models, only relative sizes matter (see Chapter 2). Moreover, this is always an 
equilibrium even in the more general case in which both regions can be subsidized.56
Competition for K drives operating profits up to the level where pure profits are 
eliminated, so K's reward in 1 is the operating profit of a typical region 1-based firm. A
55 By free-entry, though, this will be equivalent at equilibrium to a subsidy to the value o f  sales (estimated 
at f.o.b. prices) and hence to the quantity o f output.
56 We can also use perturbations to the game so that this would be the unique equilibrium.
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similar condition holds in 2. When production takes place in both regions, perfect 
capital mobility equalizes the after tax/subsidies rewards to capital across regions, i.e. 
pi=P2 in equilibrium. Due to subsidies, however, before tax/subsidies rewards n\ and 712 
can differ. In particular, when setting a firm in region 2 is subsidized (viz. 0>1), the 
prevailing equilibrium private return on capital p is equal to 7Ti=07C2- When 0<1, namely 
when firms in 1 are subsidized, p=7Ti/0=7t2.
Since manufacturing firms need one unit of capital per variety, and capital is 
inter-regionally mobile (even though its reward is repatriated), capital's full- 
employment condition requires the total mass of firms to be equal to the aggregate mass 
of capital, which we normalise, to unity. Hence the location equilibrium is entirely 
determined by the proportion n of firms that settle in 1. As usual, it is even more 
convenient to work with ratios: 0 can be interpreted as the ratio of subsidies granted to 
firms in 2 to the subsidies granted to firms in 1. Similarly, we write r\ as the mass of 
firms that settle in 1 over the mass of firms that settle in 2, viz. r|=n/(l-n). In the same 
spirit, A represents both the relative population sizes and relative nominal incomes as 
the result of three assumptions taken together. First, capital ownership is uniform across 
the country (made of regions 1 and 2). Second, free trade in A and free capital mobility 
ensure that nominal rewards are equalized throughout. Finally, everybody pays the same 
per-capita tax T in this economy.
T is endogenous in the model. We assume the government has a unique role -to 
set the regional policy. Hence T is a function of 0. Imagine 0>1 so that firms in 2 are 
subsidised. Therefore, the government budget is balanced if, and only if,
(3-2) T(Ll +L2) = W - l ) ( \ - n ) x 2
where the left-hand side is the government revenue and the right-hand side represents 
the ad-valorem subsidy paid on the operating profit that the (1-n) firms that operate in 
region 2 obtain. As always, an equilibrium condition is that expenditures on M's output 
is equal to the value of this output, viz. p(Ei+E2)=npiXi+(l-n)p2X2 . As we saw in 
Chapter 1, it is a regular feature of the DS monopolistic competition framework that 
tci=piXi/ct and 7i2=p2X2/cr, where the p's are producer prices and the x's are typical 
outputs. Using this, we can plug (3-2) into (3-1) to get an expression for p (as a function 
of 0 and the parameters of the model and aggregate endowments), viz. p[n+(l-n)/0](a- 
p)=p(Li+L2). This is not interesting in itself. What is more important is that incomes do
not depend on 0or on p. Indeed, plug this expression for p in (3-2) and (3-1) to get:
(3- 3) £ , = £ , - ? — , E, = L2 — ——
<7 — n  c r - ju
which is identical to the case without subsidy and hence ensures that the following 
result holds:
Result 3-1. Relative expenditures are a function of relative endowments 
only, viz. E i /E 2 =A.
To get an intuition for this result, note that each individual is both a taxpayer and a 
capital owner. Since taxes are collected in a lump sum fashion, there is no efficiency 
loss associated with the introduction of the policy. This ensures that what each 
consumer gives with the left hand as a taxpayer will be paid back to her right hand as a 
capital owner. Of course, if  capital ownership is not uniform, the policy has re­
distributive effects. In any case, though, this has no aggregate effect.
We now have everything at hand to solve for the equilibrium location of the
model.
Equilibrium  location
To solve for q, we use the same technique as in Chapter 1. For convenience, we 
rewrite here the equilibrium expressions for the operating profits. As in Chapter 1 
define n as the average profit prevailing in this nation, viz. 7r=nTCi+(l-n)7T2. Accordingly, 
define qj as Uj/n and ej as Ej/(Ei+E2) (j=\,2). Note that ej is proportional to the 
population in j, so that ei/e2=A. With these definitions, the equilibrium solutions for the 
operating profits can be written as:
(3' 4) *  = — 7 7 7  n ,
The solution for q2 is isomorphic.
With capital mobility, the number of varieties produced in a region may differ 
from the region's capital stock, so we also have to determine the equilibrium location of 
manufactures. To close the model, we invoke the non-arbitrage condition on capital 
markets. The novelty here is that returns on capital may be taxed on a regional basis,
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hence free capital mobility ensures that 711/7 1 2 = 0  whenever firms are active in both 
regions (with the obvious Kuhn-Tucker conditions more generally).
The solution to this problem, as expressed for r|, is:
(3_5) ( 1 - d f l A - f l g - f l
-(1 -  6(t>)K(j) + (0-<t>)
This expression holds for admissible values of q, namely when parameters are such that 
0<r|<+oo. Outside this parameter space, q equals zero or + 0 0  in an obvious manner. This 
expression is more informative than what might be inferred at first sight. By inspection, 
region l's relative share of firms q is increasing in l's relative size A and is decreasing 
in region l's relative cost o f capital 0. Moreover, q is larger than A if A>1>0 (not 
immediate, but true). These inequalities illustrate effects that will be recurrent in the 
sequel.
Expression (3-5) is the fulcrum of our analysis, so it is worth studying it in the 
absence of subsidies, i.e. when 0=1. In this case the equilibrium q becomes:
A -(j)
<3-6) 7 L  = 1 -A 0
When 1 is larger, making trade freer (d<j)>0) results in a de-location of firms to the big 
region. This is consistent with the 'New Trade' models a-la Krugman (1980). In 
particular, the Home-Market effect (HME) manifests itself as:
«»> 5
W 2 1 1-  —-  > 1; lim rj = + 0 0
(1 -A  <f>y
The first expression above says that a larger region will get a more than proportional, 
larger share of industry. It holds whenever <|><1/A. On the other hand, when <|>>1/A the 
second expression in (3-7) says that all firms cluster in 1, viz. q=+oo or n=l. In words, 
all firms cluster in the larger region when trade costs are low enough ((j) sufficiently 
close to unity), yet strictly positive strictly lower than unity). Note also the 
magnification effect of trade liberalisation of the first term, viz. c^q/dAd^O. These 
results are a re-statement of Result 2-7.
In order to isolate the effect of a subsidy on the firm allocation share, we now 
take the opposite simplifying case and calculate the equilibrium q for A=1 and take the 
first derivative of this with respect to 1/0. Using (3-5), it is easy to show that dq/d(l/0)
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is larger than one when A=1. This says that one additional unit of subsidy given to 1 
leads to a more than proportional change in de-location towards 1. We call this property 
the Home-Subsidy effect by analogy with the HME. Trade liberalisation magnifies this 
effect as well, viz. 52ri/5(l/0)5(()>O. To sum-up:
Result 3-2. Ceteris paribus, the region that has the larger income or the 
region that is subsidised has an equilibrium share o f firm that is more 
than proportionally larger than its relative income or than its relative 
subsidy. These biases are magnified by low values of <|>.
Both the home market and the home subsidy effects will be used in the following 
sections to help boost intuition.
Finally, equilibrium A-sector output is determined as a residual.
3.3. The ‘subsidy effect5 on location
The purpose of this chapter is to determine 0, and ultimately r\, as the outcome 
of antagonist political forces. Bet let us pose a minute and study first the effects of 0 on 
r) and on welfare, as these are important to understand the role of the subsidies of the 
political game to be introduced in the next section.
Start with the following definitions:
(3-8) 9 = max{0 : n = 1}, 6 = min{<9 : n = 0}, 0  = [#,#]
where n is the location equilibrium given by (3-5), with n=r|/(l+r|).
Figure 3-1 plots 6 and 9 as a function of trade freeness (j) for a given value of
A. The former shows the minimum level of subsidization necessary to attract all firms in 
the small region 2. The latter shows the minimum level of subsidy (possibly negative) to 
firms located in region 1 that is necessary to concentrate industry there. 0  is the vertical 
interval between the two curves. Substituting r|=0 and r | = + o o  in (3-5), these two 
parameters and the interval they form are defined respectively as:
(3.9) 0 SA ± £ .; 0 - 's i±AC; em[ e , 0 ]
(l + A ) f  ~ (l + AW 
As is possible to see from the top curve, the freer is trade, the smaller is the subsidy
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required to attract all the firms to region 2 because liberalization amplifies the effect of 
a subsidy. This is because location becomes ever more sensitive to regional disparities 
as (j) increases, be they in size, in the cost of capital (the variable affected by the
subsidy), or anything else. Note that, since 9 > 1 holds V<|> the minimum level of subsidy 
to industries in region 2 that makes this small region the core is always positive: a 
positive regional policy is necessary in order to offset the tendency of the small region 
to lose firms as (j) rises.
Figure 3-1. Subsidies and equilibrium location
Subsidy to 2
Subsidy to 1
1/A
The converse is not necessarily true, as a look at 9 (the bottom curve) shows: 
the relationship between the minimum level of subsidies to firms located in region 1 
necessary to keep all the firms in the same region and the level of trade integration is 
bell-shaped. The reason is that the HME works in favour of the large region, so that a 
small tax on firms there (or, equivalently, a small subsidy on potential firms in 2) is 
ineffective in making any firm move to the smaller region for any <|)>1/A. The fact that 
taxing capital in the Core does not necessarily lead it to relocate comes in sharp contrast 
to the classical results on tax competition.
It is also instructive to consider the effectiveness of a given level of subsidy to 
region 2's firms along the integration path. In particular consider what are the location 
effects when $ varies with the level of 0 fixed at some arbitrary 0f in the diagram. When
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(j) is relatively close to zero there is some economic activity in both regions since 0e@. 
As the two regions become more integrated, the HME starts dominating the subsidy 
effect. From point A onwards, the relative strength of the HME is so reinforced by an 
ongoing integration process that this level of subsidy to industrial activity in 2 is 
completely ineffective and this small region becomes the periphery region On—»a>) in 
spite of the subsidy on offer. As (j) continues to increase, the relative strength of the 
HME decreases and eventually, when point B is reached, some of the firms start leaving 
region 1 (which is hence no longer a core). Things get even worse for the larger region 
as transportation costs fall further: to the right of point C the core is in 2. Again, if we 
take the model literally, this shows how effective regional policy is when (j) is close to 
unity: without any subsidy (0=1), the core would be (and remain) in 1 from point A' 
onwards.
Lastly note that an increase in A makes the HME become stronger. As it is 
possible to see from (3-9), a higher value of A makes both 0 and 6 shift upward. The
upward movement of 6 indicates that, given <|>, in order to compensate for the fact that 
the big market attracts firms. As a result the minimum subsidy to region 2's firms 
needed to keep the core there has to be higher. Likewise, the upward shift of # implies 
that the minimum subsidy level needed to ensure that the core is in region 1 is now 
lower. Conversely, the range of trade freeness for which a small subsidy offered to 
location in 2 is still compatible with the core remaining in region 1 is wider.
The 'subsidy effect* on welfare
Since equilibrium nominal incomes are function of the parameters only, in 
particular they are invariant in r\ or 0, the welfare of the representative individual is 
function of the price index prevailing in the region she lives in. Mathematically, the 
assumed functional forms give us the following expression for the indirect utility 
functions:
(3-10) M
CT-H
+ — In 
c r - 1
m + t
rj(0) +1
for region 1 's representative consumer and
(3-11) V2(0 ;t)  = ln In
c r - 1
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for region 2's representative consumer, with r\ taken from (3-5). The first term in the 
right-hand side of each expression above is the (log of) per-capita income and the 
second term is the true price index for each representative consumer. As can easily been 
inferred from these expressions, welfare is monotonically increasing in the ratio of firms 
that locate in the agent's region as this person would then save on transportation costs. 
See Chapter 1 for details.
This implies that dVi/frrpO and dXVdriO. Since r| itself is decreasing in 0, we 
have the obvious relationship between indirect utilities and the subsidy given to region 
2: dV\/dQ<0 and 3V2/d0>O. Of course, (3-10) and (3-11) hold for values of r| in (0,+°o) 
or, which is the same thing by (3-8), for values of 0 in 0 . Hence, we have:
Result 3-3. 0 and 0 are the bliss points o f any individual in the regions 
1 and 2, respectively.
With this analysis at hand, we now turn to the political process that shall determine 0 
and x].
3.4. The voting model
The political environment is as follows. Both regions belong to the same 
constituency. All voters, whether living in 1 (as Li of them do) or in 2 (as Li of them 
do), chose a candidate from the same set of candidates. This set is exogenously given 
for simplicity.
The political game belongs to the Hotelling-Ledyard class of models and makes 
the following assumptions (see Osborne, 1995):
1. The policy space 0  as defined in (3-8) is one-dimensional;
2. The set of candidates {A,B} is fixed and finite;
3. Each candidate is 'Downsian' in that she cares only about winning office 
and is assumed to maximize her expected number of votes;
4. The number of citizens, whose preferences are monotonic on 0 , is finite 
and equal to L1+L2 ;
5. Candidates simultaneously choose a position on 0  (their 'platform');
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6. Having observed the candidates' platform, voters decide whether to vote 
or not and, if so, for which candidate. Voting is costless.
Additionally, our formulation of the voting model follows Lindbeck and Weibull 
(1984). Candidates differ not only on the policy issue (i.e. in their platform), but also on 
a second dimension, orthogonal to the policy space -call it ideology or party 
membership. The ideology of a candidate is not part of her platform because she cannot 
credibly change it, by assumption.57
Voters derive utility both from consumption and how much their own ideology 
matches the winning candidate’s own, assumed to be unrelated to consumption for 
simplicity. Hence, their utility function has, in fact, two components. The materialistic 
component (V\ and V2 as derived in (3-10) and (3-11) above) is directly affected by the 
subsidy policy and is known to both candidates.
The other component of people's utility is derived from other policies proposed 
by the competing parties or by attributes specific to the candidates. Importantly, the 
candidates know only the distribution of the voters along this dimension. Hence, in 
effect, voters face a discrete choice between two candidates that they perceive as 
different, even if the latter choose the same platform 0. This parallels the discrete choice 
theory of product differentiation, in which firms cannot observe all the variables 
affecting consumer choices. (See Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992) for a contained 
treatment of this theory.) Hence, even if each consumer or voter chooses a single option 
(to buy the product or not, to vote for one candidate or the other), the outside observer 
(a firm or a candidate) sees utility as a random variable reflecting unobservable 
preferences. We adopt this interpretation of the model, though other interpretations are 
also possible (see Anderson et al. 1992).
At the time they simultaneously announce their platform candidates know only 
the distribution of voters along the ideological dimension. If candidate A and B share 
the same platform, a given voter prefers the first of the two if candidate A's ideology is 
closer to hers.
57 This dimension is assumed to merge all the issues voters might care about -that is, all but regional 
policy. It includes the parties’ manifesto on moral issues like abortion or the death penalty, as well as on 
long standing economic positions like commitment to free-trade, joining the Euro, and so on. The key 
assumption here is that on all these issues the candidates are already pre-committed, whilst they are 
(credibly) campaigning on the regional policy issue only.
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If, on the other hand, candidate B proposes a platform on the policy issue that 
suits this voter better than A's, the voter trades off her ideological preference against her 
policy one. To what extent she is willing to do so depends upon the strength of her 
partisanship, a variable that is unknown to anybody but her. This assumption will ensure 
that each candidate’s best response correspondence will be a smooth, continuous 
function.58
As far as the voting rule is concerned, we abstract from entry issues and assume 
that two candidates, belonging to two distinct parties, compete for office. Each 
candidate ie  {A,B} proposes a value 0/ in 0 , that is, suggests to what extend she wishes 
to subsidize region 2. Voters cast a ballot for one of the candidates, according to their 
idiosyncratic preference and to the candidates' platforms. The elected candidate sticks to 
her policy platform once in office; her promise is credible in game theoretical terms, 
since candidates do not care about the policy outcome.
Voters' payoffs are as follows. As an illustration take a region 1 voter, voter j. If 
candidate B is elected then voter j's utility (both materialistic and derived from her 
'ideology') is assumed to be equal to V ( 0 B ) + S j / 2 .  V ( - )  is the materialistic utility and 
measures the voter's economic welfare derived from the implementation of candidate 
B's economic platform, whereas Sj is voter j's idiosyncratic ideological bias towards 
party B and measures the utility she derives from B's political leadership; this term is 
negative if voter j is ideologically closer to candidate A, and equal to zero if she is 
ideologically neutral and cares only about economic policy.
Conversely, if candidate A is elected voter j enjoys utility V ( 0 A ) - S j / 2 .  This voter 
is indifferent between candidates A and B for given platforms 0 A  and 0 b  if, and only if,
(3-12) V(0A) - V ( 0 B) = ej
A voter for which (3-12) holds votes for candidate A with probability 'A, but would vote 
for the same candidate with probability one or with probability zero if this expression 
held with strict inequality.
58 Anticipating the results, the assumptions just listed will ensure the convergence o f the candidates' 
platform to a unique equilibrium policy. This outcome is a Condorcet winner, i.e. a policy that beats in 
probability any other feasible policy in a pair-wise vote.
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Given 0A and 0b, this voter is ideologically neutral. We call such a voter a 
'swing voter'. Hereafter we refer to the value of her idiosyncratic parameter as 8s 
(subscript 'S' for 'swing'). Similar expressions hold in region 2, therefore
(3-13) s s„ = V2(9 ,) -V 2(0e),£SJ2 = V2(0A) - V 2(dB)
Tim ing o f  the gam e
The timing of the elections is as follows. First, both candidate A and candidate B 
announce their platforms simultaneously and non-cooperatively, knowing the 
preferences of voters over 0 and the probability density function of Sjj and zhl. Second, 
uncertainty is resolved and voting takes place. Finally, the elected candidate implements 
the platform she announced in the first stage.
We now introduce an important assumption. In the two regions all s's are drawn 
from a continuously differentiable, symmetric, and with mean zero cumulative 
distribution function Fi(e) in region 1 and F2(e) in region 2. These c.d.f.'s are known to 
anybody (in other terms there is no aggregate uncertainty). We assume that F(e)and 
F2(s) belong to the same family.59
Our working assumption is that social and economic activities are more 
variegated and heterogeneous in the big region. Indeed, it is a stylised fact that larger 
cities tend to be more diversified (Duranton and Puga 2000). Mathematically this 
translates into a higher dispersion of the cumulative distribution around the mean in the
9 9big region. Hence, if \\j is the variance of Fi(e) and y the variance of F2(e), we assume 
v|/>y.60 There is a technical issue here: to be rigorous, double-sided uncertainty is needed 
for the equilibrium to exist. That is, some of the attributes of the candidates are 
unknown to the voters at the time candidates choose their platforms. As a consequence, 
the mean of both Fi(e) and F2(e) is itself a random variable. We take it to be 
symmetrically distributed around 0. The algebra below is unaffected by other
59 Invoking a CLT, we could take normal distributions.
60 Another way o f interpreting this assumption is as follows: Assume that F^e) and F2 (e) are identical 
with variance 1 , but that the spatial distribution o f industry is a more salient issue to those voters left 
behind in the periphery than to those living in the core, as it presumably is. That is, assume now that the 
welfare o f individual j in 1 or 2 is (l-vj/')V1(0)+i|/'8j or (l-y')V 2(0)+y'6j, respectively. The assumption that 
regional policy is more salient in 2 is equivalent to assuming vj/>y. In aggregate terms, the two 
interpretations are equivalent. (Indeed, with \j/'=v|//(l-\(/) and y -y /(  1 +y) all the analytical results below are 
strictly identical.) In what follows, we use the terminology o f the interpretation developed in the text.
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parameters of the distribution of the common mean (like its variance that we assume to 
be finite) so we leave this issue in the background from now on.
It can be shown that Fi(s) and F2(e) together with Vi(0) and V2(0) fulfil the 
sufficient conditions for a Nash equilibrium in the platform setting game to exist 
because they are quasi-concave in 0. To see this, note that the V's are concave with 
respect to r\ and that r\ is a monotonic function of 0; together, these facts ensure the 
result.61 In particular, it is sufficient for the V's to be concave in n -  which they are -  
given our assumptions on the F's.
Given these assumptions, candidate A ’s expected vote share is equal to
Candidate A’s probability of winning the election is increasing in Q(0A,0B). Candidate 
B’s expected vote share is equal to l-sA.
If the e's were uniformly distributed Q would look like a weighted social welfare 
function, with the weights to Vi and V2 being proportional to the 'economic' sizes 
A/(A+1) and 1/(A+1), respectively, and inversely proportional to the standard deviations 
of the idiosyncratic ideological preferences (\j/ and y). In other words, a region 1 vote is 
worth A/v|/ and a Region 2em vote is worth 1/y to the politicians. This is due to the 
underlying uncertainty in the s's. The same intuition carries over for more general 
distributions F.
To understand the incentives the candidates face when setting their platform, 
suppose for a while that candidate A is considering to increase her platform from 0A to 
0'A. A higher 0 will boost the equilibrium number of firms in 2 at the expense of 1, 
causing an increase in 2's voters' materialistic utility and a reduction in 1 's voters' 
materialistic utility. This shifts the identity of the swing voters in both regions, as can be 
seen from expression (3-13): as a result of her unilateral deviation, candidate A gains 
some votes in 2 and looses others in 1. Candidate A has no-longer any incentive to
(3-14) i ,
2
where
61 See e.g. Theorem 2 in Lindberg and Weibull (1987) for details.
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deviate when the number of votes lost in the later is equal to the number of votes gained 
in the former. This brings us to the solution of the candidates' problem.
The Nash-equilibrium  o f  the platform  setting  gam e
Candidate A maximizes her expected number of votes given by (3-14), 
announcing a certain policy 0A taking 0B as given. Candidate B instead will seek to 
minimizes sA choosing 0B for a given 0A. Hence, 0ANE=arg max{Q(0A,0BNE): 0Ae0} 
and 0BNE=arg min{Q(0ANE,0B): 0Be@}. In words, the objectives of candidates A and B 
are perfectly symmetric and so they face the same optimisation problem: at equilibrium, 
they both find it optimal to announce the same level of subsidies, call this 0ne for short 
('NE' for Nash equilibrium).
Using (3-10), (3-11), (3-5), and (3-15) the equilibrium policy announcement One 
is the solution to the following first order condition of this problem for both candidates 
and reduces to:
(3-16)
on on
— (0m ) = 0
8 0  NC
The second order condition is satisfied by the quasi-concavity of the V's with respect to 
0. Notice that, due to standard statistical properties of probability distribution functions 
belonging to the same family, we have f2(0)/ fi(0)=\|//y. Define m as the ratio of the two 
standard deviations, viz.
(3-17)
y m
We can interpret m as the relative ‘political strength’ of region 2.
In (3-16) Afi(0) and f2(0) represent the mass of swing voters in regions 1 and 2, 
respectively (up to a factor)- namely, the mass of those voters that are marginally 
indifferent between the two candidates at equilibrium. This mass is increasing with the 
size of the region electorate (Li or L2) and inversely related to the spread of the 
population along the political dimension (\j/ or y). Finally, solving (3-16) for 0Ne gives:
if 0NEe©, or 0ne is equal to either boundary of 0  in an obvious manner otherwise.62 
Since <(><1, this is larger than unity under the assumption \)/>y.63 To get the political 
equilibrium location, plug (3-18) into (3-5) to get:
A -  m(j)
(3-19) rjNE =
m -  A (f>
Simple derivations give the expected signs for the following partial derivatives: 
dr|NE/5A>0 and driNE/dnKO, namely, the share of firms in 1 increases with its size and 
decreases in the 2’s political strength. To sum-up, we have shown:
Result 3-4. At the political equilibrium each region's share o f industry is 
increasing in its size and in its ideological homogeneity. The equilibrium 
subsidy is increasing in a region's ideological homogeneity.
3.5. The vote-market and the net-market effects
Many interesting results steam from equations (3-18) and (3-19). Since the 
ultimate concern of voters is to attract economic activities in the region where they live, 
let us focus first on t|Ne. As it is clear from (3-19), once we introduce the political 
dimension as a determinant of the policy decision, the equilibrium industry share does 
not depend solely on the economic forces at work anymore. Indeed, the equilibrium 
share of industry of, say, region 1 is increasing with its (relative) expenditure size A -  
essentially an economic parameter -  and decreasing in its ideological heterogeneity m -  
a socio-economic parameter that reflects the relative salience of the regional policy 
issue for those living in region 2.
The first of these two effects is well known and is an alternative formulation of 
the standard home-market effect (HME). The second one is new and is dubbed here as 
the vote-market effect (VME) by analogy. Recall that in the standard model (viz. m=l) 
the HME is defined as dr|/dA>l whenever A>1. Likewise, when the two regions have 
the same size (A=l), the VME is defined as dr)/d(l/0)>l if, and only if, 1/0>1.
62 Note that the utilitarian optimum is the laissez-faire outcome. Indeed, the utilitarian planner puts equal 
weights on anybody’s welfare as does the candidate facing population with identical ideological spreads. 
This is reminiscent o f Result 2-12.
63 The attentive reader might have noticed that apparently regional size does not matter in determining the 
equilibrium subsidy; we get back to this in Section 3.5.
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In order to determine which dominates we define a third effect shortly: the net- 
market effect (NME). To this aim, we need to introduce a new variable,
(3-20) A w — -
_ A _ L l IL2 
Swing ~ m ~  y/ / y
representing the overall relative force of the two regions. Particularly, Aswing is the ratio 
of the mass of swing voters in 1 to the mass of swing voters in 2. Note that Aswing can be 
lower or larger than unity. Using this definition into (3-19), it is easy to check the 
following result:
(3-21) ~ -fy g-  = ---------------
SASwing (1-Ms»in8)2
In other words, we have:
Result 3-5. (Net-market effect) At equilibrium the region that has more 
swing voters will get a more than proportionally larger share o f 
industries.
To put it differently, in equilibrium, the big region (1) will end up attracting a more than 
proportional number of firms only if its economic strength (measured by its relative 
expenditure A) more than compensates its political weakness due to the higher 
dispersion of its population over the political dimension (l>m). Conversely the 
economically small region can attract a more than proportional number of firms if it has 
enough political power, i.e. if it has a sufficiently large mass of swing voters. Thus, 
when the VME is added to the basic model, predictions may differ from those induced 
by the standard economic HME and the political game may qualitatively reverse the 
laissez-faire outcome.
A final point deserves attention here. When trade barriers are sufficiently low, 
but still positive, our model too features a core-periphery outcome (unless AsWing=l)- In 
particular, all the economic activities concentrate in the large region (tine=+00) 
whenever <|>>1 /Aswing, while region 2 becomes the core (tine=+00) whenever <J>>AsWing- 
Note that the two are mutually exclusive because <|) e [0,1).
The novelty o f this analysis is that, when the political game is given the 
deserved attention, the definite prediction of the traditional models on the big region
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becoming the core does not necessarily hold anymore: it is not necessarily the large 
region that attracts all economic activities in the end.
In other words, the political environment does matter in shaping the equilibrium 
geography.
Having analysed the equilibrium location of economic activities, we can now 
turn to the analysis of the equilibrium subsidy level which delivers r|NE, namely One 
given by (3-18).
The Equilibrium  Subsidy Level: D oes Size M atter?
As expected, interior solutions for 0ne are increasing in m -  see (3-18). 
Candidates want to attract swing voters and the less dispersed group has a larger mass 
of such voters (ceteris paribus). Hence, the wider is the difference in the homogeneity 
degree of the two regions, the higher is the subsidy level the relatively more 
homogeneous region receives. Besides, 0ne is larger than unity and, hence, region 2 is 
subsidised because l>m. This departure from a majoritarian result, which is due to the 
fact that regional policy is more salient to a minority of citizens, is one of the sources of 
non-majoritarian outcomes discussed in Besley and Coate (2000).
The attentive reader might have noticed that apparently regional size does not 
matter in determining the equilibrium subsidy One- Indeed, the economic weight A does 
not appear in (3-18) and the region that gets the subsidy is the more homogeneous one, 
independently from its size. As we shall see, this is clearly a knife-edge result that 
depends on the logarithmic transformation of the aggregate consumption index in the 
utility function U. More generally, the relative size of the two populations matter, and 
the effect of an increase of A on One is ambiguous.
This is best understood from the dual nature of A. For one, this represents the 
ratio of electorates and hence, since candidates try to get as many votes as possible, a 
larger A implies a lower 0, ceteris paribus. But A also represents the ratio of 
expenditures and, given (3-5), a larger A implies a larger r\. Hence, for a constant 
political equilibrium t|Ne in (3-19), a larger A must be compensated by a larger 0 so that 
the solution to the economic relationship (3-5) is unchanged. In other words, if the 
result of the political process decides for some location equilibrium t}Ne a larger subsidy 
0 will be needed do accomplish this if A is larger.
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This point is easily made mathematically. Let us detangle the two natures of A 
and write Ay when we talk about electorate sizes (the subscript 'V' for voters) and Ac 
when we talk about economic sizes (the subscript 'C' for consumers). Hence, since (3-5) 
is an economic equilibrium relationship, we write:
(2-22) (1 -  0<f>)Ac -  (j){6 -  <f>)
-(1 -  6(f)) Ac(f) + (6 -(f))
Conversely, the A's in Section 3.4 above clearly represent electorate sizes. Hence, we 
rewrite (3-19) as:
(3-23) ^  = ^ 1
m  -  A v (f)
Obviously, the two rj's must be consistent, so 0ne solves r|=r|NB- Using (3-5), the 
solution to this problem is:
(3-24) ^  = i + ( W ) (w ~ 1)A + '”(Ac - Ar>
(1 + </>m)Ac -  (Ac -  Ap)
Obviously, the solution to (3-24) is identical to the solution to (3-18) if and only if there 
are as many electors as consumers (or, more generally, when the participation rates are 
the same in the two regions).
For reasons explained earlier, (3-24) reveals that:
Result 3-6. The equilibrium subsidy to region 2 is increasing in Ac and 
decreasing in Av.
Interestingly (3-23) tells us that only political variables matter in the determination of 
the t|ne- Indeed, t|ne is entirely determined by tastes, participation rates, and ideological 
heterogeneities. Conversely, (3-24) suggest that economic variables matter only for the 
determination of the level of the instrument needed to accomplish the equilibrium 
policy.
A final remark is in order here. Different participation rates have the same 
qualitative effects on the equilibrium location and subsidies than different ideological 
heterogeneities. To fix ideas take m=l but imagine instead that in the larger region the 
participation rate is m' times lower than in the small region -possibly because there are
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larger foreign populations in big cities and foreigners are forbidden to vote by law. This 
assumption implies Av=Ac/m'.
Then it is readily seen from both (3-23) and (3-24) that the solutions in (3-18) 
and (3-19) are identical, with A replaced by Ac and m replaced by m \ In short, we can 
either assume that large regions are socially more heterogeneous or that participation 
rates are lower there than in small regions. Both of these are reasonable assumptions 
that yield the same result: at the political equilibrium, small regions get a larger of 
industry than in the laissez-faire equilibrium and when trade costs are low enough it is 
possible that the industrial cluster end up in the economically disadvantaged region.
To summarize, the political equilibrium of this section game has removed the 
original definite prediction made in the original models like Krugman (1980) regarding 
the identity of the core. Taken at its face value, the analysis conducted in this chapter 
has shown that it is no longer obvious that the large, rich region or trading partner will 
eventually attract all the industrial activity.
3.6. Concluding comments
In the late 1950’s, the per-capita income gap between Belgium's main regions, 
Flanders and Wallony, was particularly wide (see Bismans 1988). Flanders was behind 
and it was widely expected that it would take it more than 20 years to close the gap. In 
fact, it took only six years for Flanders' per capita income to reach the level of Wallony. 
What happened? Early in the 1960's, the 'Loi d'expansion regionale' (literally, the 'law 
of regional expansion') entered into force. This law was designed to attract investment, 
mainly to Flanders. Some of this investment was clearly diverted from Wallony and the 
law had the effect of accelerating the catch-up process. But why did this law get passed 
in the first place?
The explanation put forth by our model focuses on the difference in the political 
environments prevailing in the two regions. Wallony was deeply divided politically 
with a very conservative right, a strong left-wing party, and a tense class struggle. By 
contrast, the political parties and the unions in Flanders were more moderate. Moreover, 
Wallony experienced an influx of immigrants and, consequently, its society was more 
heterogeneous and variegated than the Flemish society. These differences still remain 
today, and now it is Wallony that is behind.
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This historical example illustrates how political groups that focus only on a few 
issues are particularly attractive for politicians. In particular, we have argued that a 
more homogenous electoral base is better able to capture political gains through a 
voting process and we have applied this property to an economic geography issue 
showing that political forces can dramatically change the market outcome.
Using a very simple model of economic geography enriched to allow for 
endogenously determined regional policy, this chapter has analysed the impact regional 
policy on the spatial allocation of industry. In spite of the framework's simplicity, 
interesting results emerged. The relative size of the regions has an ambiguous effect on 
the equilibrium subsidy. On the one hand, if a larger fraction of the population -hence, 
of voters- lives in a given region, the equilibrium subsidy to the other region tends to be 
reduced as more voters favour a lower value of subsidies. On the other hand, due to the 
home-market effect, an increase in a region's size increases its equilibrium share of 
industry - and hence, its real income - for any given subsidy level. This aspect of the 
home market effect allows all political candidates to raise the subsidy to the other region 
without altering individuals' welfare. In essence, the very fact the economically big 
region is big means that its people are willing to accept larger 'real taxes' (in the form of 
a loss in their economic welfare). The net effect of the relative population size is thus 
ambiguous.
The effectiveness with which regional policy slows down the agglomeration 
process depends on the relative size of the two populations. For a given amount of 
regional aid, the regional policy is less effective in attracting industrial activity to the 
small region if the size-disparity of the two regions is larger, again due to the home- 
market effect. Thus, the political factor determines the amount of aid and the economic 
factor establishes its effectiveness. Indeed, if the small region is much more 
homogenous than the large region, politically determined regional policy may even 
reverse the spatial outcome predicted by orthodox economic geography theory. That is, 
the core can end up in the small region when trade/transport costs are sufficiently low 
since the agglomeration forces that favour the big region become very weak as trade 
gets freer, allowing the small region's political advantage to overcomes its economic 
weakness.
Even if it is difficult to find cases in which regional policy reversed the expected 
regional specialization patterns, our theoretical findings help exposit the internal logic
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of the complex interplay of openness, regional policy and the observed spatial allocation 
of industry. Poor and depressed regions may not attract all the economic activities and 
become the core in spite of the help they get in the form of regional aids as happened in 
the case of Flanders. Nevertheless we should expect countries (or constituencies) 
marked by prominent 'rural-versus-urban' divides to have lower levels of agglomeration 
at any point on the integration path, ceteris paribus. We note, however, that adding 
labour mobility -in  the form of, say, a rural exodus- might increase the heterogeneity of 
urban areas (assuming it takes one generation for the newcomers to adapt fully to the 
new life-style). To the extent that this favours a more aggressive anti-agglomeration 
regional policy, such a mechanism would tend to favour a more spatially dispersed 
outcome for industry.
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Chapter 4. GEOGRAPHY AND
COMMUNICATION COSTS
4.1. Introduction
This chapter looks at how reductions in communication costs -  together with 
variations in transportation costs -  affect the spatial distribution of economic activity. 
‘Communication costs’ are understood here as encompassing the cost of coordination 
and of conveying information between the head of the production unit and workers 
providing routinised back-office work. Unlike transportation costs proper 
communication costs are immaterial.
Low communication costs allow a firm to physically separate different activities 
that used to be performed in a single location. Jones and Kierzkowski (1990) dub this as 
the 'fragmentation' of vertically integrated production processes. The actual production 
of the final output is performed by the ‘front office’; routinised ‘back office’ tasks 
involve include data entry or processing, database management. More elaborate back 
office tasks include financial and accounting services, processing assurance claims, and 
the development of computer software (Wilson, 1995).
This chapter analyses the spatial separation of front office and back office of the 
routinised kind. Duranton and Puga (2001) analyse the later kind of task unbundling.
Unbundling of back and front office production is widespread. Over 200,000 
people are thought of as being engaged in back office work in the US. The example of 
Citibank comes to mind: its headquarters are based in New York and the data 
processing is carried out in South Dakota. A firm can even get multinational and 
outsource back office tasks. Such offshore back office is quantitatively not as important: 
production in the US employs about 30,000 offshore back office workers. In both cases 
the mechanisms are the same: firms commonly relocate back office production to rural 
or suburban areas where cheaper and more skilled part-time workers are available, using 
communication facilities to communicate with the management maintained in the more 
costly urban core or 'central business district'.
As Baldwin and Martin (1999) point out, ‘on the microeconomic side of 
globalisation, FDI flows are the only thing that has changed sharply in the last twenty 
years (p. 17).’ From 1985 on, foreign direct investment surged well above domestic
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investment: up to 1985, both series were fluctuating around 1980 numbers. Eleven years 
later, domestic investment has merely doubled, whilst FDI has been multiplied by a 
factor 6.5. Part of this pattern certainly comprises some offshore back office production 
-though this does provide only indirect support for the phenomenon this chapter aims to 
take account for. Duranton and Puga (2001) review some indirect evidence of another 
sort.64 For one, firms increasingly outsource some tasks that used to be carried within 
the boundaries of the firm. Moreover, there are a growing number of multi-location 
firms in the US. This last trend presumably reflects the spatial allocation of different 
stages of the production process according to their comparative advantage (understood 
in a broad sense, including access to a variety of specific intermediates).
Some anecdotic evidence illustrates how low communication costs and offshore 
back office production are linked. In the seventies, some US firms would occasionally 
send some batch work to the Caribbean for processing (Wilson, 1995). The shipment 
would take two weeks each way. Nowadays, American Airlines assembles the 
accounting material and ticket coupons in Dallas; uses its own carriages to send it to 
Barbados where its subsidiary processes 800 thousands A A  tickets a day; and sends the 
data by satellite to Tulsa. Clearly, for this to work both transportation and 
communication costs must be low (in the example: air cargo and satellite transmission, 
respectively) relative to the well-documented extra managing cost incurred by multi­
plant firms.
The agents these multinationals deal with are their subsidiaries in the Caribbean, 
various Asian countries or Ireland, i.e. in countries that have undertaken huge 
investments in communication technology. AA and other firms go multinational in 
search of low production costs; in particular labour intensive tasks are conveyed in 
labour abundant countries. The literature on multinationals has identified other purposes 
for establishing plants in foreign countries (see Markusen 1995 for a survey). For 
instance, firms might establish foreign subsidiaries to serve the host market so as to 
avoid the trade barriers and transportation costs associated with producing the good at 
home and trade it (this is known as the 'jump the tariff argument').
641 came across this paper while writing the very final draft o f this chapter. This is unfortunate because, 
though the analysis there is clearly relevant to this chapter, I had to disregard the connexions between at 
this late stage.
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Globalisation of services is a recent phenomenon. Just as recent are the 
substantial falls in communication cost, with new opportunities for both offshore and 
suburban back office production. Over the post-WWII period, the transatlantic phone 
bill has been reduced by a factor 100 (see Figure 4-1). Also, the annual real cost of a 
telephone circuit in 1965 was $22,000. In 1980, this figure was down to $800 and in 
five years later further down to $30 only (Wilson 1995). Finally, current satellite 
communications cost less than 10% of what they used to do in the mid 1970’s.
Data on quantities show that these downward trends for prices were matched by 
upward trends in quantities. In 1986, there were 0.1 millions transatlantic and 0.041 
millions transpacific of voice paths, two figures that rose to respectively 2.022 and 
1.889 millions in 1996 (Baldwin and Martin 1999). Over the same time span, the 
number of Internet hosts surged from .005 to 12.881 millions and is nowadays close to 
30 millions.
Figure 4-1: Transportation vs. communication costs, 1940-1990
- Ocean freight
- Air freight
- Satellite charges 
-Transatlantic phone call
source: Baldwin and Martin (1 9 9 9 )
Figure 4-1 also strikes on the relative importance of the downward trend of the 
series on communication costs versus the series of trade and transportation costs. 
Transportation costs (over long distances at least) flattened out in the mid-eighties after 
the Second World War: air and ocean freight costs have decreased by about 40% 
between 1940 and 1960 -  and a further 40% for the former until 1990 (the latter have 
merely stagnated since then).
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Though of different magnitudes, the time patterns of transportation costs and 
trade barriers, on the one hand, and communication costs, on the other, point in the 
same direction: the world economy is ever more integrated. These costs are of different 
nature, however. As Harris (1995) puts it, communication facilitates coordination and 
the transfer of information, while transportation is a physical transfer of a good across 
space. How does this translate into firm’s location decisions? How are geographical 
inequalities affected? What are the implications on factor rewards? What does the new 
economic geography (NEG) suggest these are?
In NEG models in the tradition of Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999) all 
forms of costs are melted into one parameter, the iceberg transportation costs. The aim 
of this chapter is to disentangle communication costs from trade and transportation costs 
and assess how this framework conveys new insights to help understand the growing 
importance of these phenomena that have taken some importance recently -primarily 
the growing importance of unbundled back office work.
The remainder of the chapter is organised in the following way. The next section 
introduces the model (an extension of the FCVL model o f Chapter 1). Sections 4.3 
introduces communication costs to the model. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 convey the stability 
analysis in the extended model. Section 4.6 considers how various integration paths 
generate radically different specialisation patters whereas section 4.7 evaluate the 
welfare effects associated with these patterns. Finally, section 4.8 concludes. Some 
cumbersome algebra is relegated to an appendix.
4.2. The simple extended model
The model developed in the sequel extends the model of Chapter 1 in a simple 
way. The properties of the resulting model are similar to Fujita et al. (1999, section 
14.4). For the time being, I assume that (what I dub as) communication costs are 
prohibitive, namely, the model is a standard NEG model.
Instantaneous equilibrium
The world is made of two regions or countries, j= 1,2, identically endowed with 
the primary factors. Tastes are driven by (1-1). There are now three primary factors of 
production (and their respective returns): capital (n), labour (w) and land (r). As before, 
two goods are produced in this economy, A and M. The manufacturing sector M
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produces a differentiated good under increasing returns using capital, labour, and 
intermediates.
The novelty is that the production of the numeraire A now involves a constant 
returns to scale technology that makes use of both labour and land. I take a Cobb- 
Douglas functional form such that minimizing costs and perfect competition in the A- 
sector together yield:
are decreasing returns on L in the A-sector. The assumption 0<1 implies that nominal 
wages are likely to diverge even if no country ever specializes in M. Hence, we now 
have to make the dependence of the endogenous variables on wj explicit. The model of 
Chapter 1 is the limiting case in which there are constant returns in L, viz. 0=1.
The expressions of Chapter 1 that need be changed are the following. First, 
monopolistic pricing yields the relation pj(l-l/a)=  jSWj'^G/1 for a typical firm in j. (The 
term in the right-hand side is the marginal cost.) The normalisation /3=1-1/cj ensures that 
the following holds:
As usual I define n as the average operating profit in the world economy, viz. 
7 r = n 7 ii+ (l-n )7 r 2 .
Second, write the implicit definitions of the price indices as:
The expression for A2 is isomorphic.
Third, let Ej denote expenditure in j (we use capital letters so as to refer to the 
variable itself; in Chapter 1, we used small letters to refer to shares); the structure of the 
model implies:
where O<0<1.65 Viewing land as a hidden factor, this is equivalent to saying that there
(4-3) A ,  =  « A >a-H-aXl-a) + </>(\-n)A2w2
(4-4) Ej  = /j. ^ Wj + ^ rj +7r + _  i}n7r + 0,(0. _  1 )n ( n .  -  n ) \  Tj = w j01' 0
2
65 The parameter 0 here is unrelated to the parameter 0 in other chapters.
I l l
with j=l,2. The first term in the right-hand side of the expression above represents 
consumer expenditure; L, A, and 1 refer to the world endowment of labour, land, and 
capital, respectively; (4-1) implies rj=Wj‘e/(1‘0). The last two terms refer to the 
expenditure that firms in j spend on manufactured inputs.
Finally, firms in 1 make the following operating profits:
and 7i2 is isomorphic.
To close the model, we need an expression for 7t, the equilibrium average value 
of operating profits. As before, the value of total output in sector M evaluated at 
producer prices must equal the value of aggregate expenditure spent on manufactured 
goods, viz. npiXi+(l-n)p2X2=aP[npiXi+(l-n)p2X2]+fi£j[WjL+rjA+7t]/2. Because the w's 
are no-longer constant when n varies, this implies that n is no longer invariant in n 
either. Alternatively, we can close the model using the labour full-employment 
conditions. Using (4-1), (4-2) and applying Sheppard's lemma to the cost function, these 
are:
where nj=n if j= l and nj=l-n otherwise. The left-hand side of the expression above is 
the aggregate wage bill of the workers in country j; the first term in the right-hand side 
is the wage bill paid by the manufacturing sector; the second term is the wage bill paid 
by sector A. Note that, for a given 7tj, wj is increasing in n_j. The interpretation for this
there are decreasing returns in L in sector A, the supply of labour to the manufacturing 
sector is imperfectly elastic. Hence, dw/dnpO must hold, as claimed.
Together, (4-2)-(4-5) are the counterpart to (2-3)-(2-6) and define the 
instantaneous equilibrium of the model. Treating n as a parameter, we can solve the 
system for all factor prices. Then we ask which of these equilibria make sense at all 'in 
the long run'.
(4-5) 1 ( 
cr
(4-6)
result is obvious: the more firms settle in j, the higher the demand for labour in 1. Since
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Long-run equilibrium
In the long run, capital is mobile and capital owners open plants where there profits 
are maximised. Whenever n\ and tc2 differ, the adjustments follow the law of motion (2- 
7); accordingly, a long-run equilibrium is defined as an instantaneous equilibrium for 
which the following hold:
(4-7) Tlj > 0, 71 j < 7T, YljiTlj -  7T) = 0
Namely, active firms make no pure profits.
The description of the basic model is now complete. I now briefly review the 
dispersion and agglomeration forces of the model.
Im perfectly elastic labour supply: a n ew  dispersion force
The basic model of this section is very similar to the model of Chapter 1. In 
particular, the agglomeration forces in both models are identical and stem from the 
vertical linkages that arise the result of firms buying each other's output as intermediate 
inputs. The market crowding dispersion force is also present in both models. Ceteris 
paribus, a firm that locates in a country in which most of its competitors are located has 
smaller market shares on each market. We saw in that chapter that the magnitude of all 
these forces is decreasing in trade ffee-ness (j) and that the magnitude of the dispersion 
force decreases faster.
The present model displays yet another dispersion force, a force that stems from 
the decreasing returns in labour in agriculture. To repeat, these decreasing returns imply 
that the labour supply curve to M is strictly positive. In turn, this slope does not depend 
upon <|), but 9. This has dramatic consequences for the location equilibrium.
To illustrate the main effect of this new force on the location equilibrium, 
assume that (|) is arbitrarily close to 1 and, without loss of generality, that most firms 
settle in 1, viz. n>Vi. Then we know from the discussion that follows (4-6) that n>/i 
implies wi>w2 or 7ii<7i2 or both. But n> * /2  cannot be part of a long run equilibrium if 
profits are larger in 2, so it (4-6) implies wj>w2. Next, <j)«l implies Ai«A2. Using these 
and (4-5), 7i]>7r2 implies W!<w2. This contradicts wi>w2. As a consequence, (|)«1 implies 
n=,/ 2 . The reason is simple, but deep. When § is close to unity, production costs between 
the two regions cannot differ by much because firms' location decisions are very 
sensitive to international differences in production costs. At the same time, the cost of
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intermediates is roughly the same across locations; hence the differences in production 
costs come from different labour wages must be small, too. With identical and strictly 
increasing labour supply in both countries, this implies that the labour employment in M 
must be identical in 1 and 2, too.
Turn to Figure 4-2. Like Figure 1-1, this figure plots the magnitude of the 
agglomeration and dispersion forces -the curves AA and DD, respectively. The nature 
of the former and, among the latter, of the market crowding force, is unchanged in the 
present setting. By contrast to Figure 1-1, Figure 4-2plots an additional dispersion force 
(the horizontal, dotted line), due to the imperfect elasticity of the labour supply. The 
more inelastic is the labour supply (viz. the lower 0), the higher is the horizontal dotted 
line. Figure 4-2 is plot for n=l, a 'core-periphery' pattern. A qualitatively similar figure 
would emerge for n=1/2 .
Figure 4-2: Dispersion and agglomeration forces at the core-periphery equilibrium
Dispersion force (market crowding 
and imperfectly elastic L supply)
Agglomeration forces (vertical linkages)
Clearly, if  the new dispersion force is not too strong, the curves AA and DD 
cross twice. For low values of <|), the market crowding force is strong enough for the AA 
curve to lie below the DD curve; the core-periphery outcome is not sustainable. For 
values of (|) larger than <|)s, the vertical linkages are stronger than the market crowding 
force. But when <|) is high enough (larger than (|) on the figure), the strength of the 
vertical linkages is weaker than the strength of both dispersion forces taken together.
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Hence, a core-periphery structure is sustainable only for intermediate values of ({>. 
Summing-up:
Result 4-1. Decreasing returns in agriculture introduce a dispersion force 
that is independent of ((). As a result n=V2 is the unique stable long run 
equilibrium of the model when (|) is sufficiently close to unity.
To put it simply, in any configuration in which n^A  the presence of decreasing returns 
in labour in A implies wi*w2. When <j> is arbitrarily close to 1, this implies that 
production costs cannot be different in 1 and 2. This in turn implies that n* XA cannot be 
part of a stable long-run equilibrium.
This brings us to the conditions under which n=1/2  is part of a stable long run 
equilibrium.
B r e a k  p o in t s
The 'dispersed equilibrium' (n=Vi) is always part of a long-run equilibrium by 
the symmetry of the model, but is not always stable as we saw in the earlier chapters. 
The break points are defined as the values of <|> at which the symmetric equilibrium n=1/2  
is just stable. In this context, 'stability' means that any exogenous shock to n is self- 
correcting by the law of motion (2-7). In the model of this chapter, there are two break 
points for (j) in the unit interval provided that agglomeration forces are large enough 
relative to the dispersion forces. As we shall see in the analysis of the sustain point 
below, this means that the agglomeration forces net of the market-crowding force, as 
captured by a larger p or a low cr, should be large enough relatively to the extend of 
decreasing returns in A, as captured by a low 0.
Observe first that n=1/2  yields wi=w2, ri=r2, Aj=A2 and 7ti=7t2. Again, I denote 
these variables with the nought subscript. Substituting these into (4-3)-(4-6), we can 
solve for wq, Tq, Aq, and tiq. We find:
(4-8)
Following standard practice in the NEG, I choose units for L and A such that 
wo=ro=7to= l at n=/z. From (4-3), it is then easy to see that Ao1*a=(l+<|))/2.
115
As we shall see, the break points play a minor role in the analysis of this chapter, 
so I relegate the formal analysis to the appendix of this chapter.
Sustain po in ts
We now turn to the conceptually different issue of the stability of the core- 
periphery patterns. A long-run core-periphery pattern (n=0 or n=l) is said to be 
sustainable if  and only if (4-7) is satisfied at n=l, namely 7ti>7t2 and n=l hold 
simultaneously. In words, this requires the following: given that all firms are in 1, no 
individual entrepreneur has any incentive to deviate and start producing in 2. A single­
equation implicit solution for the sustain point like (2-10) is no longer available for the 
general case 0<1. However, the discussion on Figure 4-2 above permits us to assess that 
there are two sustain points (if any) in the interval (0,1). These are the real roots of a 
non-integer polynomial.
Two limiting cases are of interest. If 0=1 there are no DRS in agriculture and we 
know from Chapter 1 that the largest of these roots limits to unity whereas the smaller 
root -denoted as <|>sust in Chapters 2 and 3 - is strictly in (0,1). At the other extreme 0=0 
in which case agriculture uses land only. As a result labour is supplied inelastically to 
the manufacturing sector in each region. This in turn implies that if no firm establishes 
itself in region 2, say, then wages are zero there. This cannot be part of a long-run 
equilibrium because the shadow-profit tt2 limits to infinity in this case.66 As a 
consequence none of the roots belong to (0,1] in this case.
More generally, when 0<1 both roots are smaller than unity if they are real. For 
the sake of illustration, I develop the case 0=1A.
Using (4-6), it is easy to see that n=l implies w2=(A/L)'/2. From (4-3) we find 
Ai=wi ]’CT and A2=<j)Ai. Plugging this and the previous result in (4-5) and (4-6), and 
making use of (4-4), we find that the ratio of nominal wages when all firms locate in 1 
is equal to:
(4-9)
w.
66 That is, the marginal productivity o f labour is infinite when employment is nil. Since the nominal wage 
is zero in this case and because the elasticity o f demand on the product market is larger than 1 , profits are 
infinite.
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Clearly, wj is larger than w2 as labour is scarcer in the country in which the 
manufacturing industry clusters. Making use of (4-5) again, it is easy to see that the 
ratio of (shadow) profits in 2 to profits prevailing in 1 is equal to:
(4-10)
where
5?
7T, n= 1 V
/  l - s
*
(4-11) 4 = i ( l  +  a / ? + /? ( l - a ) W )
The Se's represent the expenditure shares for n=l.Obviously, V^ <Se1<1 holds in any 
admissible parameter configuration. Clearly, the core-periphery pattern is ’sustainable' 
when the expression in (4-10) is less than one.
The interpretation of (4-10) is the following. The first term in the right-hand 
side, 8 o (1’CT)(1’a ) , is larger than unity and represents the cost saving realised in the low- 
wage country 2.67 By contrast, the term (]>“ represents the extra-cost paid intermediates, 
all of which must be imported from the industrial core (country 1). Finally, the term in 
the parenthesis captures both the extra cost of serving market 1 from abroad (se1 is 
deflated since (|)<1) and the gain from serving market 2 from within (se2 is magnified 
since 1/(|)>1).
We can now state that the core-periphery configuration is sustainable for any (j) 
in [<j)S,<t>S], where <j>s and <}>s are the roots of h(<j))=0, where:
(4-12) h{f> = - 4  y  -  (i -  4 )
In other words, <|>e {<[>s><t> } implies that the expression in (4-10) is equal to unity, viz. 
712=711 .Trivial algebra shows that the polynomial on the left-hand side of the expression 
above is negative and increasing at §=0, negative and decreasing at <j)=l, and concave 
everywhere. Hence, h(.) admits a unique maximum. If agglomeration forces are too 
weak, this maximum is negative (in such a case the curves AA and DD in Figure 4-2 do 
not intercept). If agglomeration forces are strong enough (p. large and a  low), the two 
roots of (4-12), namely <|>s and <|> , belong strictly to the (0,1) interval, in which case
Q
dh/3(|)>0 at (J>s and 3h/d<|)>0 at § . Otherwise these roots are not real.
67 e0 limits to infinity in the case 0=0.
117
Figure 4-3: The 'Double Tomahawk’ diagram
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R anking the break and sustain po in ts
We saw in Chapter 1 that the ordering of the break and sustain points was 
crucial for the dynamics of the model. 9=1 in the model there and as a result there are a 
unique break point and a unique sustain point in the interval [0,1). We saw that the 
sustain point came before the break point (see the 'Tomahawk diagram'), which implies 
two facts. First, no interior, asymmetric equilibrium is ever stable. Second, there is 
hyseresis in location, in a sense we made precise there. The same holds true here: at 
least when a=p (the case Krugman and Venables (1995), among others, assume)
c
simulations show that the sustain interval [(|)s,<t) ] encompasses the break interval 
[<t>B,(t)B], hence <{)s<4>B<<t>B<<|>S, as shown in Figure 4-3.68
This figure plots n against <(). As usual, the stable, long-run equilibria of the 
system are depicted in plain lines whereas the unstable ones are depicted in doted 
schedules. There is room for hysteresis in this model in the sense that if the system finds 
itself at n=l when <() is, say, larger than (|)b , then this remains a stable long run
68 Details o f the calculations can be found on the Maple worksheet vertical_linkages_0523.mws, available 
upon request. When a*p , the parameter space has many dimensions, hence making sure that the ranking 
remains unchanged for all parameter combinations is a formidable task. For this reason, I put it aside and 
assume that the combinations o f  the parameters a , p, and a  is such that the ranking holds so that Figure 
4-3 is always relevant.
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equilibrium if (j) decreases to some value in (<f>s,<t>B)- Conversely, if the system finds itself 
at n=1/2  and (}> is lower than (j>s, then this remains a stable long run equilibrium if <|) 
increases to the same value in (c|)s,<J>b)- Hence history matters.
4.3. Communication costs and ’multinationals’
I now depart from the standard model. Remember that the analysis thus far 
essentially assumes that trade in M is costly whilst trade in A is not. Also, capital is the 
unique factor that can move freely from one country to the other (in the long run), 
whilst migration of L is prohibitive. The first is merely an assumption o f convenience.69 
Removing the second assumption would complicate the analysis because it would 
require two laws of motion -  one for K, one for L. More importantly, labour is not 
really mobile, especially internationally. However, thanks to good communication 
infrastructures it is now possible to fragment the production process and different 
services to the firm can be undertaken in different locations.
The idea in the remainder of this chapter is to disentangle the effects of falling 
transportation costs (rising <|>) from those of falling communication costs. The former 
affects trade in goods (intermediate inputs included) whilst the later affects trade in 
business services. Presumably, the qualitative effect of these two related phenomena on 
the location equilibrium are distinct. This is the object of study of this section.
To capture that idea, I now assume that a firm in country 1 can hire some 
workers living in country 2 (and hence become 'multinational') and incurs a 
'communication cost' in doing so (this captures managerial tasks and coordination 
costs). This firm still manufactures the good in 1, but some services are undertaken by 
workers abroad. These workers can be thought of as independent subcontractors who 
sell their services (in which case the firm is not a proper multinational) or as working in 
a foreign subsidiary. However, the issue of the boundary of the firm is beyond the scope 
of this chapter.70
The possibility to hire workers abroad has an important implication for the 
dispersion and agglomeration forces. When a firm moves from 2 to 1 (i.e. dn>0) this has 
both a spatial 'expenditure shifting' effect and a 'cost shifting' effect, as we saw in
69 See Davis (1998) and Fujita et al. (1999, chapter 7) for a discussion.
70 See e.g. Grossman and Helpman (2002) for a framework where the structure o f the firm changes 
endogenously with the market structure.
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Chapter 1. This firm now buys more of its intermediates and sells more o f its output in 
1, which increases relative profits of existing firms in 1. The former effect arises 
because firms price their output above marginal cost; the latter effect works by reducing 
other firms' costs.
By contrast, when an entrepreneur in 1 hires a worker in 2, this does not imply 
an expenditure shifting in this well-defined sense because workers are paid at their 
marginal product. However, nominal wages in 2 must increase as a result of this firm 
going multinational and this has a general equilibrium effect on firms' profits.
M odelling comm unication costs
Take a firm in 1. In the model as described in section 4.2, the implicit 
assumption is that this firm and the workers it employs communicate freely. By 
contrast, prohibitive inter-regionally communication costs prevent this firm from hiring 
a worker in region 2 for doing some 'back-office'job.
This assumption is now relaxed as follows. Any firm in 1 can hire any worker in 
1 at unit cost of Wj and any worker in 2 at unit cost of SW2 , with s>l quantifying the 
magnitude of communication costs. In this spirit, workers are seen as providing a 
service to the firm. Communication facilities decrease coordination costs between the 
worker in 2 and the firm in 1. Hence, the manufacturing final output still takes place in 
country 1, as in section 4.2.
Unlike transportation costs, communicating from one spatial entity to another involves a 
fixed -  as opposed to variable -  cost. The nature of this cost can be seen as the time 
spent on coordination; the more numerous the workers a firm hires abroad, the more 
time is lost communicating. I assume here that a worker who supplies one unit of L 
spends 1/e of his time productively and 1-1/s of it communicating and coordinating with 
the entrepreneur. This time lost must be paid at the ongoing wage; hence the 
communication cost (s-1) is multiplied by w2.71 Workers hired by an entrepreneur 
abroad are sometimes referred to as external workers below. As a consequence, the cost 
function (1-2) to firms in 1 has to be rewritten as:
71 Within a region, 8  is meant equal unity; across regions s is assumed to be larger than 1. The key 
assumption here is that inter-regional communication between agents is more time-consuming than 
within-region communication. Assuming positive communication costs in the latter case as well would 
essentially involve a re-scaling o f  the labour-output coefficient /3 and/or o f  the entire labour force L.
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(4-13) C,(x1) = ^ 1 + pxx{w'x)x~aG*\ w/ = min{wp £w2}
C2(x2) is isomorphic. It is immediate that the very (potential) existence o f external 
workers reduces (potential) international nominal wage differences. It is also obvious 
that if  some firms in 1 hire workers in 2, no firm in 2 will ever hire a worker in 1,72
I now modify the model of section 4.2 assuming that if any entrepreneur ever 
hires an external worker, only entrepreneurs in 1 would do so. Accordingly, I 
concentrate on the case n>V2 . This is without loss of generality given the symmetric 
nature of the model. It happens that the full-employment of labour conditions (4-6) 
alone have to be modified to incorporate this extension of the model. We also need the 
no-arbitrage condition sw2>wi( as labour is homogenous. Denote m as the proportion of 
workers firms in 1 hire abroad. Loosely speaking, m can be referred to as the proportion 
of multinational firms. Given this, the following must hold at all times:
(4-14) w{ < sw2, m>  0, (w, -  ew2)m = 0
The interpretation of the expression above goes as follows. There are either no external 
workers (the case of section 4.2), and in such a case wages in 1 are below wages in 2 
adjusted for communication costs, or wages in 1 have a propensity of being larger than 
adjusted wages of external workers, and hence it is profitable for some entrepreneurs in 
1 to hire workers in 2.
To get an idea of what the possibility of hiring workers from abroad has on the 
instantaneous and long run equilibria, turn to Figure 4-4. This figure plots the 
instantaneous equilibrium for some (|)g[(t)s,<t) ]. The horizontal axis measures the 
proportion of firms established in region 1, n. The vertical axis measures the 
difference in operating profits between firms operating in 1 and firms operating in 2. In 
the configuration depicted by the plain schedule the core-periphery outcome is not 
sustainable (7ii-7i2<0 at n=l) and the dispersed configuration is stable, viz. d(7ii- 
7t2)/dn<0 at n=1/ 2 . In other words, the degree of trade ffee-ness is either low or high, viz 
either <()<<t)s or (|>>(|) .
The plain schedule represents a typical configuration of section 4.2. In this case, 
communication costs are prohibitive and firms hire workers on their local labour market
72 Indeed, a firm in 1 hires a worker in 2 if  ew 2<w1. Conversely, a firm in 2 would hire a worker in 1 if  
w 2>8 W!. With e> l, these two conditions are mutually exclusive.
73 By the symmetry o f the model we can disregard the interval [(V/2).
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only. As we know, employment in the manufacturing sector in region 1 increases when 
the proportion of firms established in 1 increases. This implies that wages in 1 increase 
as n increases. Now allow firms to hire workers abroad as well. As can be seen from 
(4-14), if 8 is not too large firms in 1 will start hiring workers in 2 when the wage gap 
increases beyond some threshold. This happens only if n is substantially larger than Vi 
(indeed, by the symmetry of the model wi«W2 when n«14).On the graph, this happens 
from point A onwards. The ability to hire cheap labour increases the profitability of 
firms in 1 and hence the curve 7: 1-712 rotates anti-clockwise around point A. In the 
situation depicted, the core-periphery outcome n=l becomes sustainable. Moreover, m 
increases as n increases. To sum-up, we can write:
Result 4-2. The ability of firms established in region 1 to hire workers 
from region 2 has three effects. First, it potentially increases the relative 
profitability for firms in 1. Second, m is non-decreasing in n. Finally, a 
core-periphery pattern that was unsustainable when communication 
costs were prohibitive might become sustainable as the result o f low 
transportation costs.
Figure 4-4. Hiring workers abroad.
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Note, however, that the stability properties of the model are unaffected in the 
neighbourhood of n=1/2. Moreover, even when s is so low that firms in 1 hire workers in 
2, we have:
Result 4-3. Employment in 1 (2) rises (decreases) as n increases. As a 
result nominal wages in 1 (2) increase (decrease) as n increases. However, 
this relative effect on employment and wages is reduced as 
communication costs 8 fall.
I formalise all these claims in the sequel.
To close the model, we need to modify the full-employment conditions so as to 
reflect the possibility that firms in 1 hire workers in 2. Using the free-entry condition 
(4-2) and the no-arbitrage condition (4-14), full-employment in 1 now requires
(4-15) ( l-m )n (l -  a)(cr -  l)^r, + —— - — w~6/]~e = —w.
1 2 (1- 0 ) 1 2 '
to hold. Accordingly, full-employment in 2 must now be rewritten as:
(4-16) mn(l -  a)( -1)*, + (1 -  n)(l -  -  + = k;
2 (1 — tf) 2
The first term in the left-hand side in the expression above represent the aggregate wage 
bill paid to workers in 2 by the multinationals; there are m times n such firms. The 
second term captures the wage bill of domestic firms. The third term is the wage bill of 
sector A. All three together must be equal to the total wage bill in this county, the term 
in the right-hand side of (4-16).
Note that the current model encompasses the model of section 4.2: set m=0 and 
8 arbitrarily large; the former implies that (4-15) and (4-16) collapse to (4-6) the later 
means that the no-arbitrage condition is never binding.
We now repeat the stability analysis in the extended model.
4.4. Preliminary results and break point
In this section we characterize some aspects of long run equilibria such that 
n>V2. Start with the symmetric equilibrium n=1/2 . This is always part of a long run 
equilibrium given the symmetry of the model. Observe that nominal wages are equal at
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the symmetric equilibrium, independently of the magnitude of the trade and 
communication costs: hence n=1A implies m=0, all (j) and e. By continuity, it must be 
that there are no external workers in the neighbourhood of the symmetric equilibrium. 
Therefore the analysis for the break point in Chapter 1 remains valid provided that s is 
strictly larger than unity. Note however that the no-arbitrage condition might be binding 
at interior, asymmetric equilibria. Such equilibria are always unstable in this model.74
Now take n to be 'significantly' larger than lA  so that the no arbitrage condition 
in (4-14) is binding. It should be obvious that the existence of communication costs 
implies that most workers who are employed by firms located in 1 are themselves in 1, 
namely the proportional of'multinationals' in 1 is smaller than 'A at any long run 
equilibrium, viz. melO,^). To see this, take the difference of (4-15) and (4-16) and 
manipulate the terms to get:
0 < (! _ *-•/!-#) + k  w■ - 1)
2 (1- 0 ) 2 1  )  2  2 \  J
(4-17)
= (1 - a)(cr - 1)[(1 -  2m)nn, -  (1 - n)x2]
= (1 - a)(ct - 1)[2«(1 -  m) -  l]7r, + (1 -  a)(cr - 1)(1 -  H)(/r, -  n2)
= (1 -  a)(<j -  l)2/z[(l -  — ) -  m]7r 
2 n
where the inequality stems from the parameter restrictions -in  particular e > l. The first 
equality follows directly from (4-15) and (4-16). The second equality is just a 
rearrangement of the previous line. The final equality stems from (4-7) and the 
definition of n; also, in any long run equilibrium n>0 implies 7ii=7i; in turn this implies 
m <l-l/(2n). Since n>V2 by assumption, it follows that m<’/2, as was to be shown.
To get further intuition for this result, assume that all entrepreneurs are in 1 and 
that half of them hire workers in 1 and the other half hire workers in 2, viz. m=1/ 2. As 
they are all located in the same region, each firm equilibrium size is identical, and hence 
all entrepreneurs hire the same number (mass) of workers. At equilibrium, they must all 
pay the same gross wage (wj=sw2). Therefore nominal wages in 2 are lower than in 1. 
On the other hand, the labour force employed in sector A in each region is the same by 
the assumption n=l and m=1/ 2 . Because there are decreasing returns in labour in this 
sector, nominal wages must be the same in both regions (wi=w2), a contradiction if e>l. 
In short, we have:
This need not be the case if  the two countries were not ex-ante identical.
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Result 4-4. In the symmetric equilibrium n=V2 costs in both regions are 
identical, so m^O. In any long-run equilibrium such than n > ! / 2  the 
proportion o f workers joining the manufacturing sector is larger in 1, viz. 
n (l-m )> m n+ l-n . This in turn implies that less than half o f the firms in 1 
hire workers from 2, viz. m < 1/ 2 .
As we saw in section 4.2, a core-periphery pattern n=l can sometimes emerge as a 
'sustainable' long run equilibrium. We now analyse such a configuration when 
communication costs are non-prohibitive.
4.5. Sustain points
No simple expression exists for the sustain points in the general case O<0<1, so I 
impose 0=1/2 as in section 4.2.
To ask whether a core-periphery pattern is sustainable, we set n=l but impose nothing 
on m, the proportion of 'multinationals' and, as usual, check whether the shadow profit 
in 2 is indeed lower than 7ii=n. If this is indeed the case the agglomerated equilibrium is 
stable. If this condition were violated, however, any capital owner would gain by 
closing her plant in 1 and relocate production in 2. Before proceeding further, note that 
when communication costs are large enough the solution to the problem is given by
(4-11). In such a case, the difference in nominal wages in each region is 
maximal and is given by (4-9). Therefore, the no-arbitrage condition is binding only 
when 8<So. From now on I assume this is the case, unless otherwise specified. Hence, 
some firms in 1 will hire workers in 2. Since these workers earn less, it is now less 
costly to produce in 1. In other words, the dispersion force of producing in the high 
wage country is weakened by the possibility of going multinational. This has a dramatic 
effect on the dynamics of the system, and in particular on the sustainability of the core- 
periphery pattern, as we now show.
The system given by the expenditure definition (4-4), the operating profit (4-5), 
and the full-employment conditions (4-15) and (4-16) can be solved for the nominal 
wages, the equilibrium operating profit, and the proportion of'multinationals'. Using the 
normalisations that yield 7i0=l and wo=l in (4-8), this straightforward exercise gives us 
the following expressions:
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(4-18)
6
(£o z£2_ ^ (5) = (1 ± £ 2
where e =min{8,8o} and so is given by (4-9). Standard comparative statics confirm that 
w2 (wi) decrease (increase) with 8, as lower communication costs are synonymous to 
greater manufacturing employment in 2 (lower manufacturing employment in 1). For 
the same reason, m decreases with 8. Obviously m=0 when communication are equal to 
or larger than So since, in such a case, the discrepancy in nominal labour costs does not 
compensate for the high transportation costs; by contrast, half of the manufacturing 
workers are hired from 2 at the limit s=l (no communication costs), as is obvious from 
the expression above.
Equilibrium profits are decreasing in wage costs as is to be expected. However, 
(4-18) also shows that equilibrium profits are increasing in s which means that, despite 
the cost-reducing nature of lower communication costs, capital owner loose when s 
decreases. This is not a robust result, for it is the outcome of various countervailing 
forces. Note first that, with Cobb-Douglas preferences and variable costs a constant 
fraction of income (p.) and costs (a) is spent on M. With aggregate price elasticity larger 
than one, these fractions would decrease with 8 and as a result 7t would have a tendency 
increase as 8 falls.
Second, since all firms are located in the same country by assumption, they have 
the same market shares on both markets 1 and 2 and have the same cost structure. 
Together with Cobb-Douglas tastes and technology, this implies 7i=Ew/cr, i.e. operating 
profits is proportional to the world expenditure on M and does not depend directly on 
costs at equilibrium. This can be derived using (4-3) and (4-5) using n=l.
Finally, the presence of decreasing returns in agriculture implies that Lw+Ar in 
(4-4) is a convex function of w, hence Ej is maximised for comer solution employment 
patterns, namely, when most people work in sector M. Since we convey the analysis for 
n=l, Ew is maximised for m=0. As a consequence, Ew is increasing in communication 
costs s. By opposition, the E/s are minimal when n=J4. This is a general equilibrium 
effect whose magnitude is small if the sector M's share of GDP is small.
With all this at hand, we follow the same strategy as in section 4.2, namely, we 
solve for the shadow value of 7i2 using (4-3) and (4-5) and ask under which conditions
:
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this is smaller than 711=71 in (4-18). When this is so, the core-periphery equilibrium 
described by n=l and (4-18) is sustainable. Computations show:
(4-19) ^
where
(4-20) = 1^1 + t0  + (1 -  a )P fl7 ^ ]
Here, se is as defined Ei/Ew for n=l and 8<so. The expression above is the counterpart 
to (4-10) and (4-11). Clearly, Se tends towards something larger than Z% from above as 
8—>1. This is obvious: as s tends towards 1, incomes are equalized since all factor 
rewards are; however, all firms are clustered in 1 and so all intermediates are sold and 
bought there, hence expenditure in 1 is always larger than expenditure in 2. Also, 1/ 2<Se 
from (4-11) at the limit s=eo, which follows from the fact that any communication cost 
larger than So is prohibitive. More generally, ds£/de>0 holds for ee(l,eo]. The intuition 
for this result is as follows. Factor prices diverge less between countries when 8 is low; 
this may or may not increase se. Because of the production technologies we have 
assumed -both sectors A and M use L (the former with decreasing returns) and the other 
factors (A and K) are specific- 1 -se increases in the share of workers in 2 that are 
employed in the manufacturing sector. By (4-18) this is decreasing in 8, hence ds£/de>0.
With non-prohibitive communication costs, the core-periphery outcome is
Q c
sustainable if <|>e [(|)s,<|> ], where (j>s and <|> are the roots of f(()>)=0, where:
(4-21) m e )  = _ sj i  _ (1 _ Sg)
Accordingly, <|)g {<j>s,4> } implies that the expression in (4-19) is equal to unity, or 
n2=7i\=n. The expressions for f(.,e) and h(.) in (4-12) are similar, so there is no need to 
repeat the comparative statics for p, a , and cr. Note however that f, like h, is negative 
and increasing at ((>=0; negative and decreasing at (j)=l; and concave everywhere. Hence, 
f(.,s) admits a unique maximum. Unless otherwise specified, we assume that 
agglomeration forces are strong enough so that this maximum is positive and the roots 
of f(.,e) are in (0,1). As a consequence, df/d§>0 at (j>s and df/d§<0 at (|)S.
, 1-Sr-
sE<t>+—
n=\
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Communication costs and sustainability o f  the core-periphery  
equilibrium
We are now interested in the effects of 8 on the sustainability o f the core- 
periphery equilibrium keeping other parameter values constant. The effect of a fall of 
communication costs, viz. de<0, on f(.) is a-priori ambiguous. This is because de<0 has 
two effects. On the one hand, when transportation costs are low it is less expensive to 
produce in 1, as it is now possible to hire the cheap labour available in 2; this is the 
direct effect, as captured by the first term in the right-hand side of (4-21). Put another 
way, when firms can hire workers from any region, a dispersion force is weakened (cost 
effect): despite the existence of decreasing returns in A, wj and w2 can no longer 
diverge without bound.
On the other hand, 1 -Se is decreasing in s, hence 2 grows richer relative to 1 as 
communication costs decrease; by the home-market effect, this makes 2 a relatively 
better (or less bad) place to locate production. This indirect, general equilibrium effect 
is best seen using (4-20). When s decreases, the rewards in 1 and 2 are more alike (and 
hence their incomes), and so l-sg increases and Se decreases. This weakens an 
agglomeration force (the backward linkage).
Since both an agglomeration force and a dispersion force weaken as 8 decreases, 
the net result of reducing communication costs is ambiguous. Of course, if  sector M is 
relatively small relative to the aggregate economy, viz. p«0, the indirect effect is 
negligible and hence the direct effect dominates. Simulations suggest that this is always 
the case, but since (4-21) is a non-integer polynomial the analytical proof is certainly
m o
extremely involved. More precisely, simulations show that d(|)s/de>0 and 3<|> /ds<0 
whenever 0<<t>s,<t)S< l . Following standard practice in the NEG, I am content with the 
simulations. The implication for this result is that the sustain interval [(|)s,<t> ] increases 
when 8 decreases. Namely,
Result 4-5. When communication costs decrease, the core-periphery 
equilibrium is sustainable over a wider range o f trade costs.
75 The Maple worksheet comm._costs_0613.mws contains the simulations and is available upon request.
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The case of zero communication costs
When communication costs are nil (viz. 8=1), firms can hire workers from any 
region at no additional cost. Hence wages must be identical or else there would exist 
arbitrage opportunities. In such conditions, if all firms cluster in the same region (e.g. 
n=l), exactly one half of the workers employed in the manufacturing sector are hired in 
1, that is, m=1/2 . As usual, (4-3) and (4-5) imply Ew=cr7t. Using n=l and m=1/2  in (4-15) 
and (4-16) and the former equality implies that the sustain point solves:
(4-22) 2</>'-a -  [1 + a P ] f  -  [1 -  ap\ = 0
of which the largest real root is unity and the smallest one, which we defined as <|)sust, is 
strictly in the (0,1) interval.
Figure 4-5. The ’Loudspeaker’ diagram
*
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Three important facts are of interest here. First, this expression holds regardless 
of the functional form (4-1) chosen for the production function of sector A.76 As an 
immediate corollary, (4-22) does not depend on 0. And, second, this expression for the 
sustain point is exactly identical to the expression derived in Chapter 1, viz. <|)s=(|)sust. 
The interpretation of this remarkable result is rather intuitive. The labour supply to 
sector M is perfectly elastic in both 1 and 2 in Chapter 1. That makes one dispersion
76 O f course, all other functional forms still matter.
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force wash away. Here, the possibility to hire workers regardless of where they live is a 
substitute for this at the margin.
Finally, the analysis here and in the previous subsection imply that the sustain 
interval looks like depicted in Figure 4-5. On this diagram, the break and sustain points 
are plot as a function of the communication costs (at the power 1-cr). When either <j) and 
e1'0 are close to zero, transportation and communication costs are both near prohibitive. 
Conversely, when they limit to unity, trade in both goods and back office services is 
free. The break points do not depend on s; consequently, both <|>b and (j>B are flat on the 
figure. By contrast, the sustain points are independent of 8 only when communication 
costs are prohibitive, i.e. whenever and s l’a<8o1*°. When communication costs are low 
enough, however, arbitrage opportunities on the labour market exist and, as depicted 
above, <|>s increases with s (decreases with s1_a) whereas (|)S decreases with s (increases 
with e1'0).
4.6. ‘History of the world, part IP?
In the recent past, trade barriers and communication costs have fallen 
dramatically -  since the end of WWII, the cumulative number of transatlantic and 
transpacific voice paths did so by a factor 30, while the factor falls to less than 6 for the 
air freight costs (see the introduction). How do these two trends differ qualitatively in 
terms of their effect on spatial distribution of economic activity?
The title of this subsection is inspired by Fujita et al. (1999, chapter 14) and to 
Krugman and Venables (1995). These authors refer to the rising inequalities between a 
rich, developed and a poor, undeveloped (and possibly developing) hemispheres as the 
‘History of the world, part I.’ Their model -qualitatively similar to the model of section 
4.2- suggests that the same process (falling trade and transportation costs) that may 
have driven income divergence in the first place may, if furthered, yield convergence in 
both the industrial structure and in cross-factor income distribution. This scenario is 
referred to as Part II of the 'History of the world' in the studies quoted earlier. This 
scenario can be visualized by moving horizontally in Figure 4-3. When <|> is either low 
or large, both regions are equally industrialised (n=1/ 2) and equally rich. When <|> takes 
intermediate values, one region only is industrialised (n=0 or n=l) and the other one 
lags behind. Note the importance of the assumption of decreasing returns in A for this 
result to hold.
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We also saw that removing communication costs is equivalent to removing 
decreasing returns in A at the margin. Therefore, with low communication costs, the 
most likely outcome is that industrial structures will keep diverging when transportation 
costs and trade barriers fall -  that is, a core-periphery pattern prevails. However, 
nominal incomes might converge at the same time.
Integration in the standard m odel
Consider the standard case first (s>So). This replicates Krugman and Venables 
(1995) and Fujita et al. (1999, chapter 14). As trade costs decrease, the anti­
agglomeration force exerted by the presence of two segmented labour markets with 
imperfectly elastic labour supplies eventually comes to dominate any other effect. As a 
result when (|) is large the sole, stable equilibrium is n=1/ 2 .
If, on the other hand, we assume that such returns are constant (0=1), then the 
conclusion is reverted: as (|) limits to unity, agglomeration forces come to dominate 
stabilizing forces and the core-periphery outcome is the single stable equilibrium. For 
0=1, we have seen that ne {0,1} for all <|) larger than <|)sust. But this outcome is an
o
artefact. For any 0<1, the core-periphery outcome is stable for all (}) in [<|)s, <\> ] -  two 
roots that are strictly smaller than unity -  so that the graph of the stable equilibria 
against 0 is not lower hemi-continuous at 0=1.
The implicit assumption for this result is that (() captures all sorts of transaction 
costs, be they trade, transportation, or various communication costs. But if  one accepts 
the idea that communication costs affect more intangible transactions not directly 
related to the manufacturing process, namely, services, whereas trade/transportation 
costs affect the delivery of the final good to a foreign market as well as the import of 
intermediates, then a fall in all these forms of transaction costs have potentially 
qualitatively different effects on the equilibrium location of firms and, consequently, on 
income divergence.
Integration in the extended m odel
Consider the extended model (e<So) with s -» 1. As communication costs 
disappear, the two labour markets become ever more integrated: wages in 1 and 2 can 
no longer diverge -not because workers can move freely from 1 to 2, but because some 
services can be provided by people working in a distinct location at no additional cost.
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Hence nominal wages in poor and rich countries are expected to converge. Therefore, 
location does not really matter anymore as far as labour market considerations are 
concerned. The capital owners now base their location decision exclusively on 
considerations related to market access and price of intermediate inputs.
Section 4.5 revealed that the break interval [<J>b,<J)B] is invariant in 8 as long as 8 
is strictly larger than unity (equivalently, e1_CT<l), and so it is drawn as a horizontal pipe 
here. On the other hand, agglomeration forces are reinforced by any increase in z]'a 
above So1'*7 (i.e. an decrease in communication costs) when agglomeration has already 
taken place. Below soI_c, communication costs are prohibitive and irrelevant to the 
sustain interval [c|)s,<t>S]; hence the “loud-speaker” shape of this interval in figure 3.1. At 
the limit, we saw above that (|>s=<|>sust and <|)S=1 when s—>1.
4.7. Wage inequalities
It is widely thought that spatial integration of some sort can have a big 
distributional impact on factor rewards. In trade theory, the point was famously made in 
the early forties by Stolper and Samuelson (1941). They showed how relative prices of 
good would influence factor rewards and hence focused on intra-regional, cross-factor 
distributive effects. Trade integration also hinders inter-regional distributive effects -  
both in real and in nominal rewards. In this section we look at how falling trade barriers 
and communication costs affect the distribution of income in the population as a 
whole.77
Before turning to the analysis, it is worth remembering a few facts. In the words 
of Baldwin and Martin (1999), post-WWII globalisation has been a ‘zero sum game’ 
between unskilled and skilled workers in all OECD countries. The former have seen 
their earnings falling sharply relative to the earnings of the later; in the face of 
unemployment, this inequality is forcefully present as well. There is no consensus about 
the extend of the causality from trade openness to these figures but up to 50% of the 
wage gap may be due to trade and migration. See Friedman (1995) for a critical survey 
of the empirical evidence on the causal link between rising imports of manufactured 
goods from developing countries and rising inequalities in real wages in OECD 
countries.
771 concentrate the discussion on w and it; this is w.l.o.g because r behaves as the mirror image o f w. See 
expression (4-1).
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The least disputed factor at the root of this gap is most certainly skill-biased 
technological change. Neither this nor migration of unskilled labour is modelled here, 
but it might still be interesting to consider the impact of transportation versus 
communication cost reduction in the framework of our model.
Falling com m unication costs
Potentially two effects arise when labour markets get more and more integrated 
as communication costs fall. The first is a direct effect: when s falls, the demand for 
different factors changes, and so their equilibrium prices. The second effect is indirect: 
given <j>, a variation in s might affect the spatial equilibrium and the shift from a long- 
run equilibrium to another has its own implications on factor prices. I consider the direct 
effect first, both at the dispersed and at the concentrated equilibria (n=1/2 and 1, 
respectively). There is no need to consider other instantaneous equilibria because they 
would not be stable (if they exist at all) and hence would not constitute a long run 
spatial equilibrium.78
M arginal changes in s
We consider here changes in s that are small enough so that the nature of the 
location equilibrium does not change. Start with the dispersed equilibrium. At n=Vi all 
nominal factor rewards are constant and equal unity by choice of units, so that 
anybody’s real income is just equal to the inverse of the price index, viz. A ^ ' 1^  where 
Al a=1/2(1+(J)). Hence A can readily be used as a metric for indirect utility. Since nominal 
wages are the same in both regions m=0 for any s>l. Therefore all rewards, nominal 
and real, are unaffected by any move in s.
This absence of conflict falls apart when the economy is on the concentrated 
equilibrium. There nominal factor rewards diverge according to both the nature of the 
factor and its spatial location. Here I assume that n=l and < |)e (< |)s ,< |)  ) for all values of s 
under consideration. To account for the evolution of real rewards, we also need an 
expression for the price indices. From (4-3) and (4-18), we have A]=s (1'CT)/2 and A2=<|)S (1‘
781 acknowledge that this fact depends upon the functional form chosen for sector Y production function. 
Other choices might well bring stable, asymmetric equilibria for intermediate values o f  (}). For instance, if  
U is o f the form A+ln(M) rather than Cobb-Douglas (with A as the quantity consumed o f good A and M 
as the CES aggregate o f  all varieties o f good M), when it exists, an asymmetric, interior equilibrium is 
stable. Mathematically, the break point comes before the sustain point when returns in labour are non­
decreasing in sector A.
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CT)/2. Hence, as intuition would predict, prices decrease as communication costs fall, viz. 
3Aj/ds<0 (j=l ,2).
Solving the model for n=l gives (4-18) and (4-19), i.e. the solutions for m, wi, 
W2 ,7ti, and 7i2, the latest being a shadow reward. Clearly, wi decreases and w2 increases 
as communication costs fall below eo, for the reasons already described in section 4.5. 
The real wages evolve in the same direction as nominal wages. Define coi as wiAi^®"1* 
and CO2 accordingly. We find the following elasticities:
(4-23) ^ £  = I z £ > 0 , 5 ^ „ _ ^ i f c o ! ± £ < 0
coJ e 2 a)2/ e  2
if e<8o and 0 otherwise. In other words, the impact of falling wage costs does not 
compensate for the fall in l's workers’ nominal wage and amplifies the increase in 2's 
workers 2's nominal reward.
It is worth noting that both wages converge towards unity as communication 
costs vanish, which is exactly the dispersed equilibrium nominal wage, hence workers 
are unable to capture any of the agglomeration rents. However, it can be seen that 
aggregate nominal wages ( L w i + L w 2) / 2  decreases as s  diminish below 80 (it remains 
unchanged otherwise), hence 'globalisation' is not exactly a zero-sum game for the 
workers. Clearly, when s is low, competition among workers is fiercer (the aggregate 
labour supply curve is more elastic) and this hurts them; workers in 1 take more than 
their fair share of the hit since w2 does increase as 8 increases. However, aggregate real 
wages ( L c o i + L c o 2 ) / 2  increases when communication costs fall when 8 is small enough. 
Mathematically,
(4_24) d(Z,a>, +Lw2)Jd£_ g ( l - ^ ) - ^ 1<r~ <
( L cqx + L cq2) / E
if 8 and <|> are close enough to unity. A necessary condition for this elasticity to be 
negative is e<(l+p)/(l-p); it is easy to check that (l+p)/(l-p) is larger than So, hence the 
necessary condition is always fulfilled. If <)) is large enough, then e<eo is also sufficient. 
In such a case, the favourable cost-reduction effect dominates the unfavourable nominal 
wage effect when e<So. This is intuitive: when e*l, the reduction in wj is equal (in 
percentage terms) to the increase in W2 ; since the two populations of workers are equally 
sized, this is purely a distributive effect and hence the net aggregate effect is nil. By
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contrast, costs fall uniformly in percentage terms, and hence every worker benefits. So it 
must be that the net effect of a fall in s is positive when s is small enough.
j. Recall from (4-17) that equilibrium operating profits are non-decreasing in e, viz.
if s<So and 0 otherwise. Consequently, there is clearly no class conflict between capital 
owners and workers but there is an 'international' conflict among workers themselves 
for all values of s in (l,So).
Falling transportation costs
In this sub-section we fix e and consider the implications on real incomes of
  Q
falling transportation costs. Turn again to Figure 4-5. For (|) on [0, <(>s) or (<() ,1], the
Q n
symmetric equilibrium n=lA  is the sole stable one; on [<|>s,<|>b] or [<() ,<|) ], there are two 
more stable (long run) equilibria (h=0 and h=l). On ((j>B,(|)B), these two are the unique 
spatial equilibria.
Imagine the economy starts in a situation in which both transportation and 
communication costs are large, such as at a point like A in the figure. Two facts are 
worth emphasizing. Clearly, at point A n=1A is the unique stable equilibrium in such 
circumstances. All nominal rewards are equal to 1 by assumption and the real returns 
are equal to with A j  (implicitly) defined as Aj1"a=Vi(H-<J)), j= l ,2
Also, £>£o implies m=0 for all n. Now imagine that (j) increases over time along 
the arrow that links points A and B on the figure. As long as no relocation ever takes 
place, which is the case if  <()<(|)b when agents are myopic, all factor owners earn one 
monetary unit, and their real returns are increasing in (j).
When (|) increases beyond (|)b catastrophic agglomeration takes place in, say, 
country 1 and hence n, wi, and Aj incur a discrete, positive jump whereas both W2 and 
A2 fall in a discrete manner. The relevant expressions are (4-18) for the nominal rewards 
(with e-£ o) and
We finally turn to Wj=n the real capital reward for an owner who lives in
(4-25)
X D j I s  J 2 ( s  +  \ )
(4-26) a l ~ a  _  _ ( l - a ) ( l - o - ) / 2  — c n , ( l - a ) ( l - < r ) / 21 -*o
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for the A's. Using (4-18), (4-26), and the expression of A at n= 1/ 2, the (discrete) change 
in welfare for the various factor owners, denoted as 8 (.), is found to be:
By inspection, 5(coi) and 8(tui) are positive, 8 (0 )2) is negative, and the sign of 8 (0 1 2) is 
ambiguous. These are the result of four effects.
First, when n jumps from 14 to 1, the nominal rewards jump from 1 to a number 
larger than 1 for all capital owners and for the workers in 1; W2 falls below unity. This is 
so because capital owners capture the agglomeration rents and labour become more 
(less) scarce in country 1 (country 2). Second, since all firms cluster in a single location 
labour costs increase in the manufacturing sector. All the same, the cost of intermediate 
inputs falls as firms save on transportation costs for all the inputs that used to be 
imported but no longer are. The net effect of this on costs, and hence prices, is 
ambiguous. Finally, as firms cluster in country 1, consumers in 1 save on the 
transportation costs of the varieties they no-longer import (the opposite is true for 2 's 
consumers). The net effect is a-priori ambiguous for all factors.
Workers in 1 gain because their nominal wage increases. The price of 
manufacturing good, even if it increases, increases by less for three reasons. First, 
labour costs represent only a fraction of the variable costs of the firms. Second, the fact 
that firms fully pass the additional costs onto consumers is an artefact of the model, but 
this is clearly an upper bound in a more general context. And third, when they join a 
cluster, firms save on the costs of intermediates; this reduces the price of the final good 
since this cost reduction is passed onto consumers. Capital owners who live (and 
consume) in 1 gain for essentially the same reasons. Their nominal return increases by 
more than wi, as can be seen in (4-18), so it must be that 8(tni)>0.
(4-27)
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Workers in 2 unambiguously loose for reasons that are broadly symmetric to the 
increase in coi. Their nominal reward falls; and even if the variable production costs of 
the manufacturing goods falls, the price index of their bundle of these goods increases 
because they now have to import all units they consume. Finally, capital owners who 
live in 2 may or may not enjoy a greater utility because both their nominal reward and 
the price index on the manufacturing goods they consume increase.
This discussion is summarized in Figure 4-6. This figure is the normative 
counterpart to Figure 4-3. For the sake of clarity, and to be consistent with the thought 
experiment above, I have only plot the welfare workers and capital owners from both 
countries enjoy at the symmetric equilibrium for <|)<<j)B and (()><() and at the concentrated 
equilibrium n=l when <|>e(<|>B,<|> ). When (j) is low, welfare changes according to falling 
prices in manufacturing goods only. Then real rewards shift as shown (except perhaps 
for 11J2). Real wages and capital rewards are represented with plain and dotted lines, 
respectively.
Figure 4-6. Trade liberalisation and welfare
o
,S
As trade liberalization proceeds further or transportation costs keep falling, 
nominal reward and price indices in 1 remain unchanged. Consumer prices in 2 fall, 
hence everybody is made no worse-off beyond <|>b  as long as the core-periphery
q #
configuration is sustainable, i.e. as long as (|)<<j) . When trade/transportation costs are so
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low that a point like point B in Figure 4-5 is reached, half of the firms move back to 2. 
Such a 'catastrophic' dispersion has welfare effects that are perfectly symmetric to those 
described in the previous paragraphs, namely, 8(coi)<0, 8(rui)<0, 8(cd2)<0, and the sign 
of 8 (1112) is ambiguous. Since (J)S><|)b, the magnitude of these effects is smaller for factor 
owners located in 1, but ambiguous for factors in 2. When <j)«l, all factor rewards, both 
nominal and real, are equal to 1.
Path depen den cy
So the world economy is at point B where industries are evenly spread between 
the two countries. Assume now that communication infrastructures improve so that we 
move horizontally to point C. Since agents are myopic, we know that industries remain 
evenly spread out as long as the boundary (j>B has not been crossed. In other words, even 
though a core-periphery pattern is sustainable at point C, the manufacturing plants 
remain dispersed as in B.
Instead, imagine the following, completely different integration path.
Start from point A in Figure 4-5 again. At a point such as A firms are equally 
active in both countries. Imagine now that transportation and communication costs 
decrease simultaneously -call this globalisation- so that the integration path looks more 
like the arrow from A to C. When this arrow crosses <j)B then all firms cluster in a single 
location. Possibly (if s<£o)> some of them hire external workers. When globalisation
p
proceeds further towards point C the curve (|) is never crossed, so the core-periphery 
pattern remains a stable long-run equilibrium.
In other words, history matters. In the first case, when the world economy 
globalises in two waves (from A to B first, and then from B to C), then ultimately both 
economies converge. When transportation costs decrease alongside communication 
costs (as illustrated by the move from A to C along the diagonal arrow) then divergence 
prevails.
4.8. Conclusion
This chapter used a standard model of economic geography to assess the effects 
of falling trade costs as well as communication costs on both the spatial equilibrium and 
the wage distribution. In particular, a 'double tomahawk' can summarize the dynamics 
of the model. For high trade costs firms want to be close to final demand; because some
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factors are inter-regionally immobile (workers and land), so is some final demand; 
therefore capital (and hence firms) is allocated evenly in the two regions. At the other 
extreme, for very low trade costs, locating close to final customers is no longer a key 
issue. Rather, entrepreneurs will save as much as they can on costs and hence locate 
where cheap labor is. As labor is evenly split between the two regions and labor supply 
is finitely elastic, these considerations will again yield a dispersed spatial equilibrium.
At intermediate trade costs, however, these two dispersion forces are weaker 
than the main agglomeration force: if all entrepreneurs are concentrated in region 1, 
then shipment costs are saved on half of the varieties that used to be imported. 
Moreover, each other's demand for intermediates is greater when they co-locate.
As the spatial distribution of industrial activity is even, so are real and nominal 
incomes: all rewards are equalized across regions, and so are the costs of living. When 
the spatial allocation of firms diverges, so do these variables: the cost of living and the 
land reward are lower in the core, whereas workers’ wage is lower in the periphery.
We then considered what happens when labour markets get integrated as well. 
We assume that labour markets become ever more integrated because communication 
costs drop over time. This enables firms in region 1 to buy the services of workers in 
region 2 at a cost that encompasses any difference in language, the legal system and 
genuine communication costs. This has the clear, immediate implication that nominal 
wages can only diverge up to the point at which the no-arbitrage condition between 
nominal wages binds; spatial wage and land reward inequalities are non-decreasing in 
those costs.
The second implication is that one dispersion force is now weakened by this 
mechanism: labour markets are no longer completely distinct, so that agglomeration is 
now sustainable over a larger range of trade costs -  some firms would now simply hire 
or buy services from (that is: hire) workers living abroad. This has an adverse effect on 
spatial wage equality, as we already know that spatial agglomeration implies factor 
rewards and costs of living to diverge. Save for landowners, the two effects go in the 
same direction, so that real incomes diverge as well.
The net effect on inequality among people living in the same region is generally 
ambiguous, and for the same reason: given that the economy is on the concentrated 
equilibrium, falling transportation costs is generally a good thing because nominal 
rewards usually converge. On the other hand, if  it prevents the economy to going back
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to the dispersed equilibrium (where factor rewards diverge least), then this form of 
labour market integration is a bad thing on equity grounds.
Finally, we saw that the integration path itself is very important for the north- 
south duality in both the production structure and real income divergence. In particular, 
the model suggests that when communication costs fall faster than transportation costs, 
as the evidence surveyed in the introduction suggests, then it is much more likely that 
the non industrialised nation remains locked-in the specialisation of labour-intensive 
products and routinised business services like call centres.
Clearly, this model gives a relatively rich picture of divergence in real incomes -  
both across factors and across regions -  and generates losers and winners that might 
differ whether labour market de-segmentation or trade integration -o r both -  takes 
place. The political economics in such a framework are therefore more involved that in 
simple 'zero-sum' games, where essentially one factor or one region gains while the 
other looses.
Appendix
The analysis here complements section 4.4. The 'dispersed equilibrium' is said to
be unstable if d7ii/dn>0 at n=1A. (By the symmetry of the model, d7t2/dn=-d7ri/dn at
h=1/2 .) In words, the dispersed equilibrium is unstable if moving one unit of K from 1 to
2 increases the capital reward in 1 relatively to 2 (remember that capital reward equals
operating profit by free-entry). In such a case, agglomeration forces dominate and, by
the law of motion (2-7), n increases further. That is, the initial shock is not self-
Jcorrecting. Accordingly, any long run interior equilibrium n' such that 7Ci=7i2 is said to 
be unstable if d(7ri-7i2)/dn>0 at n=n'.
We then differentiate the system around the symmetric equilibrium, as in 
Chapter 1; we also use the symmetry properties o f the model and write dw0=dwi=-dw2, 
d7io=d7cl=-dTc2, etc. See Chapter 1 for details. This way we get a system in dlnAo, dw0, 
and d7io, dEo:
N$1 2 p [ a ( ( j - \ ) -  nZ] Z - a d7T0 a p z
(4-28) 0 (.( T - m - a ) Z 1-ccZ dw0 = 2 Z
-P fi + C L - a f i - M W - * ) ) 0 _dA0/ A0_ _ P _
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where Z= (\-<())/( 1+(|>) and p = l-l/a  as before, and dn is treated as exogenous. By 
Cramer's rule, it is easy to get a solution for d7i0/dn; the break points <|>b  and (J)B<1 are the 
zeroes of the resulting second order polynomial in (j). In the limiting case 0=1, (|)B=(|)break 
in (2-9) and cj)B=l.
With the addition of decreasing returns in A, both <j>B and (j)B are smaller than unity -  
when they are real. The reason is, again, that these decreasing returns act as a dispersion 
force that does not depend on <|>, so it must be that d7io/dn<0 at n=1/2  (namely, the 
symmetric equilibrium is stable) when <|> is arbitrarily close to 1. The general solution to 
(4-28) is not particularly enlightening, even in the special cases a=p or 0=1/2.
However, there are a couple of useful facts that some standard (if tedious) 
algebra reveals. At the limit a= l (agglomeration forces as measured by strength of 
vertical linkages are maximal) we have <J>B=0 and <|>B=1, all {cj,|li,0}; this implies that the 
symmetric equilibrium is never stable. By contrast, a=0 implies that the symmetric 
equilibrium is always stable (the model essentially collapses to the FC model of Chapter 
1).
Note an important caveat here: a necessary condition for <|>b  and (J)B to be 
sufficient statistics for our problem is that the denominator of d7io/dn is different from 
zero. It turns out, however, that the polynomial that constitutes the denominator 
generically admits two zeroes. One is always negative and, as such, does not make any 
economic sense, hence we disregard it entirely. The largest one is sometimes positive 
(but not always) and smaller than 1, so it matters. Define it as (|)oB. With some effort, we 
can check that a= l implies (|)oB=0. However, it can be shown that the following is true:
(4-29) <f>* = 0 <=> min {max {0, (f)B}, (f>8} = 0
in the simplifying case p=a Fujita et al. (1999) and others assume. In words, (4-29) says 
that, (|)oB=0 if and only if the smallest between <|)b and (|)B is nil, provided it belongs to 
the meaningful range [0,1], are the same. This fact is useful for the graphical analysis 
we are now conducting.
D D
Figure 4-7 plots <|>o , <|)b and <|> as a function of a , for some p=a, a=5.31, and 
0=3. The first locus, (j>oB, is the curve that links (0,-1) and point A. The second and third 
loci, (J>b and (|)B, link point B to point C and A, respectively. At point B the radical of the 
solution to (J)B and (|)B is negative, which implies (|)B=<t)B. Also, <J)0B and <()B cross on the
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horizontal axis for some a  in (0,1). All these properties follow from the observations 
made in the previous paragraph.
The configuration plot in Figure 4-7 is typical: for low values of a  (when 
agglomeration forces are weak), no real root exists (the radical is negative) and the 
symmetric equilibrium is always stable. On the other hand, when p is sufficiently large 
(i.e. the radical is positive), the symmetric equilibrium is unstable for all combinations 
of p and (j) in the convex set ABC.
When agglomeration forces as measured by a  so weak that (t>B<0 Va, <|)b rotates 
anti-clockwise; it is increasing in pon the relevant range, but negative for low values of 
a.
Figure 4-7: Break points (parameter values: a=p, a=5.31, 0=.3)
It can be shown that when a  is low enough (agglomeration forces strong 
enough) the convex set of the combinations (a,(|)) such that <j>e[(|)B,(t>B ] expands; in 
particular, the value of a  such that the radical is nil is lower. Further simulations show 
that the analysis for general values of 0 is qualitatively identical (in particular, this set
A
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expands when 0 increases because this corresponds to lower dispersion forces). 
Therefore, I am confident the analysis conveyed is exhaustive.79
79 The Maple worksheet BreakAnalysis.mws is available on request.
C hapter 5. THE HOLD-UP PROBLEM, 
INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC SKILL
ACQUISITION, AND FUNCTIONAL 
AGGLOMERATION
5.1. Introduction
All chapters thus far fit the so-called 'New Economic Geography' (NEG) 
paradigm whereby agglomeration, or the clustering of economic activities, is the result 
of the interaction between increasing returns at the firm level, transportation costs, and 
factor mobility across sectors or space. The emphasis is put on the technology 
(increasing returns) and the market conduct (imperfectly competitive segmented 
markets). By contrast, factors are assumed to be perfectly homogenous and the factor 
markets to be perfectly competitive. That is, factor market motives for agglomeration 
are disregarded.
The aim of the present chapter is to remedy to this and focus our attention on 
labour market considerations. In order to draw as clear conclusions as possible, this 
chapter abstracts from final goods market considerations.
Many industries are spatially concentrated in the world, and this is by no means 
a recent phenomena. For instance, Marshall (1920) reported almost a century ago that 
the British cutlery manufacturing was concentrated in Sheffield. This is still the case 
nowadays.
Beyond anecdotic evidence, Duranton and Overman (2001) show that 51% of 
the four-digit UK industries and, confirming earlier empirical work, show that location 
externalities must be highly localised. Interestingly, their results report that industries 
that belong to the same branch have similar localisation patterns. This last fact can of 
course be explained by the NEG if similar industries have similar input-output matrices 
(as in the work of Puga and Venables 1996). Or it might be that similar industries use 
workers with similar skills and, in turn, that firms co-locate along the skills they use. 
The theory of this chapter provides an explanation for the co-location o f firms that 
employ workers with similar skills, regardless of the industry in which they work. In 
other words, the functional specialisation of a location, to use the terminology
144
introduced by Duranton and Puga (2001), permits the labour market pooling of workers 
with similar skills. By contrast, when market access and supplier access are crucial for 
an industry then sectoral agglomeration may arise as the outcome of that tension. This 
was the topic of all earlier chapters.
As an example, take the accordion industry. The world production is dominated 
by a bunch of medium and small firms located in an Italian village, Castelfidardo, near 
Ancona in the region named Le Marche. Clearly, the accordion industry is spatially 
agglomerated by any measure. According to the NEG, we should suspect the presence 
of immense scale economies, low transportation costs, and strong input-output linkages. 
I have not run a proper econometric study on this specific industry, but this line of 
reasoning looks doubtful as a candidate explanation for the spatial concentration of this 
industry. Firms in Castelfidardo serve the world market and the stuff they produce is 
easily transportable. This suggests that market access considerations are not the central 
concern in the location decision in this industry. In other words, firms in this industry do 
not seem to have clustered in this medieval town because they belong to the same 
industry per se but, as we shall argue, because they employ workers with similar skills. 
This distinction is subtle but important.80
The reason why this industry is actually located in this particular town is
Oj  t t t
historical. The reason this industry is agglomerated in a single location at all (or 
almost) is that, locals would tell you, they have the savoir-faire. Which puts the 
question mark one step further: why is this savoir-faire agglomerated? The theory this 
chapter puts forward relies on solving (or attenuating) a 'hold-up' problem in skill 
acquisition.
In industries like the accordion industry, where skills are highly specific, 
workers' investment risk being ‘held-up’ by firms that employ them. An investment is 
held up if one party must pay the cost while others share in the payoff (Acemoglu and 
Shimer 1999).
The argument developed in this chapter runs as follows. An entrepreneur has to 
choose where to locate her firm. To produce, she needs some workers. The entrepreneur
80 Actually, some firms in Castelfidardo specialize in the production o f the instruments, others mostly 
repair them, and yet others produce some components only.
81 See the website http://www.comune.castelfidardo.an.it/Visitatori/Fisarmonica/storia fisa.htm
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and the workers own complementary production factors. The worker can increase her 
productivity by incurring some costly investment (education, say) into acquiring 
specific skills. Once she has done so, the worker decides to join an entrepreneur or 
another. Since skill acquisition precedes the productive relationship, the firm will pay 
the worker her reservation wage. In a location in which nobody else has any use of her 
skill, a worker's reservation wage is independent of her skills. By contrast, if  the worker 
joins a firm that locates near competitors for that skill then her outside options depend 
positively upon her skills.
The conclusion follows. In case a worker joins a firm that stands alone (in the 
sense that nobody else value her skills), she has no incentive to acquire these skills in 
the first place. By contrast, if she joins a firm that stands among many, competition for 
her skills ensures that her wage will depend on her skills. This provides her with the 
incentive to acquire the skills in the first place.
The entrepreneur is perfectly aware of this fact. If she locates in isolation she 
knows that she cannot credibly promise the worker to pay her according to her 
qualifications in the future when she joins her. Co-location and the resulting 
competition for the workers' skills, in other words, provide a credible way to pay high 
wages once the worker has made the investment.
To put it another way, a hold-up problem arises if the investment is relation- 
specific -which is the case if the firm locates in isolation. This hold-up problem 
disappears if the investment is industry-specific.
This story works under the following implicit assumptions. First, moving from 
one location to another is costly for the worker. This can be justified on several grounds. 
Leaving a city for another entails monetary costs, obviously, but it also entails leaving a 
network of friends, looking for a new school for the children and other intangibles of 
the like. Second, the amount and quality of skills acquired might be observable by all 
parties but is not verifiable by a court, say. As a result, it is not possible to write a 
contract contingent of the amount of skilled acquired.
As an aside, this story is one about providing investment incentives. It is not a 
story of committing to pay higher wages per se. Indeed, we assume that location is 
contractible, so that the firm made of the entrepreneur and workers will chose to locate 
so as to maximize the joint surplus. If this joint surplus is maximised at some positive 
investment level, then firms will co-locate at equilibrium. In sum, this mechanism
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shows how a thick labour market for some specialized skills provides a rational for 
agglomeration.
Our setting is closely related to Rotemberg and Saloner (2000). They assume a 
simple setting where two very different parties are necessary to each other to produce a 
given good. One has all market power; the other is to make a non-verifiable investment. 
Since this is essentially the setting described above, they get the same result: 
agglomeration takes place as it solves the hold-up problem.
We shall stress below that a very specific conjunction of assumptions is needed 
for this result: agglomeration is the efficient spatial organization of production if the 
party that has to make important relation-specific investments faces a potential hold-up 
problem. In the example above, if the firm has to make unverifiable investments as well, 
then it might be better for it to locate somewhere in the ‘periphery’ and form a one-firm 
town so as to grab a larger share of the surplus generated at the production process so as 
to, which in turn gives it higher incentives to invest. This suggests an explanation for 
the 49% of the four-digit UK manufactures that fail to be agglomerated according to 
Duranton and Overman (2001).
When firms locate apart, this increases the degree of competition among workers 
who sell their labour on local labour markets. Hence, in general, it might well be that 
agglomeration worsens the hold-up problem, turning Rotemberg and Saloner’s (2000) 
result upon its head. In sum, the respective identity of the party that exerts market power 
and of the one that makes an industry-specific investment is crucial. This suggests a 
potentially rich theory in which the relative importance of the investments of the parties 
involved, the specificity to their relationship, and their outside options all mater.
This also implies that agglomeration and dispersion forces are o f the same 
nature, by contrast to other papers. (Typically, other studies assume that agglomeration 
economies arise in thick markets and that congestion costs are the result of land 
scarcity.) A final technical point deserves some mention here. Technically, 
agglomeration economies arise when there are increasing returns to scale so that size 
matters. In this chapter, I assume away all non-convexity in the production function as a 
simplifying assumption. Hence, there might be benefits associated to the co-location of 
some agents in the same region but these are not agglomeration proper. I leave this issue 
in the background so as not to blur the analysis.
147
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 introduces a 
simple model in which one party of a production relationship has all the market power 
(the firm) whilst the other one (the worker) has to make an investment that improves the 
productivity of the relationship. It is shown that in this simple and very specific 
example, Rotemberg and Saloner's (2000) result obtains. In Sections 5.3 and 5.4, we 
establish more symmetry between the parties and concentrate on the question of how 
market power, investment in relation-specific investments, and location all interact. 
Finally, section 5.5 concludes.
5.2. A simple model
This section considers a disturbingly simple model that will prove sufficient to 
illustrate the main point of this chapter: agglomeration might exacerbate or soften the 
hold-up problem. There are two types of agents in our economy, entrepreneurs and 
workers. There is a single industry in which production requires agents o f both types to 
establish a productive relationship, which we call 'a firm'. We assume that one party 
(potentially) exerts market power and that one party makes an industry-specific 
investment; in this section we assume that these two parties are distinct.
The environment in which entrepreneurs and workers evolve is as follows.
There are two 'firms', each made of one entrepreneur (K) and a continuum of workers 
(L) of mass one. For simplicity, we say that they belong to the same 'industry'. But 
industry here must be understood from a functional perspective: both firms make use of 
workers with identical skills to convey the same function (say secretaries), irrespective 
of what good or service the firm produces.
In this chapter we leave final good market considerations aside. Hence we 
assume that firms produce a homogenous good under constant returns to scale that they 
sell on the spot market in a perfectly competitive environment. None of the choice 
variable of the model has any effect on the price firms might get on the good market.
We also make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1. On the labour market, workers are atomistic but 
entrepreneurs are discrete units.
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This is another way of saying that workers have no market power, whereas 
entrepreneurs might have some. Next, workers make an industry-specific investment 
best thought of as acquiring some human capital:
Assumption 2. Workers make a non-verifiable industry-specific 
investment, which is labour augmenting.
This investment is observable by both parties (no asymmetric information) but not 
verifiable by a third party (e.g. a court).
As for the location decision, our economy is made of two regions, region 1 and 
region 2. We assume that location is contractible. Therefore, whoever has to make the 
location decision chooses to locate in the region so as to maximize the joint surplus of 
the entrepreneur and the workers. It is natural to assume that firms make that decision.
The exact timing of events, some additional terminology, and the notation are all 
introduced in the game we define below.
The gam e
There are two symmetric, ex ante identical regions, region 1 and region 2. If 
both firms establish themselves in the same location, we dub this region as the 'core'. 
The empty region is referred to as the 'periphery'. By contrast, we refer to the 
configuration in which there is one firm in each region as the 'dispersed' outcome. The 
set of players is made of two entrepreneurs j e {1,2} as well as of a continuum of 
workers of mass 2: Le[0,2].
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Firms chose where to locate. In particular, whether to co-locate or to 
locate separately.
2. Workers make their investment decisions and join the firms. Firms offer 
wages that workers may refuse. If they accept, production takes place 
and the gross surplus (or revenue) R is realised.
In period 1, firms decide where to locate so as to maximize the expected joint surplus, 
or revenue R. The location decision is contractible, so the identity of who actually 
makes this decision does not matter for the equilibria of the game. R itself is non-
149
verifiable ex-post and hence non-contractible (see Grossman and Hart 1985 for a full 
treatment of incomplete contracts).
In period 2 workers make a labour-augmenting, industry-specific investment i>0 
that costs them i and then join a firm. The entrepreneur makes them an offer that they 
may refuse, in which case they either get a reservation wage normalised to 0 (crucially, 
this reservation wage does not depend upon i) or try to be hired by the other firm. If the 
two firms locate are dispersed, we assume the cost of moving from one region to the 
other is prohibitive for the worker. This simplifying assumption is for convenience only; 
it implies that workers' outside option is zero when there is one firm in each region.
If located apart, it follows from Assumption 1 that entrepreneurs detain full 
market power. Anticipating the results, no firm has any incentive to pay the workers 
more than their reservation wage.
If both firms co-locate, we assume that they compete in prices for the workers. 
This competition a-la Bertrand ensures that the workers are paid their marginal product. 
This implies that the workers' outside option is their marginal product in this 
configuration.
This combination of extreme assumptions is purposely designed so as to get 
bold results to illustrate the mechanism of interest.
Turn to technology. R is defined as R(iL,K), where L and K are the 
mass/number of workers and entrepreneurs of a typical firm, and i is the labour- 
augmenting skill acquired at stage 1 by a typical worker. Therefore, iL is interpreted as 
the 'effective' labour. There are constant returns to scale in iL and K. Denote the first 
derivative to R with respect to its Zth argument as Rz(.) and its second derivative with 
respect to the same argument as RzzO-
We impose the following regularity conditions on R:
Assumption 3. (Positive and decreasing marginal products.) V Z = l,2 ,
Rz>0 and Rzz< 0, all Z>0. Moreover, Ri2>0.
Assumption 4. (Inada conditions.) limK->oR20-+00, limvL-»oRiQ=+0°- 
Moreover, V Z’^iL jK , limz,-K)Ri2 (.)= + 00 •
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The first of these assumptions means that production (and hence revenue) increases with 
the use of one factor -keeping the other one fixed- at a decreasing rate. Also, the factors 
are complementary in that marginal productivity of either factor increases with the 
amount of the other factor used. The Inada conditions state that the marginal 
productivity of any factor grows unbounded when this factor is used in ever-smaller 
quantities. By contrast, the reservation wage in finite (and normalised to zero). This 
ensures that the first best amount of investment i is positive.
Note that because i is labour-augmenting, we have RL(i)=dR/dL=iRi(.), 
^2R/5L2=i2R ii(.), Rv(i)=dR/di=LRi(.) and c^R /di^I^R nQ , so the Inada conditions 
above ensure that the worker will make a positive investment in any equilibrium in 
which her pay is an increasing function of her marginal product. Finally, by the 
assumption of non-increasing returns workers will join firms in equal proportions at any 
symmetric equilibrium, viz. L=K=1 for any firm. Hence, with some abuse of notation 
we write R (il,l)=R(i).
Accordingly, the joint surplus achieved when workers make no investment is 
defined as Ro, where Ro=R(0)=R(0,l). R0 can be smaller or larger than the reservation 
wage. None o f the results below actually depend on the size of Ro.
Finally, we must characterize the payoffs. The entrepreneur is the residual 
claimant and gets the profit 7i=R(i)-w, namely the revenue minus the wage he pays to 
the workers. By the non-contractibility assumption, w cannot be contingent to i. By 
constant returns, we have Rl(i)+Rk(i)=R(i). Everybody is risk-neutral.
We now turn to the solutions of the game.
Solution to the g a m e
As usual, we solve the game backward. In stage 2, workers observe the firms 
location decisions and decide how much to invest in industry-specific skills and then 
join firms, foreseeing the outcome on the labour market in each case (co-location or 
dispersion). In stage 1, firms perfectly anticipate the investment decisions and decide 
where to locate accordingly.
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Consider the dispersed equilibrium first. In stage 2, the firm is a monopsonist on 
the labour market, made of a unit mass of workers (since the two entrepreneurs' problem 
is identical, we drop subscripts). Its problem is then to maximize its profit:82
(5-1) max {nDlsp = R(i) -  w : w > 0}
The firm decides how many of the workers who followed it in its location to hire and 
makes a take-or-leave-it offer in wages. Clearly, the firm offers the reservation wage 
w=0 to all workers, an offer they accept.
In stage 1, since the two locations are segmented the investment the worker 
might make becomes relation-specific. Foreseeing her wage to be zero in stage two 
whatever the amount of i she chooses (namely, facing a ‘hold-up problem’) the worker 
does not invest. The total surplus generated by each firm is then Ro-
Next, consider the concentrated equilibrium. In stage 2 firms compete on the 
labour market. Competition for workers takes a ‘Bertrand’ form. The Nash equilibrium 
(wn*,ws*) to this sub-game is defined as:
(5-2) wN = argm ax{nc°nc =R(iLn)~  wNLN : wN > 0}
with
(5-3) Ln =
09W f f < \ v s
= W 's
2,w„>w*s
and Ws is defined symmetrically. As is well known, competition in prices for a 
homogenous commodity, as here, is equivalent to perfect competition: workers are paid 
at their marginal productivity, so w * = R l( i ). Therefore, expected wages are an 
increasing function of i, even though i is not contractible. This happens because 
competition in the labour market creates a link between the workers' productivity and 
their expected wage.
At stage 1, workers maximize their expected wage, anticipating w*:
(5-4) mxx.aBRL( t ) - t
82 Formally, the firm also chooses the number o f workers it wishes to hire, L e [0 ,l] . Since it is price 
taking on the good market and labour is in fixed supply, it clearly chooses L=1 whenever the resulting 
profit is non-negative.
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The solution to this problem is given by 
(5-5) + 1)
CD
Define i as the first best solution to the investment problem, that is, the investment in 
human capital that solves Rt(i)=l. The following result from Assumption 3 and the 
homogeneity of degree one in R(.).
Result 5-1. Workers under-invest under agglomeration as well as under 
dispersion. However, they under-invest less under agglomeration than 
they do under dispersion, viz. 0< t*< iFB.
To see this, note that iFB is implicitly defined as R i(ifb,1)=1. Subtracting from (5-5), we 
find:
(5-6) R} (iFM ) -  R,(i*,I) = * * Ru (i*, 1) < 0
The inequality follows from Assumption 3 (decreasing marginal returns). Assumption 3
FBalso implies i >i*. Finally Assumption 4 (Inada conditions) ensures i*>0. This 
demonstrates Result 5-1.
The intuition for this result is simple. The hold-up problem is reduced in the 
concentrated configuration, so workers internalise part of their investment. Since they 
are paid at their marginal productivity, and hence they invest so as to increase their 
wage. Another way of interpreting this result is as follows: when firms conglomerate in 
a unique region, each worker’s outside option improves. Because her investment is 
industry-specific in this case (and not only relation-specific), any investment she makes 
also improves her outside option.83
The bottom line is that, absent feasible contracts, agglomeration acts as a 
credible commitment for the entrepreneurs to pay more productive workers a higher 
wage where a contract could not do this by assumption. Hence, the unique sub-game 
perfect Nash-equilibrium of the game described above is one in which firms cluster in 
one region only. Remember that we have made the reasonable assumption that location 
is contractible so that firms locate where the revenue is highest. In particular, the
83 But note that they do not internalise the positive effect their investment has on the entrepreneur's 
marginal productivity, so that workers invest less than the first best.
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distribution of R between n and w is of no interest, even though no side-payment are 
needed here (both wages and profits are higher under agglomeration).
5.3. Entrepreneur investment
In this section we turn the previous result over its head by removing one but 
crucial assumption and imposing its perfect symmetric instead. Assume now that the 
entrepreneur has both market power on the labour market and has to chose whether to 
invest and how much. In particular, we maintain Assumption 1 but replace Assumption 
2 with the following:
Assumption 5. Entrepreneurs make a non-verifiable, industry-specific 
investment, which is K-augmenting.
That is, we now write the gross revenue as R(I), defined as R(L,IK) for L=K=1, where I 
is the entrepreneur's investment. Also, the symmetric of Assumptions 3 and 4 hold for I 
replacing i. Finally, because I is capital augmenting, we have RK(I)=5R/dK=IR2(.), 
e2R/aK2=I2R22(.)> R[(I)=5R/5I=KR2(.) and ^ R /d l^ R z z O -
Under dispersion, the entrepreneur maximizes R(I)-I and chooses the first best 
IFB, where IFB solves
(5-7) R ,(IFB) = 1
The entrepreneur chooses the first best under dispersion because she can fully 
appropriate the returns on her investment. Under agglomeration, Bertrand (i.e. perfect) 
competition on the labour market forces each entrepreneur to pay the workers their 
marginal product, so (by the assumption of constant returns to scale in production) 
entrepreneurs are left with their marginal product in value. As a consequence they chose 
I so as to maximize Ri(I). The solution to that problem is I, where I is implicitly defined 
as:
(5-8) R v ( i )  = R2( l J )  + IR22(l,I )  = l
Using the same methodology as for proving Proposition 1 above, we have:
(5-9) R2( U FB) - R 2( l j )  = IR22( lJ )
By the assumption of decreasing marginal products (Assumption 3), (5-9) implies the 
following result:
Result 5-2. Entrepreneurs under-invest under agglomeration and choose 
the optimal level o f  investment under dispersion, viz. 0< I<  IFB.
Clearly, the entrepreneurs under-invest under agglomeration, because they internalise 
only the effect of their investment on their marginal productivity. Assuming that 
location is contractible at date 1, though, each firm would then locate in different 
locations. (The entrepreneur can compensate the worker for the smaller wage she is 
going to pay her.) Dispersion provides the right incentives to the right person.
5.4. Core-periphery or dispersion?
We now have everything at hand to state our key proposition. This makes the 
comparison between Result 5-1 and Result 5-2:
Result 5-3. Under Assumption 2 (workers invest), agglomeration is 
preferable. Under Assumption 5 (entrepreneurs invest), dispersion is 
preferable (the first best is even achieved).
In both cases, the nature of the agglomeration and dispersion forces is the same: any 
firms should locate where the hold-up problem is minimized. Under agglomeration, the 
workers' market power is higher than under dispersion (her outside options are more 
valuable); the converse is true for the entrepreneurs. So, firms should locate so as to 
give maximum market power to the side that invests.
5.5. Discussion
In this chapter we have seen how the interaction between market power, location 
and non-verifiable investments gives rise sometimes to agglomeration, sometimes to 
dispersion. The simple model above yields powerful results. When market power and 
firm-specific investment are complementary this acts as an agglomeration force. When 
market power discourages investment this acts as a dispersion force.
The most novel insight is that if agglomeration of firms in a given industry 
increases the market power of the side whose investment is the most important to the 
(joint) surplus, then we should expect to observe all firms of this industry to locate in a 
few 'cores'. Conversely, if  agglomeration reduces the incentives to invest, then we 
should expect this industry to be dispersed in more numerous locations. Clearly, the
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proximity of other firms (or the absence hereof) engenders externalities on the 
incentives to invest within other firms.
The empirical predictions of the model are that spatial units should be 
specialised along functional characteristics. This does not conflict with, but rather 
complement, the NEG prediction that market access and supplier access considerations 
trigger sectoral agglomeration. Duranton and Puga (2001) propose a NEG model in an 
urban setting in which there is a tension between sectoral and functional specialisation 
of cities. The model suggests that falling managerial costs enable firms to fragment the 
production process so that various plants can be set in various locations so as to benefit 
from agglomeration economies that are specific to the production stage o f the various 
plants.
This chapter has assumed that investments are industry-specific, but the result 
can be generalized: if  a worker can choose to invest in general skills or to become more 
specialised, then the presence of other industries in the same location might induce her 
to invest too much in general skills so as to improve her outside options (in other words, 
her prospects on the local labour market); this in turn generates negative externalities 
between industries. To be more specific, and leaving entrepreneurs’ investment in the 
background, assume that i is bi-dimensional: along one dimension, the worker chooses 
what amount of skills she wants to acquire; along the other dimension, she decides how 
specific it is to a given industry. Both are costly. The proximity of another industry B 
might induce the workers of industry A to invest more (a positive externality), but to do 
so in less specific skills (a negative externality). Grossman and Helpman (2002) have a 
general equilibrium setting in which service providers decide how much to invest in 
relation-specific skills, and how much to invest in more standard ones so as to increase 
their outside options and hence their bargaining power.
Consequently, a theory of location based on this insight can give rise to a rich 
set of results. If an agent is to choose between a relation-specific investment and a more 
general one, for instance, dispersion might then increase the joint surplus, as then the 
investing party does not undertake the less valuable investment that would increase her 
outside option instead. We wish to pursue in this direction along the lines of Hart (1995) 
and Grossman and Hart (1986) for future work.
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Co n c l u s io n
This thesis has contributed to the 'New Economic Geography' in several ways. 
On positive issues, it has proposed a relatively tractable model in which agglomeration 
forces stem from vertical linkages between firms. This model encompasses a well- 
known trade-cum-geography model, the so-called 'Footloose Capital' model of Flam 
and Helpman (1987) and Martin and Rogers (1995). This latter model does not display 
self-enforcing agglomeration forces and, as a direct consequence of this, is analytically 
very convenient to work with. As a result, it can be applied to various extensions. 
Conceptually then, its results can be thought of as giving a first approximation to a more 
complete model that allows for agglomeration forces. This more complete model is the 
topic of Chapter 1 of this thesis.
The core of the models of economic geography builds on Dixit and Stiglitz's 
(1977) monopolistic competition framework with trade/transportation costs a-la 
Samuelson (1952). The contribution of Chapter 2 was the completion o f the 
characterisation of the equilibria of the simplest models among these. In this way, it 
filled a gap that even the monograph of Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999) let open. 
This chapter also showed how seemingly different models are deeply isomorphic.
New Economic Geography models are well suited to analyse situations in which 
comparative advantages of nations change endogenously as core parameters vary. 
Indeed, an extension of the vertical-linkages model of Chapter 1 that allows for 
decreasing returns to scale in the background sector shows how decreasing 
trade/transportation costs generate production specialisation and income divergence 
between countries with seemingly similar factor endowments and technology when 
trade/transportation costs are low; and how further trade integration generates 
convergence in the same variables. This result is reminiscent of Krugman and Venables 
(1995) and results from the tension that arises between agglomeration economies and 
cheap labour in less industrialised areas. The model of Chapter 4 then goes on showing 
how falling communication costs help integrate spatially segmented labour markets and, 
doing so, relieve one of the congestion cost associated with an industrial base. As a 
result, the existence of the industrial base is sustainable over a wider range of 
trade/transport costs. Firms co-locate so as to benefit from specialised intermediate
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inputs and outsource the most labour-intensive tasks in the less industrialised countries 
where wages are lower -o r set up a subsidiary to that purpose.
Marshall (1890) and others have pointed to other forces driving firms to locate 
near to each other's. Labour market imperfections are thought to provide one prominent 
such force. It is often argued that thick labour markets provide firms with on average 
better skilled workers and that, in turn, these workers can expect a better match and 
higher wages in denser labour market. The argument often goes as follows (see e.g. 
Hesley and Strange 1990). The firms' skill requirements and the workers' abilities are 
heterogeneous. There are increasing returns at the firm level, so there is finite number of 
firms operating at equilibrium. As a result, there is a tension between the quality of the 
average match (which increases in the number of firms) and the scale economies 
associated with a small number of firms. Crucially, the set of possible skills is supposed 
to be finite and constant. Therefore, large cities relieve that tension and hence generate 
higher per-capita returns. The World is not like a single big city because congestion 
costs (e.g. commuting costs) eventually outweigh the advantages associated with a large 
labour market.
The final chapter of this thesis contributed to this literature by suggesting that 
the pooling of the labour market provided co-location economies of another kind. In 
effect, firms that use workers with similar skills compete for those workers when they 
locate near one another. This way, they can credibly commit to pay workers in 
accordance to their skills. This, in turn, provides the workers the incentives to acquire 
those skills in the first place. Under mild conditions, this benefits both the firms and the 
workers. Interestingly, the lack of market power on the side of the firm may reduce its 
own incentive to make specific investment. The argument is the flip side of the previous 
motive for co-location. Without market power, the firm cannot capture the full rents its 
investment generates. In other words, co-location of firms avoids a hold-up problem on 
the side of the workers but creates such a problem on the firm's side. This implies that 
agglomeration and dispersion forces are of the same nature. This might provide an 
explanation for why some industries are agglomerated whereas others are not, as 
reported in Duranton and Overman (2001), for instance.
This thesis has also dealt with normative issues, a rare exercise in the New 
Economic Geography. For a long time the New Economic Geography has been devoid 
of policy analysis, for its results are 'too stark to be true' (Neary 2001). The welfare
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implications of these models in the simplest form are stark indeed: it is always good for 
you to live in the region or the country in which the whole of industry clusters (see 
Chapter 1). Does this mean that no policy implication can be drawn out of these 
models? As it turns out, one can be optimistic about this issue. On the one hand, it 
appears that simple alterations of the simple models make them 'ambiguous enough to 
be true' (Baldwin et al. 2001).
On the other hand, some policy analysis can be carried out even in the simplest 
setting. If the market spatial allocation of industry cannot be Pareto improved (i.e. the 
size of the pie is optimal), then one may still ask, how does a given policy affect the 
spatial equilibrium? How is this policy chosen at equilibrium (i.e. how is the pie 
shared)? How does the political economy environment interact with the usual economic 
geography determinants of location? This was the approach taken in Chapter 3. There I 
showed how socio-economic differences across various populations within the same 
constituency affect the political equilibrium in a model of electoral competition. The 
result was that more homogenous populations are more attractive to politicians and, as a 
consequence, obtain regional policies that may help maintain an industrial base where 
the market would have decided otherwise.
The way ahead
A lot of potentially interesting topics related to the subject of this thesis have 
been put aside. On the descriptive side, it should be easier to work out extensions now 
that the functioning of traditional New Economic Geography models is better 
understood, and thanks to the recent apparition of analytically simpler and potentially 
richer models (Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse 2000). Various studies have already taken 
a fresh look at such topics as trade policy, regional policy, and tax competition within a 
New Economic Geography framework (see Baldwin et al. 2001 for a comprehensive 
treatment).
From a political economy perspective it would be especially interesting to see 
how institutions affect the spatial landscape. Arguably, political systems in which small 
constituencies have a disproportionate representation -as is often the case in bicameral 
systems- should deliver a more even political landscape. Also, it is often heard that 
industries are more agglomerated in the United States than in Europe (a claim which is 
difficult to confirm or reject on sound empirical basis). Moreover, it is often argued in 
the same breath that the lack of labour mobility in Europe is responsible to this fact. In
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sum, it seems that people vote with their feet in the US and with their pencil in Europe. 
What is the effect o f this on the spatial concentration of industries?
Cities tend to grow and decline with the sectors in which they are specialised. 
Also, a wide range of empirical studies suggests that sectoral protection is biased 
towards shrinking industries.84 How does this affect both the urban landscape and the 
aggregate growth rate of the economy at equilibrium? These issues deserve at least as 
much interest as those tackled in Chapter 3. As a consequence, they will be among the 
objects of further research.
Firms in chapter 4 break up a vertically integrated process in search for cheap 
inputs according to the factor intensity of various stages of production process. But the 
model is silent about the internal organisation of the firm. In particular, does the firm 
outsource the tasks that used to be processed within the same location? Or does it 
merely set up a subsidiary in a foreign country? In other words, does the firm become a 
multi-location firm or does it buy these inputs on the spot market?
Likewise, the current view among economists about what is a firm is that it 
firms are a set of incomplete contracts that provide incentives to contracting agents to 
undertake the best possible actions under unforeseeable contingencies. The location 
choice of the firms of Chapter 5 plays a similar (albeit slightly different) role.
An obvious question follows: how do the location and the 'make vs. buy' 
decisions are related? How do they interact? Is there circular causality o f sorts between 
these two decisional dimensions? Questions of this sort are the object of a budding 
literature body. They are also left for future work.
84 Many explanations are consistent with the fact that protection and subsidies are skewed towards 'sunset 
industries' at the expense o f  booming sectors. Possibly, shrinking industries are better able to capture the 
lobbying rents since they do not fear these rents to be dissipated by further entry.
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